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FIGHTING THE GERMANS. FIGHTING THE GERMS. 
CLEVELAND'S RESPONSE TO THE 
1918-19 SPANISH FLU EPIDEMIC 
 
HAAKON BJOERSHOL 
ABSTRACT 
Epidemics and disease are often overlooked in historical inquiries. This is unfortunate 
for a number of reasons. First of all, people's beliefs about what causes disease, as well 
as their ideas about how to respond to disease, are intrinsically linked to culture, 
philosophical convictions, and identity. Secondly, the ways a society respond to disease 
and epidemics largely reflect existing ideologies, values, social structures, and various 
needs and interests. In short, medical history is a tremendously helpful lens for studying 
political, economic, social, and ideological aspects of cultures and societies.  
This thesis looks at Cleveland's response to the 1918-19 Spanish Influenza epidemic. 
Relying heavily on newspaper accounts and various annual reports, the study views the 
epidemic crisis from a public health perspective, and explores the multiple factors that 
influenced the city's response. Acutely aware of the roles played by historical 
precedents, the thesis delves deeply into Cleveland's history of health care and finds a 
rich tradition of public health responses in the city. Many of these were utilized during 
the Spanish Flu crisis. Most importantly, the city relied greatly on Progressive traditions 
of education and cooperation. It also benefitted from a highly educated and well 
organized health department. Equally aware of the importance of historical context, the 
iv 
 
thesis looks at life in Cleveland in 1918. An extraordinary event in its own right, the 
deadly flu epidemic arrived in the U.S. and Cleveland during even more extraordinary 
times. Most crucially, in 1917, the United States became embroiled in what is now 
known as the First World War. This changed life in the U.S. and Cleveland almost 
beyond comprehension. The war effort took on such an important role that practically all 
elements and facets of society were affected by it. Public health was not an exception. 
This thesis explores many of the numerous ways that the Great War affected Cleveland's 
response to the Spanish Flu. Crucially, the war not only helped spread the disease, but 
also provided health professionals in Cleveland with a number of weapons and tools to 
fight the epidemic with.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  Avoid crowds, coughs and cowards,  
   but fear neither germs nor Germans!
1
 
 
    - Advertisement in Cleveland Plain Dealer. 
 
     It is said that when one person dies it is a tragedy, but when thousands die it is 
statistics. The history of the 1918-19 influenza pandemic encapsulates both these 
elements. Hidden within the horrifying numbers and statistics of one of the deadliest 
events in history are thousands upon thousands of personal and social tragedies as both 
young and old succumbed to the disease. For some,  the contrast between happiness and 
despair was particularly strong. Young Mary Carroll, for instance, travelled from her 
home in Indiana to Bucyrus, Ohio, to marry her sweetheart Edwards Searls. Whatever 
the couple's hopes and dreams about the future were, it all came tumbling down in an 
instant. Before the two even made it to the altar, any chance of marital bliss was 
suddenly and brutally extinguished as nineteen year old Edward fell ill with influenza. 
He died shortly thereafter. Neither youthful strength nor the prayers of his fiancée could 
                                                 
1
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 10, 1918, Cleveland Public Library, Research Databases, Plain Dealer 
Historical (1845-1991), http://www.cpl.org/Research/ResearchDatabases.aspx. 
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save him. Left behind, Mary fell ill with the same disease. The records do not say 
whether she lived or died. Even if she lived, her life was forever changed by the death of 
her original fiancé.
2
  Mary and Edward were not the only ones to experience intense pain 
and the utter destruction of marital- and family life. Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Rodgers 
from Washington, Pennsylvania, were found "[c]lasped in each other's arms, with the 
agony of their death struggle plainly pictured in their faces."
3
 A man in Lowellville, near 
Youngstown, Ohio, was struck harder than most, losing twelve close relatives to the 
epidemic. To add to his misery, the man was prevented from attending any of their 
funerals because of quarantine regulations.
4
  
     Other kinds of tragedies were also reported. For instance, many people blamed 
influenza for causing all sorts of violent insanity. Newspapers reported that a woman 
from Wallington, Connecticut, had committed brutal acts of insanity because of the 
emotional distress caused by losing her spouse: "Crazed by the death of her husband 
with influenza, Mrs. Mary Bustai,... murdered two of her small children, slashed the 
throat of a third and probably fatally wounded herself."
5
 Samuel T. Zick from Detroit 
died from the terrible internal injuries he sustained as he, "delirious from influenza and 
pneumonia", jumped from the third floor of the hospital he was in.
6
 Even more terribly, 
Mrs. Masnagetti of Uhrichsville, Ohio, drowned herself and her infant son in a hideous 
pool of water at the American Sewer Pipe works close to her home. Her husband found 
the two of them, his dead son clasped tightly against the mother's chest. The article ends 
                                                 
2
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 6, 1918. 
3
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 26, 1918. 
4
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 24, 1918. 
5
 Cleveland News, Oct. 26, 1918 
6
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 28, 1918. 
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with the simple statement that "[i]llness with influenza is believed to have affected her 
reason."
7
 Others, perhaps not insane but certainly believed to be affected by the 
epidemic, chose to take their own lives rather than succumbing to the disease. Thomas 
L. Fox of Cleveland, for instance, shot himself while hospitalized with the flu.
8
 A 
Cincinnati business man ended his life in much the same way but with much more 
drama. After a night out with his wife, and still in evening attire, 32 year old Lee B. Ault 
killed himself by placing a gun in his mouth and pulling the trigger. The best suggestion 
that his friends could come up with to explain Mr. Ault's actions was that "he was 
depressed because he feared he would become a victim of influenza."
9
 Whether the 
Spanish Influenza caused insanity, depression or suicides or not, people certainly found 
it a likely culprit to blame.   
     The Spanish Influenza was indisputably to blame for some of the most heart 
wrenching tragedies of  1918-19. The unspeakable sadness of deathly ill children and 
children orphaned by the flu is aptly described in numerous newspaper articles. Many of 
these types of stories also took place in Cleveland. The following account about two 
young sisters typifies the dreadful experiences faced by untold children and their 
families: "There are 30 little white beds in the Louise Day Nursery,... Eighteen were 
occupied Tuesday by babies and children ill with flu. The remaining beds will be filled 
by Tuesday night with other victims. Julia Haina, 3, and her baby sister, Irene, occupy 
adjoining cots. Neither is expected to live. Other patients are seriously ill."
10
 The two 
                                                 
7
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec 14, 1918. 
8
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 25, 1918. 
9
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 24, 1918. 
10
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 22, 1918. 
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sisters were taken to the day nursery after the undertaker who came to pick up their dead 
mother recognized that the little girls were suffering from the same disease that had just 
killed their parent.
11
 Many flu-orphans survived the disease itself, but still faced 
tremendous sadness, uncertainty and challenges. When George and Anna Koprionack 
died of the flu within a three day time span, the care of their children John, Michael and 
Mary fell to one of the children's uncles. When the uncle also fell ill to the disease, the 
children - all under the age of 8 - joined the list of the many orphans who needed a new 
home.
12
 By early 1919, the number of orphans in Cleveland had risen by about 4,000 as 
compared to the previous year. Most of these had been orphaned by the flu.
13
 When 
contemplating the number of children who lost just one parent, or the number of families 
who lost their main bread winners, the social impact in Cleveland alone must have been 
widespread and with long-lasting effects.  
      It is clear that even for many of those who did not succumb to the disease, the flu 
epidemic stood out as an extraordinary and very dramatic experience. Mr. John W. 
Hencke of Cleveland lived through a close brush with death as Spanish Flu struck him 
with tremendous force. After several days of being bed-ridden and with high fever, Mr. 
Hencke started to feel better. Then, as he later recalled to the Cleveland Press, his heart 
suddenly seemed to stop beating, prompting him to stoically tell his wife: "I guess I'm 
going,... Good-by." Describing the unusual experience, Mr. Hencke told the paper that 
"[t]here was a feeling that my soul was leaving my body. It seemed to float away from 
me in a sort of zigzag fashion." His life was allegedly saved by the quick actions of his 
                                                 
11
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 22, 1918. 
12
 Cleveland News, Nov. 19, 1918. 
13
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 2, 1919. 
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wife who responded to the crisis by forcing a strong heart stimulant down her husband's 
throat. Mr. Hencke completed his tale by simply stating: "So now I'm back on the job."
14
 
It is safe to say that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hencke forgot about the Spanish Flu very 
easily. The epidemic must have been equally unforgettable for others who fell 
desperately ill, and for the number of friends and relatives who had to help dig graves 
for their dearly departed  when Cleveland's cemetery personnel became overloaded by 
the number of dead who were piling up and awaiting burial.
15
 
     People were also affected by the many measures taken by the City of Cleveland in 
order to combat the dreaded disease. Whether it was dealing with flu masks, the open 
windows on the street cars, the closed schools and churches, the closing of theaters and 
other forms of entertainment, or the ban on a number of football games, the people of 
Cleveland individually and collectively experienced what it was like to combat a wildly 
communicable disease that had no known cure.
16
 Cleveland was not a passive victim of 
Spanish Influenza. In fact, the city's leaders and its populace engaged in a wide variety 
of actions when fighting the flu. This study examines the nature of their response. I have 
chosen to approach the topic by focusing on two distinct elements. One part of the study 
looks at the many different responses that the City of Cleveland, particularly its health 
commissioner and Department of Health, undertook during the epidemic. The second 
part explores some of the main factors that influenced the city's responses. I posit that 
three factors uniquely shaped Cleveland's fight against Spanish Flu. Firstly, the city's 
                                                 
14
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 29, 1918. 
15
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 24, 1918. 
16
 Cleveland News, Oct. 12, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; Oct. 16, 1918; Oct. 21, 1918; Oct. 25, 1918; Cleveland 
Plain Dealer, Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 20, 1918; Cleveland Press, Oct. 5, 1918; Oct. 11, 1918; Oct. 15, 1918; 
Oct. 21, 1918;  
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history and traditions greatly affected the response. In this category I include the city's 
progressive ideals and traditions, the development of highly organized and engaged 
private charitable organizations, the professionalization of the health department, the 
American cultural values of civic duty and obligations, and previous experiences with 
epidemic disease. I argue that by the time Spanish Flu arrived, the City of Cleveland had 
already established a long tradition of broad, societal cooperation in matters of public 
health, and had also developed a system of norms, values and ideals that promoted civic 
duty, voluntarism, and cooperation. Secondly, Cleveland response to the 1918-19 flu 
epidemic was largely affected by the development of the epidemic itself. Measures were 
implemented, changed, and abandoned depending on the spread and severity of the 
disease. Finally, Cleveland's fight against the epidemic was tremendously influenced by 
the historical context, specifically by the Great War. The war effort was by far the most 
important part of life in both the United States and Cleveland in 1918. In fact, the Great 
War was such a defining and essential aspect of 1918 life that Cleveland's fight against 
Spanish Flu cannot in any way be studied, interpreted or understood separate from the 
world war context. The war on Germans quite simply overshadowed the war on germs. 
In the process, the Great War , influenced,  and even dictated parts of the battle against 
influenza. When discussing the impact of the world war on the flu fight, I focus 
specifically on wartime obsession with patriotism, loyalty, sacrifice, cooperation, 
propaganda, persuasion, and coercion. I also look at the ways in which war time 
organization and mobilization helped Cleveland deal with the epidemic. The Red Cross 
is a particularly great example of such activity, as the organization had been greatly 
expanded during the war, and also infused with a tremendous degree of patriotic fervor 
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and voluntary cooperation. I also look at how the war effort re-defined what parts of  
society and life were essential and which ones were not. The latter point greatly 
influenced what public health measures were acceptable and not.  
      While exploring these factors and describing the various measures that Cleveland 
undertook during the epidemic, I  also discuss a number of various themes and concepts. 
Greatly inspired by  World War I  historians Christopher Capozzola and David M. 
Kennedy, I ponder the nature of American voluntarism, civic duty, and cooperation.
17
 I 
also base my study on the concept that all public health measures must be understood as 
extremely complex matters that are influenced by several various elements. For 
example, public health decisions must be seen in the light of conflicting interests. 
Although it is fundamentally a matter of medicine and public health, a public health 
measure is just as essentially a political decision. And, as we know, political decisions 
are always influenced by various factors, including other political needs, desires or 
aspirations, or by economic, cultural, social, religious, ideological, philosophical, and 
technological ones. A good, responsible leader must consider the various conflicts of 
interest that exist in a society, and make a educated, balanced, and well considered 
decision. Such a leader, or leaders, should consider the multiple consequences of their 
actions, weigh the different needs and interests of the populace with the needs and 
necessities of the situation, and make decisions accordingly. In short, decision-making is 
a balancing act in which some needs or desires are placed before others. This study 
                                                 
17
 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Want You. World War I and the Making of the Modern American 
Citizen (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008); David M. Kennedy, Over Here. The First World 
War and American Society, 25th Anniversary Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, [1980] 
2004). 
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shows that when responding to the Spanish Influenza epidemic, the city's leaders clearly 
considered various needs and necessities when making decisions.  
     I have opted to leave  a number of factors that influenced Cleveland's response to the 
Spanish Flu out of the main part of this study. This does not mean that these elements 
were not important. It is instead a reflection of my belief that albeit important, they were 
not as instrumental or fundamental as the other factors that I have explored. The most 
poignant example of this is Cleveland's status as an immigrant city. The immigrant 
nature of Cleveland surely influenced the city's life and response. However, primarily 
because of the Great War and the ways U.S. leaders and people used the war to force 
universal patriotism, Americanism and notions of loyalty, sacrifice and civic duty 
throughout society, it appears that the immigrant nature of the city mattered less than it 
otherwise would have. Again, the war did not remove the immigrant factor entirely, but 
it made it matter less in regards to the Spanish Flu fight. Still, because first and second 
generation immigrants made up a significant part of Cleveland's population, I have 
decided to cover the topic briefly in order to help with the overall context. Or, as the 
Protestant organization called the Federated Churches of Cleveland stated in 1917, "[t]o 
understand Cleveland we must understand its people."
18
    
     Between 1900 and 1915, about fifteen million immigrants entered the United States, 
inevitably affecting the cultural, social, religious, political, and economic structure of 
                                                 
18
 David E. Green, The City and Its People; a Brief Statement of the Character and Distribution of the 
Population of Cleveland (Cleveland, OH: Federated Churches of Cleveland, 1917), Oberlin College, 
Storage, Call Number 312.771 C5999G. 
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society.
19
 Cleveland welcomed a great portion of the newcomers. At the turn of the 
century, the city had already been experiencing tremendous growth for a good forty 
years, greatly helped by the expansion of industry during and following the U.S. Civil 
War. The city was also already the home of numerous first- and second generation 
immigrants. In fact, as early as in 1900, more than seventy-five percent of Cleveland's 
residents were either foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born parent. The explosive 
population growth did not end with the turn of the century, nor did the immigrant nature 
of the residents. Between 1900 and 1920, the city's population more than doubled, going 
from about 380,000 to just under 800,000. And although the ratio of the foreign element 
dropped slightly to encompass about sixty-nine percent of the total population in 1920, 
the number of residents with immigrant background or parent(s) had increased from just 
under 290,000 in 1900 to around 550,000.
 20
 Many of these immigrants hailed from 
Eastern and Southern Europe, adding new elements to the city's already wide range of 
ethnic backgrounds. In 1920, the size and rich variety of the immigrant population was 
so great that it allowed for the local publication of twenty-one foreign-language 
newspapers in twelve different languages.
21
 Not surprisingly, the vast and varied 
immigrant presence in the city presented a number of challenges for the city and its 
officials. From a political point of view, immigrants often became voters. This fact made 
it necessary for elected officials to try to attract the support of immigrant groups. 
                                                 
19
 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza - The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (New York, 
NY: Penguin Books, 2004), 205. 
20
 City of Cleveland, Ohio, Division of Health, Statistical Records, 1916-1924 (Cleveland, OH, City of 
Cleveland, Division of Health, 1925), 8, 10, Case Western Reserve University, Digital Content 1875-
1930, Annual Reports of Public Health Collection, Cleveland, Ohio, 1875-1930, accessed April 14, 2012,  
http:/digitalcase.case.edu:9000/fedora/get/ksl:hslanncleann32.pdf 
21
 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 8 (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland 
Hospital Council, 1920), 672, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 8.  
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Sometimes this involved dealing with and gaining the support of strong ethnic or 
religious community leaders.
22
 Cultural challenges were probably even more dire and 
noticeable. For instance, a sizeable number of people were transforming from a rural 
background in the Old World to an urban, industrial life in Cleveland.
23
 These 
newcomers had to learn not only how to live in a foreign country, deal with a foreign 
language, and learn new types of jobs. They also had to simply learn how to live in an 
urban setting. Although the immigrants certainly faced the greatest trials, their presence 
must have also been a tremendous challenge for city officials and community leaders, 
especially when attempting to govern and organize a city with multiple languages, 
cultural traditions, values and customs. In short, immigrants had to learn how to live and 
function in America and in Cleveland, and native-born Clevelanders had to learn to live 
and function with them.  
     Some scholars argue that many immigrants adapted to their new surroundings 
brilliantly. According to this view, the newcomers were not only "Americanized" when 
coming to the U.S., they also changed America by bringing their own unique ideas, 
mores, values, beliefs, traditions and resourcefulness.
24
 Although this idea seems quite 
clear and maybe even inevitable today, it was not the main belief, and certainly not the 
established ideal in the early twentieth century U.S. For many Americans, the governing 
ideal in regards to immigrants was Americanization. Newcomers should adjust and 
                                                 
22
 For further information  on the immigrant factor in local politics in Cleveland, see Kenneth Finegold, 
Experts and Politicians. Reform Challenges to Machine Politics in New York, Cleveland, and Chicago 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), chapters 6-8.   
23
 See Josef J. Barton, Peasants and Strangers. Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an American City, 
1890-1950. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
24
See for instance Alan M. Kraut, The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880-1921 
(Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson Inc., 1982). 
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adapt to their new life in America as quickly and as thoroughly as possible. Viewing 
immigrants through a lens of cultural superiority, proponents of Americanization 
believed that immigrants had to learn the civic duties of Americans, as well as the 
language, customs, values and expected behavior. One way to do this was to declare 
certain forms of voluntarism and cooperation as good, and others as unacceptable. In 
Cleveland, this was for instance done by encouraging immigrants to join religious and 
philanthropic organizations such as the Red Cross while discouraging them from 
associating with labor union activities.
25
 However, the main force for Americanization 
was undoubtedly the public schools, where immigrant children were taught both to 
speak English and what it meant to be American. 
     Educating the immigrants was also a big part of the city's public health tactics. 
Cleveland reformers and health officials held up the foreign-born population's woeful 
lack of education, its general inability to speak English, and its primitive ideas about 
medicine and health care as tremendous challenges for Cleveland when confronting 
issues of public health.
26
 Cleveland health officials saw the immigrants' propensity for 
relying on "quack doctors" and miraculous concoctions as big problems.
27
 The issue was 
highlighted by the enormous number of advertisements for such physicians and drugs in 
newspapers, particularly in the foreign press.
28
 These ads escaped the Pure Food and 
Drug Act of 1906 by exploiting a legislative loophole. The law stated that medicines 
                                                 
25
David C. Hammack, "Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation: Central Europeans in Cleveland, 1850-1930," 
in Identity, Conflict, & Cooperation. Central Europeans in Cleveland, 1850-1930, eds. David C. 
Hammack, Diane L. Grabowski and John J. Grabowski (Cleveland, OH: The Western Reserve Historical 
Society, 2002), 12-44.  
26
 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 8, 672. 
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Ibid., 672, 675.  
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could not have fraudulent information on their labels. Advertisements, on the other 
hand, were fair game for any type of phenomenal claim.
29
 The same went for doctors. In 
a world of creative self-promotion, one physicians even had the chutzpah to claim that 
he was "[f]ormerly doctor to the Czar."
30
 The situation was quite extraordinary, and the 
city's health officials saw it as a legitimate danger to the health and health care of 
society. A group referring to themselves as "Firms Interested In The Welfare Of the 
Working People" went as far as holding quack doctors and miracle drugs largely 
responsible for the spread of venereal disease, and consequently a detriment to both 
society.
31
 Immigrants and their gullible and primitive ways were therefore seen as a 
challenge as well as a potential danger to public health. It did not help that many 
immigrants hailed from cultures and traditions where hospitals were seen as "places 
where you go to die."
32
 Today it is well known that this tradition generally can be traced 
back to Medieval customs, practices and beliefs that became engrained in society and 
passed down through the generations.
33
 However, to many Old Stock Clevelanders in 
the early twentieth century, the immigrants' reluctance to visit hospitals was seen simply 
as proof of ignorance.
34
 Some of the Old Stock took a more generous view and, rather 
than simply criticizing the immigrants, sought to remedy the situation. The 1920 
Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey thoroughly explored the issue and suggested that 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., 675. 
30
 Ibid., 674. 
31
 Cleveland Citizen, Dec. 14, 1918. 
32
 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10 (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland 
Hospital Council, 1920), 850, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 10. 
33
 For great descriptions and discussions on earlier European views on hospitals and hospital care, see 
Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., Cultures of Plague: Medical Thinking at the End of the Renaissance (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2010) ; Mary Lindemann, Health & Healing in Eighteenth Century 
Germany (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Mary Lindemann, Medicine and 
Society in Early Modern Europe, New Approaches to European History (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
34
 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 10, 850. 
13 
 
hospitals should make special efforts to help immigrants who spoke little or no English, 
and to help them understand better what was going on. Too many people experienced 
finding themselves in a hospital without even knowing their official diagnosis, 
prognosis, or what to expect of treatment. One solution to this problem was to hire 
professional interpreters for the hospitals, especially in cases where there were no 
English-speaking friends or relatives to help communicate important or reassuring 
information.
35
 The Western Reserve University provided a different kind of solution for 
dealing with immigrants and for educating them in matters of health. As was common in 
many U.S. cities at the time, Cleveland had a number of nurses who visited homes in 
order to both help treat and educate the sick and their families. In order to better equip 
these nurses to deal with an ethnically diverse population, the University invited 
Professor Henry G. Bourne to come and teach about "the Traditions and Ideals of the 
Foreign population of Cleveland." Representatives from different ethnic- and religious 
groups were also invited to help teach the nurses how to best communicate with the 
immigrants and their communities.
36
 The challenges were there, and the city tried to 
address them. Another tried and true tactic was to organize various community centers 
to help promote civic education of the city's immigrants.
37
 
     Issues of health care and education were not the only challenges Cleveland faced 
when dealing with the immigrant part of the population. The ethnic, cultural and 
religious conflicts inherent in an immigrant city can easily be imagined. Old World 
                                                 
35
 Ibid., 851-4. 
36
 Eleanor Farnham, Pioneering in Public Health Nursing Education: The History of the University Public 
Health Nursing District, 1917-1962 (Cleveland, OH: Press of Western Reserve University, 1964), 7. 
37
 Finegold, Experts and Politicians, 25. 
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animosities continuing in the U.S., intra-group conflicts, labor conflicts, conflicts 
between immigrants and the Old Stock, and religious disagreements inevitably existed in 
Cleveland during the early twentieth century.
38
  However, immigrants were not the only 
newcomers to Cleveland who forced both the residents and leaders of the city to adapt to 
new demographic, economic, social and cultural realities. For many white residents of 
Cleveland - immigrant and Old Stock alike - the Great Migration of African Americans 
presented a reality that many would much rather have been without. Anti-immigrant 
sentiment certainly existed throughout parts of the city's population. Racist sentiments 
towards blacks were more or less universal. With almost 30,000 African Americans 
arriving in Cleveland between 1900 and 1920 - especially from 1916 and onwards - the 
"Negro" population of the city grew by an incredible 475 percent.
39
 Although blacks still 
made up only around four percent of Cleveland's residents, their arrival inevitably 
increased racial tensions. In addition to all these challenges, on the eve of the Spanish 
Influenza outbreak Cleveland and Clevelanders were also contending with women's 
suffrage issues, matters regarding Prohibition and myriad other challenges associated 
with rapid urbanization and an incredibly culturally and ethnically diverse population. 
Even so, the main factor of 1918 - by an almost incomprehensible amount - was the 
Great War.  
                                                 
38
 One of the most prevalent conflicts to affect numerous immigrant groups in Cleveland revolved around 
matters of faith and religion. The Catholic Church in particular faced multiple issues, often rising from the 
fact that different ethnic groups had unique traditions of worship. In Cleveland, the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church was dominated by the Irish, giving the diocese a distinct Irish Catholic character. Many 
of the other immigrant groups resented the Irish dominance and sought permission to worship in their own 
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     Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu was clearly influenced by numerous factors. 
This study looks at a number of specific measures, and explores the origins and 
explanations for these responses. Chapter II looks at the history of the city, including 
previous experiences with epidemic disease, the professionalization of the health 
department, and how progressive ideals of education, voluntarism, civic duty and 
cooperation came to be a big part of the city's public health system. Chapter III explores 
the arrival and progression of Spanish Flu in Cleveland and discusses many of the 
various forms of reactions and measures the city responded with. The concepts of 
education and cooperation are central in this discussion. Chapter IV deals with the Great 
War and how this extraordinary historical context affected Cleveland's fight against 
deadly influenza. This chapter raises further questions about the nature of war time and 
crisis voluntarism. Conclusively, I argue that Cleveland's fight against Spanish Flu was 
largely characterized by a tremendous degree of both voluntary and coerced cooperation. 
This cooperation had its roots not only in historical precedents and Cleveland traditions, 
but also in the patriotic whirlwind of world war era America. 
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CHAPTER II 
A HISTORY OF FIGHTING 
[E]fforts to meet the epidemic must also be understood in light of other factors 
which  generally describe the relationship of disease and society. Local politics, 
cultural and medical understanding of epidemic in general and legislation all 
influenced the nature of the medical and public response.
40
  
 
     Rome was not built in a day. Neither was Cleveland. Many of the various factors and 
elements that shaped and affected the city's battle with Spanish Flu developed through 
years of experience and the inevitable progression of time and society. Any moment of 
history, such as the Spanish Influenza epidemic, is simply that; a moment in history. As 
such, it is not distinct or separate from the rest of history nor from the multiple 
environmental, cultural, economic, social, religious, ideological, political, and other 
human factors that make up history, the present, and the past. Studying the years leading 
up to the outbreak of Spanish Flu in the United States and Cleveland therefore allows us 
to better understand why people reacted the way they did, whether it was the city's 
health commissioner, religious figures, private organizations, companies, or regular 
residents. The history and people of Cleveland changed and developed continuously for 
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years, as any group of human beings invariably does. The moment in time that was the 
Spanish Influenza epidemic is simply a particular point on that long line of human life 
and experience in the city. To better understand this historical moment, we look even 
further into the past.      
     When the Spanish Influenza arrived on the United States' East Coast, it quickly 
caused widespread illness and death. Starting in military bases and port cities, the 
disease spread swiftly throughout the nation, affecting both the military and the civilian 
population heavily. By the time its fury was finally spent, the Spanish flu had made 
more than twenty-five percent of the U.S. population sick and killed at least 550,000 
American men, women and children.
41
 Infinitely more sinister than a seasonal 
inconvenience, the 1918-19 flu epidemic became the single greatest killer of American 
men and women since the U.S. Civil War. And, horrifically, whereas the Civil War 
needed five grueling years to exert its deadly toll, the Spanish Flu did most of its 
damage in less than a year.
42
 In fact, according to historian Alfred W. Crosby, "[n]othing 
else - no infection, no war, no famine - has ever killed so many in as short a period."
43
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The Spanish Flu was truly a deadly moment in U.S. history. Granting this fact, some 
writers have gone too far in their attempts at establishing the lethal nature and thus 
importance of the epidemic. With a strong penchant for the dramatic, John. M. Barry 
conjures up the image of history's ultimate pathological demon, stating that "'[Spanish 
i]nfluenza killed more people [globally] in a year than the Black Death of the Middle 
Ages killed in a century.
44
 This comparison is problematic. The Spanish Flu was no 
doubt a terrible affair, but no matter how many people it killed and how terrifying the 
Spanish Influenza epidemic must have been for an untold number of people, it cannot 
very well be compared to the tremendous horrors and profound social impact of the 
Black Death. In an otherwise very intriguing, thoroughly researched and well written 
book, Barry simply goes too far trying to make Spanish Flu sound like a greater scourge 
than it in fact was. First of all, when it comes to comparing the epidemic to the Black 
Death, it is quite impossible to make specific and certain claims about Medieval 
mortality numbers. We simply cannot know how many people the legendary pestilence 
killed. Secondly, a long period of incredible population growth was clearly a big reason 
for the large number of deaths during the 1918-19 epidemic. For instance, the 1918 U.S. 
population of some 103 million residents clearly dwarfed the 1860 population of around 
31 million, making even the comparison with the Civil War seem somehow unfair.
45
 
The number of people who died from Spanish Flu may have been numerically similar to 
the numbers attributed to the Civil War. However, in terms of lethality and social 
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impact, numbers are not as important as ratios. And it is clear that the number of people 
who died because of the Civil War was a much larger part of the total U.S. population 
than those who died from Spanish Flu. The example of the Black Death highlights this 
point even further. Whereas the Medieval scourge is generally considered to have wiped 
out anywhere from a quarter to half of the population in large areas of Europe - not to 
mention a great number of people in Asia and the Middle East - the Spanish Flu is 
estimated to have killed only about two and a half percent of infected Americans.
46
 
Considering that these two and a half percent came from the estimated twenty-five 
percent who fell ill, the overall impact of Spanish Flu on the U.S. population in terms of 
percentages was actually remarkably small.
47
 Therefore, to state that the Spanish Flu 
was somehow more deadly or affected societies more than a number of other diseases is 
simply not true. Smallpox, for instance, left a much more devastating imprint on the 
American continent than Spanish Flu ever did.
48
 Illnesses like yellow fever, cholera, 
measles and tuberculosis also decimated European and American populations for years 
and years. The claim that Spanish Influenza was deadlier than any of these scourges 
becomes particularly unsupportable when compared to the impact of European diseases 
on the Native American population following Columbus's arrival.
49
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     All this is not to say that Spanish Flu was not a deadly and devastating epidemic. 
After all, it killed so many Americans that 1918 became the only year in the twentieth 
century when the U.S. population shrank. At no other time in the entire century did the 
annual growth rate drop below 730,000. In every year between 1901 and 1930, the 
population grew by at least 1.3 million, except in 1918. That year, the overall number of 
Americans shrank by some 60,000.
50
 Furthermore, estimates suggest that even with its 
low death ratios, the epidemic still took more American lives in one year than died in 
battle in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War combined.
51
 
Some historians have also argued, at times very convincingly, that the political, 
economic, social, and psychological impact of the epidemic was significant.
52
 The 
discussion about lethality and impact of epidemics is therefore not for the sake of 
discounting Spanish Influenza. Instead, it is simply a reminder that although the flu 
epidemic was deadly and impactful, it was simply not as lethal or influential as many 
other scourges. If anything, the horrors of the Spanish Flu remind us how truly horrific 
the other epidemics must have been. 
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"Grippe" - It's Not So Bad    
     It is important to remember that although Spanish Influenza was not as deadly as a 
number of other diseases, it was far more deadly than regular flu. Less bloodthirsty and 
destructive than Black Death and smallpox, the Spanish Flu was still a monster. Regular 
flu, on the other hand, was not. With Spanish Flu still a thing of the future, it is not 
surprising that early twentieth-century Americans and Clevelanders did not think of 
influenza as a horrific scourge. They certainly did not think of the illness in the same 
terms as smallpox, plague, cholera, typhoid fever, or tuberculosis. Experience and 
history had made it so. First and foremost, people in both Europe and the U.S. had 
known and experienced flu - or "grippe" - for generations. The exact origin of the 
disease is not known, but some scholars argue that descriptions of flu-like epidemics go 
as far back as to the ancient Greeks.
53
 The term 'influenza' is not quite as old. Even so, 
by 1918 it had already been used in Europe and the U.S. for centuries. Derived from 
Italian, the word itself simply means "influence", apparently referring to early beliefs 
that people who suffered from the disease were influenced by celestial bodies or unseen 
forces. The French word "grippe" was another centuries-old word used to describe the 
same type, or types, of disease. With its easy-to-understand and rather fetching meaning, 
"grippe" became a highly popular nickname for influenza in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth century Cleveland. Not at all surprisingly, the German "shafhosten" and 
"shafkrankheit" (translated as "sheep cough" and "sheep disease") did not enjoy the 
same success.
54
 The terms that Americans used to describe the disease originated in 
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Europe. However, intimate knowledge of influenza, or "grippe", was certainly not 
limited to the Old World. The U.S. experienced several rounds of the disease prior to the 
Spanish Flu, as did Cleveland. The most virulent bout arrived in the city around 
Christmas, 1889 and lasted into January of 1890. Sometimes referred to as the Russian 
Influenza, this short-lived epidemic affected about 20,000, or 7.5 percent, of Cleveland's 
inhabitants. The epidemic strongly limited the productivity of factories, offices and 
schools while it lasted. Even so, relatively few people - less than 100 - actually died as a 
result of it. In addition to this, doctors believed that most of the people who died had 
succumbed to secondary illnesses and complications caused by influenza rather than by 
flu itself.
55
 With its relatively light impact, the disease was something to respect mainly 
because of its role in slowing down society. In this same  manner, it was really only to 
be feared for its role in causing worse diseases.
56
 In 1889-90, the fear and concern was 
apparently not very large in Cleveland. Far from scared, some residents even considered 
the flu to be more like a barrel of fun than a cause for worry, especially when compared 
to pneumonia and cholera. An article in a local newspaper declared influenza to be "An 
Annoying and Amusing Disease" that caused hilarious scenes of people "sneezing their 
noses off."
57
 Even among the less humorously inclined residents, influenza was hardly a 
disease that inspired trepidation or concern.  
     Despite its limited impact in terms of fatalities and immediate social impact, 
Cleveland's experience with the Russian Influenza is still important for a number of 
reasons. Most notably, the epidemic set a number of precedents for Cleveland's 
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subsequent responses to flu. For starters, it was around this time that Clevelanders began 
using the term "grippe" for the illness. They even shortened it to the simpler and more 
American 'grip'. Why they chose to adopt the French term is not clear, but it may have 
been thanks to the knee-jerk instinct of newspapers to create catchy plays on words, 
such as "The Influenza Still Holds Europe in Its Grip" and "Influenza Continue[s] to 
Strengthen Its Grip Throughout the Country".
58
 Whatever the reason, "grippe" and 
"grip" provided people with a less official and more whimsical way to describe a disease 
that was often seen as maybe more annoying than dangerous. Beyond simple terms, the 
1889-90 epidemic also set a precedent in tying more virulent flu epidemics to a location 
in Europe, and in recognizing certain versions of flu as more serious than others.
59
 
Perhaps more importantly, the epidemic set the precedent of viewing influenza as 
dangerous mainly for its role in weakening the body and causing more serious 
infections. It also reminded the medical field that even in the midst of tremendous 
technological and medical developments and breakthroughs there were still no known 
ways to either prevent or cure the malady. This fact inspired a series of both scientific 
and less scientific but tremendously creative ideas for treatment.
60
 Among the less 
scientific ideas, the therapeutic anti-flu powers of strong laxatives or cinnamon-infused 
toothpicks rank high.
61
 Among the more scientific approaches, a notable change in belief 
occurred as medical experts began to embrace more and more the germ theory of disease 
and applied this to influenza. The 1889 belief that "grippe" was impossible to prevent 
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because it spread through atmospheric changes and clearly "independent of personal 
communication" made way for a more optimistic approach that saw prevention as 
possible in parts because of the fact that flu spread through personal communication.
 62
 
A cure was still unknown, but doctors and scientists were hopeful. Optimism grew 
exponentially following the 1892 discovery of the "influenza bacillus" by German 
doctor Richard Pfeiffer. Riding on a wave of successful vaccine discoveries, many 
doctors believed that it would only be a matter of time before an effective vaccine for 
influenza would also be developed.
63
 Despite these high hopes, by 1918, a working 
vaccine had still not been found. Even so, vaccination remained a topic of discussion 
throughout the epidemic and the quest for a functioning vaccine remained a top priority 
among a number of leading physicians.
 64
 Also, vaccination was not the only medical 
advice that grew out of the 1889-90 epidemic. A number of other ideas and actions 
regarding influenza prevention and treatment were also passed on. For instance, from the 
Russian Influenza and all the way through the Spanish Flu, health professionals in 
Cleveland believed that cold weather somehow alleviated the scourge.
65
 The flu mask 
was also introduced.
66
 These beliefs and practices, along with other ideas about the 
nature and treatment of "grippe," heavily influenced the types of advice and actions that 
the city's health commissioner used during the crisis of 1918.  
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     Influenza visited Cleveland on several more occasions between 1889 and 1918 but 
never caused tremendous devastation.
67
 The far deadlier 1918 version of the flu was 
simply not your typical "grippe", as the U.S. and Cleveland would soon discover. 
Disguised as annoying but hardly dangerous flu, the Spanish version quickly proved 
monstrous. The city of Philadelphia experienced one of the most horrifying bouts of the 
disease, with probably more than half a million residents falling ill. At the height of the 
epidemic, more than 4,500 of the city's 2 million residents died from flu-related illness 
in a single week. Over a four week period, more than 11,500 perished, causing the city 
to even run out of caskets. The much higher than usual number of dead also taxed the 
city's ability to bury the bodies. Before all was said and done, Philadelphia had had to 
resort to burying a number of people without caskets, and had even been forced to dig 
mass graves to dispose of the bodies of flu victims.
68
Although Philadelphia saw some of 
the worst devastation, it was not alone in experiencing the tremendous power of the 
Spanish Flu. In fact, numerous rich and vivid accounts describe the horrendous impact 
of the disease on both individuals and society in general.
69
 A doctor at Fort Devens, 
thirty miles west of Boston, witnessed the quick and awful death of hundreds of young 
men to "the most vicious type of [p]neumonia that has ever been seen." The doctor 
lamented the terrible conditions in the military base in a letter, stating that "[i]t is 
horrible. One can stand to see one, two, or twenty men die, but to see these poor devils 
dropping like flies gets on your nerves. We have been averaging about 100 deaths a day, 
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and still keeping it up."
70
 Former president of the American Medical Association, 
Colonel Dr. Victor C. Vaughan, also described his experience at Fort Devens, reporting 
that "the dead bodies are stacked about the morgue like cord wood." Horribly impressed 
by the gruesome realities at Fort Devens, Vaughan wrote that his memories from his 
time there were "ghastly ones which I would tear down and destroy were I able to do so, 
but this is beyond my power."
 71
 In Kentucky, some poor souls even starved to death, not 
because there was a shortage of food, but because the healthy were too afraid to help 
them.
72
 People were dying by the thousands throughout the United States. Amazingly, 
they were succumbing to a disease that history and experience had taught them should 
not be as fierce and as deadly as it was proving to be. Apparently, the 1918-19 version 
of influenza failed to abide by tradition and the results were massive. Amongst the 77.8 
percent of the population that provided mortality reports to the federal government in 
1918, almost half a million deaths were attributed to influenza and pneumonia alone. 
The two diseases were counted together that year because imperfect reporting practices 
made it hard to ascertain which of the two was the true culprit in individual cases, 
especially during the confusing and overwhelming conditions caused by the Spanish Flu 
epidemic. Furthermore, influenza often led to pneumonia, making it even harder to 
accurately determine the exact killer in any given case. In the end, the two conditions 
were therefore combined for the sake of accuracy. It made for a deadly duo, combining 
for almost one third of all U.S. deaths that year. Of these deaths, nearly eighty percent 
occurred during the epidemic-months of September through New Year's. This made the 
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Spanish Flu epidemic responsible for about twenty-five percent of all reported deaths in 
the nation that year.
73
 U.S. life expectancy statistics also testify to the impact of the flu 
epidemic on American life in 1918 as the average life expectancy for the year was 
twelve years lower than that of 1917. This was a significant yet momentary setback in 
the overall steady increase in life expectancy in the country.
74
   
 
In a World of Death and Disease, What is Flu?  
     For people living in 1918, one of the most disconcerting descriptions of the disease 
was summed up by health officials and sanitarians in the eastern parts of the U.S.. When 
asked by visiting health officers from the Mid-West about how to best deal with the 
Spanish flu epidemic, the health professionals who had already faced the onslaught of 
the disease solemnly told their visitors that "[w]hen you get back home, hunt up your 
wood-workers and  cabinet-makers and set them to making coffins. Then take your  
street laborers and set them to digging graves. If you do this  you will not have 
your dead accumulating faster than you can dispose of them."
75
 After first painting these 
Medieval-esque scenes of horror, the Easterners went on to list a number of other 
specific types of advice for prevention, such as using face-masks and educating the 
public in personal hygiene. Even so, they held on to the opinion that wherever the 
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disease hit, it would hit with tremendous force and kill more people than any community 
was used to handling. In their opinion, Spanish Flu was "utterly unlike any plague which 
has yet visited this country."
76
 Stories from Eastern cities such as Philadelphia and 
Boston provided horrific images to go along with the warning.  
     The extent and virulence of the disease was well known in Cleveland as well, as 
news and details travelled as fast as the existing means of communication allowed. Even 
so, a number of the city's residents appear to have believed that the epidemic would not 
to be much more dangerous, nor cause more reason for concern than previous bouts of 
the flu.
77
 This was in many ways a very reasonable response. For starters, recent history 
did not suggest that any particular fear or special precautions or measures should be 
necessary when dealing with the disease. After all, wasn't Spanish Influenza simply a 
fancy name for "grippe"? This slightly debonair attitude does not mean that the disease 
was considered entirely harmless. For instance, unlike during the Russian Influenza 
epidemic, there is no evidence that anyone considered the Spanish Flu laughable. 
Personal experiences may have contributed to this more serious yet far from panicky 
attitude. Less than three years earlier, during the winter of 1915-16, Cleveland had 
experienced a round of epidemic influenza that had left thousands of residents sick and 
maybe as many as a hundred dead from "the grip". Harmful is not the same as 
calamitous though, and neither Cleveland's citizens nor health officials appear to have 
viewed the episode as particularly threatening, nor as a legitimate ground for 
implementing serious public health measures. In fact, the 1915-16 bout of influenza does 
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not appear to have caused any type of major reaction in the city at all. The only official 
statements that appeared in the newspapers during this time came from the chief of the 
Bureau of Communicable Diseases Dr. Martin Friedrich, who calmly stated that the 
epidemic was likely to run its course soon, hopefully aided by an expected wave of cold 
weather.
 78
 In short, the city officials and general population appear to have adopted the 
attitude of simply waiting out the epidemic. This was a tried and true traditional 
response to influenza in Cleveland, stretching at least as far back as to the Russian Flu of 
1889-90.
79
 The message from Cleveland's health officials was clear: Influenza may be a 
nuisance, but it is not a cause for fear. When faced with the disease, it is best to simply 
keep calm and carry on.  
     Along with the relative mild lethality of regular influenza, it seems likely that 
concerns with the disease simply paled among a wide array of other maladies, many of 
which killed far more people every year than the flu had ever done. After all, even in the 
flu-year of 1916, more than five times as many people died in Cleveland from  
"diarrhea" than  from influenza. The following year, more deaths were even caused by 
diabetes or by homicides than were attributed to "the grippe".
80
 In a more typical year 
when influenza was not epidemic, the disease was an even smaller concern, as more 
people died from burns, falling down, or being crushed to death than died from flu.
81
 In 
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an industrial city like Cleveland, it should come as no surprise that work-related 
accidents and deaths were more common, and a greater cause of concern, than influenza. 
Being a baby was even more dangerous than being an industrial worker.
82
 As late as 
1917, mortality rates among children under one year of age were still around ten percent, 
and about 3.5 percent of all births were still births.
83
 In May 1918, the chief of 
Cleveland's Bureau of Child Welfare Dr. R. A. Bolt was happy to inform Clevelanders 
that the city was experiencing the lowest infant mortality rates in its history. During the 
first four months of the year, the mortality rates had been "only" seven percent.
84
 
Clearly, not all deaths were due to industrial work or being a baby. Even suicide 
consistently remained a greater destroyer of life in the city than flu was.
85
 However, the 
main cause of death in Cleveland was disease, and the most prolific killers throughout 
the era remained tuberculosis, heart diseases and pneumonia. By 1916-17, the three were 
each responsible for about 1/9  of all deaths in the city, for a total of around one third of 
all deaths.
86
 It made much more sense for people to fear these diseases, along with all 
the "traditional", horrific illnesses such as typhoid fever, measles, whooping cough, 
cholera, poliomyelitis and diphtheria. These were monsters and killers. Compared to 
them, influenza was a nuisance. Instead of a pain it was an itch. Instead of a monster, it 
was an annoying flee.
87
 Furthermore, in a world before antibiotics, any type of infection 
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could spell tremendous danger. What was flu compared to that?  In such a vast sea of 
diseases, infections, infant mortality and industrial accidents, "the grip" did not seem 
like all that much to worry about. What they failed to realize is that even fleas can turn 
into terrible instruments of death.  
 
Cleveland - A Public Health City.   
     Prior to the Spanish Flu, Cleveland's health officials helped create an attitude of 
unafraid awareness towards influenza. As mentioned, although medical theory and 
practice had taken giant leaps following the discovery of the germ theory of disease, the 
early twentieth century world was still a world full of dangerous illnesses, and medical 
mysteries and misconceptions. Despite these medical blind spots, the City of Cleveland 
and the U.S. in general were experiencing steady improvements in public health and 
healthcare.
88
 The city had even risen to hold the reputation as one of the healthiest large 
cities in the nation.
89
 This prominence lasted up to the Spanish Flu epidemic and 
beyond.
90
 In the last week of recorded death rates prior to the epidemic, Cleveland led 
                                                                                                                                                
and Labor, Bureau of the Census, "S. N. D. North, Directors, Special Reports. Mortality Statistics 1900 to 
1904" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), lxxx-lxxxi, accessed March 17, 2012, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/mortstatsh_1900-1904.pdf. 
88
 Cleveland Hospital Council, Cleveland Hospital and Health Survey, Part 1 (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland 
Hospital Council, 1920), 25-8, Oberlin College, Storage, Call Number 614C5992C pt. 1; Engs, The 
Progressive Era's, 91, 167-71, 267-9.  
89
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 7, 1911; Jan. 3, 1912; Jan. 1, 1914;  U.S. Department of Commerce and 
Labor, Mortality Statistics, 1900 to 1904, lxv, lxxx-lxxxi; U.S. Department of Commerce, Mortality Rates. 
1910-1920, 18-21, 31-2, 159-160; U.S. Department of Commerce, Mortality Statistics, 1918, 129-30, 432-
83. 
90
 City of Cleveland, Health Division, Annual Report, 1922 (Cleveland, OH, 1923), Cleveland Public 
Library, Cleveland Public Library Microfilm Center, Cleveland Documents Microfilm Collection, Cleve. 
Pub. Health/Welfare Report, 360.077/C597A- 1914-5, 1922-25, 1928, 1929-31, Reel no 2.25; City of 
Cleveland, Health Division, Annual Report, 1923 (Cleveland, OH, 1924), Cleveland Public Library, 
Cleveland Public Library Microfilm Center, Cleveland Documents Microfilm Collection, Cleve. Pub. 
32 
 
all the large cities in Ohio with a weekly death rate reported at 11.8 per 1,000 
inhabitants, compared to Columbus' 14.7 and Toledo's 18.3.
91
 As early as 1878, 
Cleveland's health officer identified a death rate of 17 per 1,000 to be the measurement 
of a healthy city, or "the standard that can generally be attained by careful sanitary 
supervision[,]" and reveled in Cleveland's success at obtaining the "excellent [rate]" of 
16.72 that year.
92
 The requirements for what constituted "a healthy city" became more 
stringent or narrowly defined over the next forty years, especially considering all the 
developments within health care and medical knowledge. Even so, Cleveland appears to 
have kept up with greater health expectations, pushing death rates in the city lower and 
lower over time.
93
 A clear victory of modern medicine in matters of public health came 
about as vaccinations helped reduce and finally eliminate smallpox from the city.
94
 In 
the process, the city also experimented widely with methods of sanitation and 
disinfections, producing both controversy and valuable knowledge and experience, 
including the need to earn the trust and cooperation of the public.
95
 On another front, 
improved sewage and water treatment and safer water intake helped conquer typhoid 
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fever  and reduce the number of all sorts of water-borne illnesses and conditions.
96
 
Supplying the city with "the Purest Milk in the World" and implementing stricter food 
controls also helped reduce mortality rates.
97
 Perhaps even more importantly, 
Cleveland's effort against tuberculosis was ranked among the best in the nation, with the 
privately organized Anti-Tuberculosis League, the Red Cross, and the city's health board 
cooperating closely in the fight against "the white plague".
98
  
     Expansion and professionalization of the public health system was another major 
improvement. The first Board of Health was established in 1832 while Cleveland was 
still a village. Formed to combat a specific cholera epidemic, the health board received 
the power to inspect both ships and people and to isolate and treat those who were sick. 
The board disbanded once the crisis was over. This type of need-based formation and 
dissolution of health boards continued until 1850, when the State of Ohio authorized 
Cleveland to form a health board with the authority to reduce public disorder and to 
prevent the spread of communicable diseases. Importantly, this created a close 
connection between the city's police powers and the city's public health powers. The 
union of the two became particularly clear in 1875 when the Board of Health was placed 
under the Bureau of Police and renamed the Health Department.
99
 Also, although there 
were some district physicians working for the department, many of the health workers 
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bore the title of sanitary policeman.
100
 The sanitary policemen had a variety of 
responsibilities, including examining houses and places for filthiness, securing law and 
order wherever they went, and educating people on the benefits of separating the healthy 
from the sick and on how to use disinfectants.
101
 In short, the sanitary policemen were 
medical investigators, educators, and policemen keeping the order. They were the hands 
and feet of a system that married police powers to matters of public health and vice 
versa, allowing the authority of one factor to extend into the other.
102
 The practice of 
using sanitary policemen remained in place even after 1882, when an independent 
Health Board, free from the Bureau of Police, was re-established.
103
 Furthermore, the 
sanitary policeman positions were becoming more permanent, making the workers more 
experienced in public health work and in keeping the order in less intrusive ways. This, 
according to the chief health officer, "led to fewer complaints from citizens, and an 
increased respect for the [health] officers and [Health] Department."
104
 Respect was 
obviously tremendously important, as respect, trust, and cooperation are often closely 
connected.  
     The Health Board was thus learning to function more effectively within the city. It 
was also growing. By 1902, the number of sanitary policemen had grown from less than 
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ten in 1882 to twenty.
105
 More importantly, the board was growing in powers and 
responsibilities. The Health Board was charged with sanitary inspections of milk, food, 
industries, businesses, and schools. It also oversaw birth- and death certificates, issued 
burial permissions, and inspected water, plumbing and sewers. Crucially, the health 
board had the power to forcefully isolate people who were sick with infectious diseases, 
and also to forcefully vaccinate people against communicable illnesses such as 
smallpox. As early as 1893 it even received absolute powers to implement quarantines in 
times of crisis.
106
 The expansion of powers, duties, and numbers of long term workers 
allowed the Health Board to become more professionalized. By 1902, there was a food 
inspector, and a plumbing and sewers inspector who had four assistants. Even more 
importantly, the city now had a bacteriological laboratory and twelve district physicians, 
one for each of the city's health districts.
107
 
     Another important part of the city's development and success in public health during 
the early twentieth century was the long and faithful service of a number of professional 
health officers. In 1901, Progressive mayor Tom Johnson selected a highly educated  
and well respected doctor to become the head of Cleveland's public health office.
108
 The 
appointment of Doctor Martin Friedrich marked a change in attitudes regarding the skills 
necessary to be the city's health commissioner.
109
 In a conflict that stretched over almost 
two years, Dr. Friedrich was attacked by some central members of the health board for 
what appears to have been administrative failings. The doctor found support with other 
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members of the board, as well as the mayor and several politicians. In the end, the health 
commissioner retained his position by virtue of his knowledge and skills as a physician, 
rather than his skills as a bureaucrat.
110
 Administration and organization was clearly 
important, but so was medical skills. Collectively, the expansion of the public health 
corps, as well as the political support of Dr. Friedrich based on his skills and knowledge 
as a medical doctor shows a marked professionalization of the city's public health 
force.
111
    
     The trend of increasing expertise, professionalism, organization,  modernization and 
governmental involvement in public health continued over the following decade. The 
process was aided greatly by mayoral involvement, especially by the progressive mayors 
Johnson and Baker. As seen in the case of Dr. Friedrich, both mayors focused on 
appointing experts and professionals to governmental positions.
112
 Johnson and Baker, 
along with Democrat mayor John H. Farley and Republican mayor Herman C. Baehr, 
also provided the health department with a notable amount of funding.
113
 Johnson 
described the wisdom of this tactic in a 1905 campaign pamphlet, stating that "under the 
ancient theory and practice of city government, money was saved on the Health 
Department so that there would be funds to fight epidemics. The modern method is to 
spend enough money on the Health Department so that there will be no epidemics to 
fight."
114
 Increased funding and a focus on professionalism undoubtedly helped improve 
and expand Cleveland's public health services. For instance, by 1912, the Department of 
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Public Health consisted of eight specialized bureaus. Reflecting the most important 
issues of the day, the bureaus dealt with communicable disease, tuberculosis, child 
hygiene, sanitation, food and dairy inspection, vital statistics, occupational disease, and 
bacteriological examinations and laboratory work.
115
 The city also employed a 
bacteriologist, a chemist, and several nurses dealing specifically with contagious 
disease. Slowly but surely, the Health Department became part of almost every part of 
life in Cleveland. Amazingly, Doctor Martin Friedrich remained one of the men in 
charge of the city's health response during this decade of tremendous expansion and 
growth, despite the serious attempts by some to have him ousted.
116
 This shows the 
dedication of the progressive mayors Johnson and Baker to retain experts in important 
positions of government. It also shows the progressive preoccupation with 
improvements in health care and with expanding governmental involvement in public 
health matters. However, public health was clearly not just a Progressive political 
concept, it was a Cleveland ideal.
117
 The fact that the Health Department and the 
professionals who worked there largely made it through the two-year rule of Republican 
mayor Herman Baehr suggests that public health matters in Cleveland during the early 
twentieth century were to a notable degree left free from politics and political favors.
118
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     The city's great success in reducing death rates and improving public health, and the 
expansion and professionalization of the health department, caused a tremendous degree 
of optimism in the face of disease. This optimism was alive and well despite the multiple 
challenges that explosive population growth, urbanization, and extensive 
industrialization and commerce brought. Reflecting the positive mentality perfectly, Dr. 
Friedrich stated that  
Cleveland has grown to such a large size and its commerce has assumed such 
immense proportions, that travelers from all parts of the continent come and go daily, 
and we must expect that any disease which appears in any place of the Union will 
sooner or later come to us. But the Health Department as now constructed is able to 
take care of anything that  may  come.
119
 
 
If the health commissioner felt optimistic in the face of plague, yellow fever, typhoid 
fever, cholera, smallpox, and even tuberculosis, he would not be likely to feel 
particularly threatened by the arrival of influenza. Hindsight clearly makes this attitude 
appear not only hubristic but positively foolish. However, what we may consider 
scientific or medical hubris today was part of a genuine belief among many Americans 
at the time that the medical field would ultimately be capable of conquering all sorts of 
disease.
120
 Furthermore, medical knowledge, technology and practices were increasingly 
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seen as ways to obtain longer life. This is wonderfully exemplified by numerous 
newspaper articles that called on a long line of medical doctors to give their expert 
advice on health care and longevity. The Plain Dealer even ran an article series titled 
"The Art of Living A Hundred Years" in which doctors gave advice about all sorts of 
medical concerns, including how to use medicine properly and the importance of not 
worrying.
121
 In the same way, "To Secure Long Life" was obviously an "[e]xceedingly 
[i]nteresting" matter. The person that was called on to discuss this essential topic was 
not surprisingly a doctor.
122
  
     The early twentieth century was a time when the potential and possibilities of modern 
medicine seemed boundless to many Americans.
123
 The almost wild faith that some had 
in medicine's tremendous powers is seen in a number of extraordinary claims that even 
made it into larger newspapers. For example, in 1906, the Plain Dealer ran a sensational 
article about the connection between sour milk and long life. Not unlike more traditional 
forms of folk medicine, the article drew a distinct connection between food and health. It 
stated that according to Louis Pasteur's successor - a man named Metchnikoff - people 
who drank sour milk could live to the ripe old age of 180.
124
 The main connection 
between the claim and modern medicine was the reference to the medical pioneer and 
superstar Pasteur. The claim of sour milk's miraculous powers may have been of a more 
old-fashioned kind. The connection to a champion of modern medicine made it much 
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more believable, at least for some. Just like hindsight makes optimism in the face of 
deadly diseases appear prideful and misguided, dreams of living past a hundred years 
appear unrealistic. Even so, these dreams and beliefs show the optimism that many 
people had in matters of health and medicine. Furthermore, considering the many 
accomplishments that modern medicine had steadily made, including ways to effectively 
combat ancient foes such as smallpox, cholera, and typhoid fever, the optimism does not 
appear entirely unfounded.
125
 After all, a pattern of success often creates an expectation 
of further success. It may be hubristic, but it is certainly understandable.  
 
Grip: Chief Ally of the Grim Reaper.  
  And,... when influenza kills, it usually kills through pneumonia.
126
 
  
     Cleveland had experienced many medical improvements and successes firsthand.
127
 
Along with the relatively limited historical impact and virulence of "the grip" in the city, 
it therefore makes sense that health officials and citizens alike thought of influenza in 
less than horrifying terms. The disease had one disconcerting characteristic though, and 
that was its connection with other diseases, especially with pneumonia. Starting in late 
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March of 1916, the city's newly appointed health commissioner Dr. R. H. Bishop began 
alluding to pneumonia when discussing the recent "grip" epidemic of 1915-16. In one of 
his daily newspaper columns named "The First Wealth is Health", Dr. Bishop focused 
not on the number of deaths caused by influenza directly, but highlighted instead how a 
bout of the disease could lead to pneumonia. Influenza, Dr. Bishop stated, can often 
leave the body in a weakened state, making it easier for pneumonia to grab a hold of a 
person. Influenza, much like alcohol consumption, overweight, overworking, and a lack 
of physical exercise, was therefore seen as a predisposing factor for infections of the 
lungs.
128
 Doctor Bishop was not the only nor the first person in Cleveland to hold this 
view about the disease. As already seen, doctors in the city had highlighted the 
connection between "grippe" and other diseases at least as early as during the Russian 
Influenza epidemic in 1889-90.
129
 In 1905, then health commissioner Dr. Friedrich also 
warned that a pneumonia epidemic could easily follow on the heels of an influenza 
epidemic. "The grip itself is not so bad," Friedrich said, "it is the results that grow out of 
it that are to be feared."
130
 Two years later, Dr. Friedrich reiterated the power of "grip", 
stating that it could both cause secondary infections and turn pre-existing conditions into 
terminal cases. In a newspaper article titled "Grip Chief Ally of Grim Reaper", Friedrich 
attributed the rise in deaths during the first half of 1907 "entirely to the effect of grip 
which swept the city last winter." The doctor stated that although "only" sixty deaths 
were reported as caused by "grip", untold people with heart problems, tuberculosis, or 
other diseases had died from those diseases after being infected with the flu. In short, 
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influenza could not only cause pneumonia and other maladies, but also made other 
illnesses more lethal.
131
 In 1910, Dr. Friedrich once again blamed "grip" for causing 
numerous cases of tuberculosis and pneumonia, and thus contributing to a substantial 
number of deaths in the city, at least far beyond the two deaths that were directly 
attributed to flu.
132
  
     Doctor Bishop's 1916 statement about influenza was therefore part of a much longer 
tradition of viewing the disease first and foremost as a cause or intensifier of other 
diseases. Even so, it was still a communicable disease that could seriously affect the 
city, and therefore something the city's health officials believed that the public should be 
well informed about. In January 1917, Dr. Bishop replaced his daily "The First Wealth is 
Health" newspaper column with a new series of educational articles that were published 
in the Sunday edition of the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The series was called "Beating the 
Weather Man" and was a continuation of the health commissioner's campaign of 
educating the people of Cleveland on how to avoid preventable and communicable 
diseases.
133
 In February the same year, he posted a thorough guide on the nature of 
"Grippe", discussing how to avoid catching and spreading it.
134
 The column was not 
associated with any particular outbreak of influenza and did not suggest that people had 
to be overly concerned nor that official responses or regulations were necessary during 
an outbreak. It focused instead on popular awareness and voluntary preventive actions. 
The topic for the following week had a much more sinister focus as it dealt with 
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pneumonia, a disease that Bishop held to be the cause of ten percent of all deaths in the 
U.S. annually. In this article, Bishop once again reminded the public of how "grippe" 
predisposes people to catch the far more deadly pneumonia.
135
 In the end, flu itself was 
not that dangerous, but it could become a reason for great concern whenever it caused or 
intensified other illnesses. The main thing to do to avoid the disease was to take proper 
preventative precautions.  
     When news about the Spanish Influenza began appearing in the newspapers, there 
were no real historical or recent reasons why Clevelanders should feel more concerned 
than during other rounds of the disease, or why the health department should resort to 
extreme actions. There were certainly no historical or medically known reasons for 
implementing comprehensive bans, isolations or quarantines. The only real cause for 
concern or alarm was found within the increasingly shocking and disturbing reports 
arriving from Europe, from the American East Coast, and from representatives of the 
U.S. Public Health Service. The name of the disease was flu. But its nature appeared to 
be much more sinister than what its name suggested. 
 
A Tradition of Education and Cooperation.  
First and foremost by a long interval among the weapons of attack, comes 
education, not alone the training of the intelligence, the distribution of the facts, 
but the development of the feelings, the emotions, the instinctive reactions 
which guide us chiefly in the emergencies and great decisions in life.
136
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     Stories about the Spanish Flu first began appearing in Cleveland newspapers on June 
17, 1918, with the number of articles increasing steadily throughout July. The first 
mentions of this new round of influenza focused on how it was spreading in Europe and 
how this affected the war effort.
137
 The Spanish Influenza moniker made it into 
Cleveland newspapers as early as July 3rd, as it was then known that the disease was 
widespread on the Iberian Peninsula.
138
 With Spanish Influenza ravaging Europe but 
apparently leaving the U.S. alone, Clevelanders could allow themselves to be fascinated 
by the disease's actions in Europe without fearing any immediate personal impact. A 
particularly exotic story reported that the Sultan of Turkey, and therefore an enemy in 
the war, had succumbed to the scourge.
139
 Making use of the tantalizing nature of the 
story of the Sultan's death, Health Commissioner Bishop posted a reminder of the 
seriousness of the disease in the city's newspapers, highlighting the importance of taking 
proper personal precautions.
140
  
     Four days later, the health commissioner was chosen by the American Red Cross to 
go to Italy to join the fight against tuberculosis there. The doctor was promptly granted a 
six month leave of absence by Cleveland's welfare director Beman, who planned to 
appoint the chief of the city's Bureau of Child Hygiene, Dr. R. Bolt, as acting health 
commissioner in Dr. Bishop's stead.
141
 Dr. Bolt had other plans though, as he and the 
chief of the Bureau of Public Health Education, Mr. J. D. Halliday, decided to go with 
Dr. Bishop to Italy to fight tuberculosis together. Therefore, when reports began 
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confirming the presence of Spanish Influenza in the U.S., Cleveland found itself without 
its highly respected health commissioner as well as two other key members of the city 
health department.
142
 During the epidemic, the city also lost the services of former 
health commissioner and then chief of the Bureau of Communicable Diseases Dr. 
Friedrich, as he fell ill with influenza and remained bedridden for three solid weeks 
before returning to his office.
143
 The task of leading the city's response against the 
Spanish Flu thus fell to Dr. H. L. Rockwood who was the chief of the Bureau of 
Tuberculosis. As history would go on to show, the appointment was both wise and 
fortuitous. The wisdom of the decision was proven as Dr. Rockwood went on to perform 
marvelously well as both medical director of the tuberculosis sanatorium and city health 
commissioner for the next decade, with him and his co-workers in the health department 
receiving much of the credit for Cleveland's continued success in ranking among the 
healthiest large cities in the United States.
144
 His reputation eventually rose to the point 
where the doctor was offered the position of Director of Health for Ohio, an offer he 
turned down in order to continue his work in Cleveland.
145
 As things turned out, the 
doctor had the skills and talent needed to lead the city through the epidemic, proving 
able to not only provide medical expertise, but also showing a keen ability to organize, 
coordinate, communicate, and secure large scale cooperation. The combination of these 
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factors was immensely helpful during the influenza crisis and beyond. However, all 
these attributes would have been practically worthless if Dr. Rockwood had shared the 
same fate as Dr. Friedrich. Thankfully, the decision to appoint Dr. Rockwood was also a 
fortuitous one, in that he avoided catching Spanish Flu throughout the epidemic. If he 
had become sick, the city would have been left scrambling to find yet another health 
commissioner to lead the fight against the flu. As it happened, Dr. Rockwood took 
charge of the health commissioner's office and kept it throughout the crisis and for years 
to follow.  
     Neither of these facts were obviously known in September, 1918. Even so, probably 
due to the city's tradition of having well qualified doctors serve as health commissioners, 
Dr. Bishop's replacement appears not to have been chosen for political reasons.
146
 When 
the original candidate for the position followed Dr. Bishop to Italy, the city did not turn 
to Dr. Rockwood as a political favor or in desperation. Instead, Dr. Beman recognized 
Rockwood as an expert doctor, as a valued member of the city's health department, and 
as intimately familiar with diseases of the respiratory system. Rockwood was 
consequently a natural candidate to lead Cleveland in its response to epidemic influenza.  
The doctor was also a great candidate because of his experience within the health 
department. Almost five years earlier, in January, 1914, Dr. Rockwood had been 
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appointed to the position of resident physician at the tuberculosis sanatorium at 
Warrensville. The appointment was given by none other than Dr. Bishop, who was 
arguably the main man in charge of Cleveland's fight against tuberculosis at the time.
147
 
Dr. Rockwood apparently took well to his new job and responsibilities, quickly rising to 
the position of superintendent at the Warrensville sanatorium. As further proof of 
Rockwood's abilities and success, in 1917, then health commissioner Bishop appointed 
Dr. Rockwood to succeed him in the positions of Chief of the Bureau of Tuberculosis 
and medical director at the Warrensville Sanatorium.
148
 Therefore, when Spanish Flu 
arrived in the U.S., Cleveland's new acting health commissioner was not only 
experienced within the city's health department, but, having worked closely with Dr. 
Bishop for years, was also familiar with Dr. Bishop's ideas and methods of public health 
leadership.
149
 His experience with both these elements strongly influenced Dr. 
Rockwood's leadership and actions during the Spanish Influenza epidemic in Cleveland. 
     The greatest inheritances of Dr. Bishop's regime was a focus on educating 
Cleveland's residents and winning their voluntary cooperation.
150
 The focus on 
education was a central tenet in the Progressive worldview that sought to create good 
civil society and a "perfected humanity".
151
 The ideal of education and voluntary public 
participation became the core strategy of many public health matters in Cleveland during 
the early twentieth century. The Anti-Tuberculosis League is a prime example of this. 
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Throughout its fight against "the great white plague", the League relied on educating the 
public and largely depended on people's willful participation in working to eradicate the 
scourge.
152
 Dr. Bishop was intimately involved in this process, serving as the League's 
secretary for years, also while simultaneously serving as chief of the city's Bureau of 
Tuberculosis.
153
 The focus on education and dissemination of information, and a desire 
for voluntary cooperation, became trademarks of Dr. Rockwood's response to the 
Spanish Flu epidemic too.  
     This was not the only public health tradition that Rockwood came to rely on. 
Previous bouts with epidemic disease had allowed the City of Cleveland and its health 
department to develop numerous traditions and responses to communicable disease, and 
also create a number of measures and laws that gave the city power to enforce certain 
public health measures during times of epidemics. Earlier smallpox epidemics, for 
instance, had exposed the need to create legislation that allowed for both forced 
vaccinations and forced quarantines.
154
 Many of these measures were developed and 
implemented during times when the population proved unwilling to voluntarily and 
dutifully follow the health board's advice.
155
 The long and steady battle against 
tuberculosis also played a role in providing the city with legal power in matters of public 
health, making Cleveland "admirably equipped with legislation for the prevention of the 
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spread of the Great White Plague."
156
 Furthermore, previous bouts of diphtheria and 
scarlet fever had led the city to develop a system of placarding houses to indicate the 
presence of communicable disease.
157
  
     Most crucially, earlier experiences with contagious diseases had taught elements of 
the city to cooperate. At least as early as in the 1870s, the city's health officials and the 
public school officials cooperated in combating an outbreak of diphtheria.
158
 In the 
1880s, health officials and the schools cooperated once again, as the Board of Education 
set out to improve the air quality in school buildings and to supervise the health of the 
pupils.
159
 The smallpox epidemic of 1902 proved an even stronger unifier of Cleveland 
institutions and residents as important parts of the city cooperated in combating a 
terrible disease. Faced with an outbreak not of the "mild, slightly contagious disease of 
the previous years which left no marks and seldom proved fatal", the city experienced a 
visit from an ancient foe. It was "the smallpox 'we read about,' that terrible scourge that 
struck so much terror into the former generations."
160
 The tremendously fatal nature of 
the disease, more so than the number of sick and dead, caused health officer Dr. 
Friedrich to seek the help of a wide array of people and groups including Mayor Tom 
Johnson, the City School Council, and the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce - a 
tremendously influential, powerful, and intensely engaged organization throughout most 
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of the city's history.
161
 Help was needed mainly because of the experiences of the 
previous year, when a much milder form of smallpox had hit the city. The city had then 
responded to the threat by the tried and true tactic of recommending and executing 
widespread vaccinations. The only problem was that the vaccine was not safe and clean, 
with the result that numerous people throughout the city experienced episodes of 
tremendous, debilitating pain. At least four people even died excruciating deaths from 
tetanus because of the tainted vaccine.
162
 Besides the obvious discomfort of getting ill 
and the terror of watching people die of tetanus, the vaccination tragedy also heavily 
affected households who depended on the income of someone who was suddenly unable 
to work because of adverse effects from the smallpox vaccine.  
     The following year, Dr. Friedrich mentioned the recent experience as the main 
obstacle to voluntary vaccination during the much more dangerous smallpox outbreak of 
1902. In his words, "the people still remembered the vaccination horror of 1901 and 
were afraid of the vaccinators sent out by the city." The number of Clevelanders who 
volunteered to be vaccinated was so small that Dr. Friedrich even reported that he "did 
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not feel justified to continue this kind of work."
163
 Simply put, negative experiences with 
public health measures had caused a close to total evaporation of public voluntarism and 
cooperation. The problem was that the city was being attacked by smallpox, and 
vaccination was the only real, effective weapon against it, a fact that Dr. Friedrich was 
certainly aware of.
164
 Smallpox made vaccination essential. Public cooperation was 
therefore also essential, voluntary or not. However, it was a well-known fact that the use 
of outright force could cause tremendous resistance and conflict.
165
 In Boston, for 
instance, health officials who tried to forcefully vaccinate nineteen citizens were met by 
fierce resistance as the  men "kicked and clawed and also fought with teeth and heads 
against what some of them declared was an assault upon their rights as otherwise free 
and independent American citizens."
166
 When faced with the prospect of having to 
forcefully vaccinate Jackson County, Kentucky, the health inspector in charge reported 
to his superiors that forced vaccination would require "four battalions of four hundred 
soldiers each, well armed."
167
 In fact, the only way to truly be successful in forcefully 
vaccinate a group of people was by marginalizing that group as a minority, gain the 
support of the majority, and use police powers or military force to enforce the 
vaccinations.
168
 Dr. Friedrich himself stated that in his experience, "compulsory 
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vaccination has won only enemies."
169
 It would certainly not be an easy, or maybe even 
plausible affair in Cleveland. Rather than attempting a hugely unpopular, and possibly 
destabilizing police-style enforcement measure, the health commissioner obtained 
instead the voluntary cooperation of other holders of influence and power in the city. 
Aided by these groups' methods and powers of persuasion, coercion and encouragement, 
Friedrich found a way to secure public compliance by making vaccination the path of 
least resistance. Vaccination was not technically forced. Instead, failure to cooperate was 
made as undesirable or unsustainable as possible. For many Clevelanders, vaccination 
probably even became the path of absolute necessity, especially when proof of 
vaccination was made a criteria for working.  
     The road to wholesale vaccination of the city followed three main routes. First, the 
school council made vaccination a "conditio sine qua non for attending school", making 
proof of vaccination a requirement for pupils throughout the city. In a further sign of 
their cooperation with the health department, the school officials even put Dr. Friedrich 
in charge of everything, allowing him to make sure that the vaccination of school 
children was being carried out.
170
 The Chamber of Commerce provided the second 
strong impetus for encouraging public cooperation by getting employers throughout the 
city to require that both workers and workers' families be vaccinated.
171
 The third string 
of attack was carried out "through an extraordinary public effort" that included  a 
number of religious leaders and civic groups. These groups and individuals helped to 
both educate the public and pressure reluctant residents to get vaccinated. By obtaining 
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the cooperation of various forms of city leaders and working hard to restore the people's 
trust in the health department through conversation, communication and education, Dr. 
Friedrich thus managed to enforce wholesale vaccination while avoiding the use of 
blatant force and coercion.
172
 Vaccination remained a voluntary choice, but it became a 
choice that most people, for either financial or social reasons, could not afford to reject. 
Dr. Friedrich later highlighted the importance of all the groups and people that had 
helped him, stating that "[o]nly one who has been through the trying ordeal of fighting a 
smallpox epidemic can fully appreciate the help that the Chamber of Commerce gave us 
in time of need."
173
 Through the 1901 and 1902 smallpox debacle, health commissioner 
had learned first-hand the incredible value of using city leaders to encourage, persuade 
and enforce public compliance when voluntary cooperation was problematic.  
     The practice of cooperating with city leaders and organizations to encourage or 
coerce public cooperation did not end with the smallpox epidemic. Instead, it remained a 
main tactic in dealing with any outbreak of communicable disease in Cleveland. The 
Chamber of Commerce, for one, helped Dr. Friedrich the following year when the city 
was beset by an outbreak of typhoid fever. In this instance, the Chamber joined the 
health commissioner in exhorting the public to boil their water, and also urged 
employers to provide their workers with boiled water and to make sure that posters from 
the health board would be published in highly visible areas throughout the workplace.
174
 
Even with the persuasive and coercive powers of the Chamber of Commerce at his back, 
Dr. Friedrich remained true to the ideal of voluntarism and called for the voluntary 
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cooperation of the public, declaring that the recommendation of boiling drinking water 
could not be carried out by ordinance nor enforced by sanitary policemen. Instead, he 
stated, "it depends largely upon the citizens to put an end to the epidemic by taking the 
[necessary] precaution of boiling all drinking water."
175
 The tradition of obtaining 
cooperation from city leaders and groups, and the ideal of seeking the voluntary 
compliance of the public became trademarks of Cleveland's Health Department. It is 
therefore not surprising that Dr. Rockwood adopted the same tactics during the Spanish 
Influenza crisis.  
  
 Education and Voluntarism. The Progressive Ideal. 
 A new Cleveland is springing into existence: a city in which it is good to live; a 
 city whose residents believe that "he profits most  who serves best"; Cleveland, 
 the city that co-operates; Cleveland,  the city that seeks perfected humanity; 
 Cleveland, the city with sublime faith in its future; Cleveland, the city of ideas 
 and high ideals; Cleveland, the city that really has a soul!
176
 
 
 
     Although force was sometimes needed, far from all public cooperation was coerced 
or obtained through persuasion. In fact, the ideal of voluntary participation was far from 
a perpetually unobtainable mirage. The city's fight against tuberculosis provides one of 
the best examples of a much more ideal and voluntary form of cooperation. In their 
struggles against the great white plague, Cleveland's residents joined efforts in a 
tremendously comprehensive and inclusive way. The main efforts were coordinated and 
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carried out through profound cooperation between the city health department, the Anti-
Tuberculosis League, The Red Cross, and a wide variety of private organizations and 
individuals. It involved the young and the old; public officials and private individuals; 
men and women; Protestants, Catholics, and Jews; Americans and immigrants; labor 
unions, industrialists, businessmen, educators, and medical professionals, to name but a 
few.
177
  
     Not surprisingly, the city's campaign against tuberculosis relied first and foremost on 
educating the public and appealing to people's sense of civic duty.
178
 The Anti-
Tuberculosis League of Cleveland played a huge role in this process. Founded in 1904 
for the express purpose of combating tuberculosis, the League was formally organized in 
the city during the spring of 1905.
179
 It originally consisted of members of twenty-two of 
the city's "public spirited organizations", including the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce, the Academy of Medicine, Cleveland's public library, the city's Board of 
Education, the YMCA, the Board of Health, a number of settlement houses, the 
Associated Charities, the Slavic Alliance, the Visiting Nurse Association, and the United 
Trades and Labor Council. The League sought to coordinate and organize the anti-
tuberculosis work already done in the city, and to secure the help of all the appropriate 
"mutual aid societies and other associations and bodies" that could help stamp out the 
disease."
180
 Crucially, the League sought to work closely with the city's health officials. 
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In a clear connection between the health department and the League, members of both 
the city's health board and health office were also members of the League's board of 
directors.
181
  Furthermore, the health commissioner and communicable disease expert 
Dr. Friedrich was appointed to be in charge of the League's disinfection activities.
182
 
This personal connection between the two institutions would later be carried on in Dr. 
Bishop, who served as both secretary for the Anti-Tuberculosis League, chief of the 
city's tuberculosis bureau, and city health commissioner.
183
 City health officials and the 
Anti-Tuberculosis League cooperated, complemented, coordinated, and organized much 
of the city's efforts against tuberculosis for years to come.
184
  
     In 1905, the newly elected president of the Anti-Tuberculosis League, Dr. J.H. 
Lowman, made a series of statements expressing the tactics that the new organization 
would use in its war on consumption. First of all, he stated that tuberculosis could only 
be defeated "when we know who the enemy is, what is its power for evil, how to avoid it 
and how to arm against it."
185
 In short, medical knowledge and etiology would largely 
dictate specific measures. More practically, the Anti-Tuberculosis League would aid the 
city in the fight against the disease in a number of crucially important ways. First of all, 
it would "aid the health authorities by influencing public opinion." This would be done 
by using "schools, libraries and publications... to inform and educate the people", and by 
giving lectures and hosting educational exhibits.
186
 Education was therefore not just 
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about creating an informed populace, but also about creating an engaged and cooperative 
one. This process expanded way beyond traditional means and arenas of education. 
Through its different committees, the League also interacted with people on a very 
personal level, educating patients and their families about how to deal with the illness, 
and even providing aid for consumption stricken families. The League even helped 
convalescing adults find light work.
187
 Along with its role in education and in winning 
the hearts and minds of the public, the League's most important role was to secure the 
cooperation of mutual benefit societies. More than anyone else, these societies best 
represented the part of the population that suffered from tuberculosis, not least because 
many of their members were industrial workers and their families and people who lived 
in crowded conditions. Crucially, the mutual benefit societies also represented the 
myriad different ethnic groups that lived in the city. Essentially, the mutual benefit 
societies therefore not only had thousands of members, but also "reach[ed] homes of all 
kinds and classes."
188
  
     Based on these tactics of education and voluntary public participation, the Anti-
Tuberculosis League of Cleveland went on to perform marvelously well in both 
educating the public, win their support and cooperation, instill a sense of civic duty 
regarding a matter of public health, and work closely together with the city's health 
department. The cooperation did not stop there though. Working closely with 
educational and philanthropic groups, the League managed to spread information and 
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instill anti-tuberculosis attitudes far and wide in Cleveland.
189
 In 1906 for instance, the 
League helped a number of charitable, religious and sociological associations to 
organize a tuberculosis exhibit. All Clevelanders were invited to come and learn about 
the scourge and how to best avoid it. The visitors also got to listen to experts talking 
about what was being done to combat the disease.
190
 Creatively, the exhibit even held a 
contest for school children  in which seventh- and eighth graders competed in writing 
the best "tuberculosis essays." Eunice Ekers of 9801 Elizabeth Avenue won first prize 
and received a handsome ten dollar reward. Other children won smaller prizes of five, 
three and two dollars each.
191
 The League also organized a lecture series "to be delivered 
in the public schools and branch libraries and before the members of various labor 
unions and social settlements", effectively educating various parts of Cleveland's 
residents in anti-tuberculosis behavior.
192
 Throughout this period, the Anti-Tuberculosis 
League remained closely allied with the city's schools and board of education, 
consistently urging the need to teach school children about the disease and how to avoid 
it.
193
     
     One of the most important aspects of the League's work was to recruit the 
engagement and cooperation of the entire populace. They were remarkably successful at 
this. A key element of their success was that the League not only communicated and 
cooperated with various groups in society, but also offered memberships for 
organizations and individuals alike. Anyone who could contribute a dollar or more could 
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become a member. "In this way", League officials stated, "physicians, clergymen, 
lawyers, businessmen and all those interested in the health of the city can become 
members."
194
 By 1909, clergymen were certainly involved in the movement as churches 
organized anti-tuberculosis Sundays, invited experts to come and speak on the topic, 
encouraged anti-tuberculosis discussions, and even held fundraisers to combat the 
disease.
195
 As already seen, the League also focused on reaching not just the elite, but 
"all kinds and classes".
196
 This inclusive and universal attitude was central to the League 
from day one and may explain why Cleveland's labor unions were among the League's 
strongest and most active supporters. The labor unions' involvement and cooperation 
even preceded the formal organization of the League, and was in fact one of the 
principal forces that pushed for its formation.
197
 The unions remained actively engaged 
in the tuberculosis fight for years.
198
 All the various groups that were involved in the 
anti-tuberculosis movement show how effective the League and the overall movement 
was in creating a wide, unified front against the disease.      
     Evidence of the anti-tuberculosis movement's success in arousing public participation 
in Cleveland can also be seen in the city's overall cooperation with the Red Cross, most 
noticeably during the Red Cross Christmas campaigns against tuberculosis. In 1907, the 
Red Cross chapter in Delaware issued special Red Cross stamps which proceeds would 
go towards fighting tuberculosis. It was an astounding success. In only three weeks more 
than 400,000 stamps were sold in the small state, providing some $3,000 towards the 
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anti-tuberculosis work there. Encouraged by the success, the Red Cross decided to issue 
the stamp in all the states of the union in 1908, and also declared itself as intimately 
engaged with the fight against tuberculosis on a national level.
199
 Cleveland proved to be 
an enthusiastic ally in the fight. By November 28, 1908, Cleveland newspapers were 
commenting on the tremendous success of the stamp campaign. The Plain Dealer 
reported that "Christmas Stamp Is Season's Fad", and that the "Little Sticker Issued by 
Red Cross Society Arouses Wide Interest."
200
 The campaign was not just a success in 
Cleveland though. In fact, something akin to a Christmas stamp craze swept through the 
nation. The state of Pennsylvania led the charge with about 2,500,000 stamps ordered by 
November 30th. New York had ordered just around 2,000,000, whereas officials in 
Indiana feared that the demand for stamps would overtake and dwarf the supply. Even 
among such enthusiasm, Cleveland soon rose to national prominence. By the end of 
November, the City of Cleveland alone had gone through its original quota of 200,000 
stamps and had ordered 300,000 more, hoping to receive them within a day or two.
201
 It 
did not stop there. By December 4, the extent of Cleveland's participation and civic 
interest in anti-tuberculosis work became remarkably clear as the Red Cross decided to 
discontinue distribution of Christmas stamps to the whole rest of the state in order to 
keep up with the city's demand.
202
 About three weeks later, on December 26, 1908, 
Cleveland was closing in on Philadelphia in "the civic contest" of what city was the 
greatest purchaser of Christmas stamps in the nation, despite the fact that Philadelphia's 
population of roughly 1.5 million was about three times larger than Cleveland's 
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population of just under 500,000.
203
 At this point, Cleveland had sold about 900,000 Red 
Cross stamps and was hoping to make it through the entire lot of 1,250,000 by the end of 
the year. The goal of selling all the stamps was held up as a matter of "civic pride."
 204
 It 
is unclear whether the city managed to live up to their goal in 1908. But, carrying on a 
tradition of civic pride and participation in matters of public health, Cleveland 
undoubtedly rose to first place in the nation in 1911, selling more of what was then 
called Red Cross Christmas seals than any other municipality and city in the nation.
205
 
This was no small feat, considering that Cleveland with its estimated 580,000 residents 
was only the sixth largest city in the U.S. at the time.
206
 It is especially impressive when 
compared to New York City. With an estimated 4.9 million residents in 1911, New York 
City had more than eight times the population of Cleveland.
 207
 Even so, Cleveland 
managed to sell more than fifteen percent more seals than the Big Apple. This tradition 
of tremendous popular participation in Red Cross campaigns and other civic 
assignments continued through to the war era. In 1917, Cleveland prided itself on being 
first in the nation in Red Cross donations per capita, and also first in the nation in "civic 
attainment".
208
 A stated ideal for the present and the future was that Cleveland's 
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residents "believe[d] that 'he profits most who serves best'[.]"
209
 Cooperation was seen 
as an essential element in all these claims. The city was therefore presented to the world 
as "The City That Co-operates".
210
 It is doubtful that cooperation and voluntary service 
and sacrifice were universally held positions and practices in the city. Even so, both 
factors were evidently common enough for the city to brag about them. And in the case 
of anti-tuberculosis work, the reality of things certainly seems to have been remarkably 
close to the ideal.     
     Cleveland participation in the Red Cross anti-tuberculosis sales is therefore a great 
example of how involved and engaged the city was in matters of public health. It  also 
shows how much importance and value the city placed on the concept of civic duty and 
civic pride. Just as importantly, the Red Cross Christmas campaigns show the wide 
public participation in Cleveland. Civic duty and cooperation in public health was not 
just an elite or middle class matter. Everybody should be involved. President Lowman of 
the Anti-Tuberculosis League praised the stamp campaign for helping achieve this goal, 
stating that it was "the best possible means of interesting the greatest number of people 
in our work[.]" His enthusiasm did not end there. "One of the best features of the 
Christmas stamp crusade", he said, "is the fact than everyone can enlist in it."
211
 In early 
twentieth century Cleveland, public health was a matter that ideally involved all parts of 
the public.   
     The anti-tuberculosis movement in Cleveland is a tremendous example of a city that 
both cooperated, educated, and fostered widespread public participation in matters of 
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public health. It also reflects the core Cleveland ideology of voluntarism and 
participation as a civic duty. Progressive mayor Newton D. Baker referred to the ideal 
form of civic involvement and duty in Cleveland as "civitism". Civitism was in many 
ways like a local version of patriotism. It held that the more people loved Cleveland as 
their home, the more they would participate in making the city a better place.
212
 It can 
also be induced from this that the more they loved the city, the more they would be 
willing to sacrifice for its sake. Love of the city and local pride were therefore elements 
that influenced whether people would voluntarily cooperate or had to be persuaded, 
forced, or coerced. It is likely that the ideals of civic duty and responsibility were also 
used as a way to pressure people to cooperate. After all, whenever actions or ideals 
become social norms or collective values, it can be terribly difficult for individuals to go 
against them. It such cases, it is not so much a matter of governmental coercion as it is 
group coercion. If cooperation and participation became a societal norm, many may 
have chosen to toe the line simply as a path of least resistance. In addition, social norms 
have a way of reproducing themselves in both groups and individuals. It clearly does not 
always happen, but it is certainly possible for people to adopt norms and ideals simply 
because other people have them. It is even more common that people adopt values and 
beliefs because somebody else convinces them of the virtues of said norms and ideals. 
This is where education, whether in schools, newspapers, libraries, or on a one-on-one 
basis, becomes tremendously important.     
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     The anti-tuberculosis fight in Cleveland is important for two other reasons as well. 
First of all, the city learned to cooperate with other cities. For example, in 1910 the city's 
superintendent of health, Dr. C. E. Ford, went on a tour of the large Eastern cities and 
learned "valuable information regarding the construction and operations of hospitals for 
victims of the white plague."
213
 Secondly, the anti-tuberculosis fight brought the city of 
Cleveland and its residents into a close relationship with the Red Cross. Also organized 
in 1905, the Cleveland chapter of the Red Cross started off in many ways as an 
organization for the civic minded part of the city's middle class and elite. The first 
meeting was led by the chapter's first president, famous industrialist and philanthropist 
Samuel Mather. It was attended by a number of other businessmen, industrialists and 
professionals who, according to a Red Cross historian, "by their life experience, training, 
and inheritance, viewed humanitarian service as their duty and obligation to the city 
where they had made their home and carried on their business or profession." The 
organization's stated goal was first and foremost to provide voluntary aid to the military, 
but also to help in civilian emergencies and disasters.
 
Its focus and dedication to 
medicine and health care was reflected in its appointment of the famous physician, 
surgeon, and later co-founder of  the Cleveland Clinic, Dr. George W. Crile as chapter 
president in 1909.
214
 Its political influence was likewise reflected in the appointment of 
the next president in 1911, Mr. Myron T. Herrick. Herrick was a lawyer, politician, 
businessman and diplomat who had served on the City Council for five years in the late 
nineteenth century, served as governor of Ohio between 1904 and 1906, and served as 
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ambassador to France under President Taft between 1912 and 1914.
215
 The Red Cross 
also had clear connections to the city's Protestant groups, shown for instance in the next 
president, Charles E. Adams, who served from 1912 until 1913 and was also involved in 
the leadership of The Federated Churches of Greater Cleveland - an organization 
consisting of most of the city's Protestant churches.
216
 By 1912, the Red Cross was also 
working closely with the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Charities, 
and the city's larger newspapers, with each institution being placed in charge of 
committees according to their unique expertise and specialties. The Red Cross 
committee of publication, for instance, was made up of the city editors of Cleveland's 
daily newspapers. Four of these - the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Cleveland Leader, the 
Cleveland News, and the Cleveland Press - were in English. The fifth and last - the 
Waechter und Anzeiger - was in German.
217
 Over time, and greatly helped by the anti-
tuberculosis movement and later the world war, the Red Cross came to be largely 
synonymous with civic participation and cooperation in Cleveland. By 1917, the city's 
prominence in Red Cross contributions and voluntary enlistments was even held up as a 
key factor in earning the city the title of "First City of American Spirit."
218
 That same 
year, more than 100,000 women volunteers and 125,000 school children were engaged 
in Red Cross work and activities in the city.
219
 Ideals of civic duty, cooperation between 
city government, private organizations and private individuals, cooperation across class 
and ethnic lines, and public health education was all combined in the Red Cross. This 
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became extremely important during the Spanish Flu epidemic, as the Red Cross played a 
tremendously important role in Cleveland's fight against the scourge. 
      In dealing with the Spanish flu, Cleveland and its health commissioner relied to a 
large degree on the multiple public health connections and traditions that already existed 
throughout the city. When the epidemic struck, the city already had a long history of 
public health cooperation, coordination, and education. It had also developed a strong 
connection between public health issues and civic duty, and created numerous modes of 
operation to use when dealing with public health matters and crises. The cooperation 
between the Health Department, the Anti-Tuberculosis League, the Red Cross, and all 
the other organizations, institutions and individuals who participated in the anti-
tuberculosis fight is one of several tremendously important public health precedents 
leading up to the Spanish Flu crisis.  
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CHAPTER III 
CLEVELAND FIGHTS THE SPANISH FLU 
During the epidemic, the health department has received the backing of a great 
majority of the citizens to a degree that was not unexpected in a city which for a 
long period has prominently stood among American communities in the matter 
of its high standard of public health..... The removal of the greater part of the 
restrictions Sunday at midnight is simply a transfer to each citizen of the civic 
responsibility for the control of influenza which still exists
220
 
       - Dr. Rockwood, Nov. 10, 1918 
 
     Public health is a lens. When used to look at a human society, it can reflect and reveal 
values, beliefs, priorities, customs, traditions, ideas, social organization, power 
structures, conflicts, conflict solving techniques, and more. This is especially true during 
crisis situations such as epidemics. After all, a crisis situation demands action, especially 
seeing how a good and effective response can mean the difference between life and 
death for numerous people. However, in reality, public health is about much more than 
saving lives. Crucially, public health efforts inevitably affect economics, making it just 
as inevitably a political matter. Furthermore, the way a society chooses to respond to an 
epidemic reveals medical beliefs, ideals, social cohesiveness or conflicts, and ideas 
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about what are essential aspects of life. Public health is a lens into a society's beliefs, 
structures, and functions. It is therefore very telling, for instance, if a society does not 
respond much during an epidemic. Does this mean that certain powerful interests wish to 
minimize negative effects on commerce? Or does it mean that members of the 
community are strong believers in hands-off government, to the point where even a 
governmentally organized public health effort is anathema? If so, what can we deduce 
about a locale that depends primarily on private initiatives and responses? Conversely, 
what can we deduce about a place that has a highly developed  public health system, and 
has a long tradition of broad, societal cooperation in public health matters? More 
broadly, what do specific public health responses and actions tell us about any given 
society? The answer is a whole lot. In the case of Cleveland, the city's public health fight 
against the Spanish Influenza epidemic reveals certain fundamental aspects of the city. 
Essentially, Cleveland's fight against flu shows us some of its most prized ideals. 
Specifically, the Spanish Flu epidemic reveals that many Clevelanders viewed  
voluntarism and cooperation as central parts of civic pride, loyalty, and duty. The highly 
organized and widely cooperative nature of the city's response also shows that Cleveland 
had a well established tradition of viewing public health as important, and of 
approaching public health crises through cooperation. The emphasis on education 
further cements the ideal of voluntary cooperation. The city's various responses to 
Spanish Influenza show that public health matters are anything but random events. 
Instead, a public health crisis is a great reflector of a society's most pressing ideas, 
ideals, traditions, and beliefs.  
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     As chapter II shows, although certain types of legislation and traditions of coerced 
cooperation were available, Cleveland health officials clearly favored education and 
voluntary public participation to governmental enforcement and coercion. Coercion was 
used only when voluntary cooperation failed, and only when the situation was deemed a 
significant threat to the health and safety of the city. For example, during the 1902 
smallpox epidemic, some people were in fact forcefully taken to hospital quarantine, but 
only when quarantine was deemed necessary and the persons in question refused to go 
voluntarily.
221
 Cooperation was the ideal. Coercion was a last resort. The City of 
Cleveland and its health commissioners embraced these ideals and used them both 
before, during, and after the Spanish Influenza crisis. Dr. Rockwood was no exception. 
In fact, the combination of seeking to educate the public, a preference for broad social 
cooperation and voluntarism, and the use of legislation as an emergency resort largely 
reflects Dr. Rockwood's approach to the Spanish Flu epidemic. The doctor's actions and 
tactics during the crisis were therefore not random or uniquely peculiar to him. Instead, 
his leadership followed along a well established Cleveland tradition of public health 
ideals and measures. Reflecting a prevalent aspect of the city, Cleveland's response to 
the epidemic was thus greatly influenced by typical American and Progressive ideals 
that had been uniquely shaped and developed in the city for years. However, although 
very important, ideology and ideals do not account for all the reasons behind decision-
making. Crucially, the city's American and Progressive traditions and ideals existed 
within a much larger and tremendously complex historical and societal context. All the 
decisions that Dr. Rockwood made during the epidemic were affected in one way or 
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another by this context and must be understood and interpreted accordingly. The ideals 
may have guided the health commissioner's actions, but he also had to consider a 
number of other factors and necessities. 
     One of the most fundamental factors that affected Rockwood's tactics and decisions 
was the need to balance society's interests and needs. Every society has, at any given 
time, a tremendous amount of various and often conflicting ideas, desires, considerations 
and needs. These can be for example economic, political, social, religious, ideological, 
scientific, technological, and cultural ones. Throughout history, all these factors have 
strongly influenced people's and societies' responses to epidemics and communicable 
diseases.
222
 With this in mind, it is imperative to consider the different demands and 
needs that the City of Cleveland and its health commissioner had to deal with when 
responding to the Spanish Influenza. When the epidemic struck the U.S., Cleveland's 
leaders not only had to make preparations and organize responses according to tenets of 
medicine and public health. They also had to consider myriad other factors and develop 
a response that was as balanced and responsible as possible. The actions and decisions 
of Dr. Rockwood and the other leaders in Cleveland thus become a lens not only into 
matters of etiology and medical practice, but also into the overall ideologies, politics, 
economics, social elements, and power structures in the city. For instance, who or what 
decided which tactics, measures or regulations were appropriate or not? And who 
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decided when the situation  became so dire that coercion and the use of force became a 
legitimate way to secure cooperation or compliance? One of the ways to study this 
balancing act is by looking at the implementation of flu regulations such as the closing 
of schools, churches and businesses, and also recognize the parts of society that were not 
placed under flu bans or regulations. For instance, it is worth noting that some 
businesses were shut down during the crisis while others were allowed to stay open. 
Furthermore, it is also worth considering the reasons given for these decisions, and the 
language used when explaining the regulations and bans. Finally, it is necessary to keep 
in mind that many of the flu measures were unpopular ones. Arguments for and against 
the restrictions, incidents of resistance and enforcement, and the implementation and the 
lifting of flu regulations all show how Cleveland's city government worked to counteract 
the epidemic while simultaneously balancing the needs and demands of the war effort, 
the economy, and the city's inhabitants.   
 
The Spanish Flu Invasion.    
     The first report that the Spanish Flu had arrived in the U.S. appeared in Cleveland 
newspapers on September 12, 1918. The article informed readers that there was no 
known way of effectively combating the scourge other than total quarantine, which seen 
in the context of the war was clearly impossible. Branding Spanish Flu as a "new 
[disease] to American physicians", the writer stressed the importance of preventive 
measures and the need for the government to issue and disseminate warnings and 
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instructions on how to avoid the malady.
 223
 On September 22, 1918, in an early attempt 
to educate the public and engage their cooperation, Dr. Rockwood issued his first set of 
warnings and instructions to the people of Cleveland, asking everybody to take 
preventive measures against influenza. This was based on similar warnings sent 
throughout the nation by the U.S. Surgeon General, stressing the need to limit the spread 
of the disease.
224
 The epidemic did not reach Ohio until about a week later and was not 
properly identified as Spanish Influenza until the end of the month.
225
 Despite the lack 
of a confirmed influenza presence in the city and state, Rockwood nonetheless 
responded by issuing a call for voluntary, preventative action. Isolation of the sick was a 
central part of the recommended precautions. Any person who suffered from sneezing, 
headaches, bone aches, or cold-like symptoms, Rockwood stated, "should refrain from 
visiting public places like movies, theaters, churches, or other places where people 
congregate in numbers." The main advice for the healthy was simply to avoid getting 
cold.
226
  
     Dr. Rockwood's recommendations, although certainly a nuisance to some, can hardly 
be called stringent, extreme, or even comprehensive. Furthermore, the doctor's list of 
advice and call for preventative measures does not suggest any form of real, desperate 
concern. Instead, just as the number of Spanish Flu cases was about to explode in 
Cleveland, the health commissioner suggested that the city would probably be spared the 
full force of the epidemic.
227
 It is unclear whether this was a genuine hope, 
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overconfident hubris, or an excuse for postponing the implementation of emergency flu 
regulations. Most likely it was the latter. For one thing, based on information from 
newspapers and from local, state and federal health officials, Dr. Rockwood was 
certainly aware of the fact that Spanish Influenza did not seem to spare any community. 
On the other hand, reluctance to implement flu regulations early on can easily be seen as 
a matter of balancing the city's various interests. After all, the political, economic and 
social needs and desires of any city or society often make it extremely difficult to 
enforce public health regulations unless there is a generally recognized crisis. Simply 
put, it is very difficult to get people or organizations to willfully and voluntarily sacrifice 
freedoms, conveniences or money unless they recognize the need and wisdom of such 
actions. Essentially, public health exists within a large, dynamic, and very complex 
context where extreme actions are typically only seen as legitimate if circumstances are 
equally extreme. Metaphorically speaking, most people will only step up to man the 
pumps if the ship is taking on water. In the same way, most will only consider getting in 
the lifeboats if the ship is actually sinking. Similarly, the threat of disaster may inspire 
some passengers to put life jackets on, but a good number will resist any intrusion on 
their life for as long as possible. In the same way, the need and use of public health 
measures must always be seen in the light of how it relates to both changing 
circumstances and to the many needs and wishes of society. The actions taken must 
likewise be seen as a reflection of the ways people continually determine and re-
determine what are the most important needs of a community at any given time.  
     The mere threat of epidemic disease does not necessarily carry the power to convince 
people that other needs or desires must be subordinated to public health needs. The 
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actual presence of disease and death is much more powerful, as anybody faced with an 
actual matter of life and death is likely to recognize survival as more important than 
many other things. Survival depends on several factors. Crucially, survival is a constant 
companion of human existence and not just something that appears during a crisis. For 
instance, a steady supply of oxygen, water, food, and sleep is essential to the 
preservation of human life, regardless of circumstances. Disease, accidents, violence, 
and other kinds of trauma or lethal threats are more sudden and often unexpected than 
our constant struggles for survival. We therefore experience these crises as far more 
intrusive, dramatic, and scary. Even so, we cannot wisely sacrifice our essential needs 
for oxygen and water for the sake of surviving a number of other threats. At least not for 
long. However, we may be able to sacrifice food and sleep for slightly longer, and deny 
ourselves numerous social and material needs or desires such as church attendance, 
choir practice, sports games, travelling, or new clothing, for even longer than that. When 
it gets down to it, some things in life are more essential than others. The same is true 
about society as a whole. There is one big difference between an individual and a 
society. Crucially, whereas it is fairly easy to agree on a number of factors that are 
essential to preserve human life, it is far more difficult to determine exactly what factors 
are needed in order to prevent a society from collapsing. Things get even more 
complicated when trying to not only differentiate between what is essential or 
nonessential, but also determine on a continuous scale which factors are more or less 
important than others. To create such a "hierarchy of importance", where some things 
are seen as more essential than others, can be tremendously difficult. It is also a very 
political, economic, cultural, ideological and social endeavor, as all these aspects of 
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society will present various arguments for or against the importance of themselves and 
others. This is one of the reasons why, especially in a crisis situation, the question of 
what are essential needs of a society becomes exceptionally important. The question of 
what are nonessential needs also takes on tremendous importance, as the 
essential/nonessential question can dictate whose needs and desires are sacrificed for the 
greater good and which ones are allowed to continue on even through a crisis.  
     It is unlikely that Dr. Rockwood's failure to launch a more comprehensive or forceful 
campaign of preventive measures early on was based on genuine hope or overconfident 
hubris. As mentioned, the health commissioner certainly knew that uncountable other 
places throughout the U.S. East Coast and Midwest were in the midst of vicious 
outbreaks of influenza at the time. It must have seemed extremely unlikely that any 
community, great or small, would be lucky enough to somehow escape the scourge. 
Cleveland, as big and central to commerce and industrial production as it was, could not 
possibly have hoped to make it through the epidemic unscathed.
228
 In fact, the eventual 
need of a more comprehensive flu response in the city was a virtual certainty. This was 
also made clear from the numerous reports from places where Spanish Flu had arrived. 
Simply put, any community that was struck by the scourge was forced to take a series of  
measures in order to deal with the crisis. Washington DC, for instance, attempted to 
reduce the spread of the malady by regulating and reducing crowding. This was done by 
closing all their schools and implementing a type of shift-work program in which 
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different government offices were open at different times. The latter limited crowding 
both on streetcars and in office buildings.
229
  In Chicago, people began wearing flu-
masks in the hope that the masks would offer protection against the influenza bacillus. 
In another effort, health officials in the Windy City told the city's theaters to ban anyone 
showing signs of the "grippe".
230
 New York City also saw a tremendous number of 
people falling ill with Spanish Flu. As a result, the city proposed closing certain types of 
businesses and stores, saying they would even consider closing churches, schools and 
other public gathering places if the situation deteriorated further.
231
 In New England, the 
federal government took the crucial step of cooperating with both municipal and state 
authorities to combat the malady.
232
 Such broad governmental cooperation became 
imperative as Spanish Flu began spreading from military camps and to the civilian 
population throughout the nation, starting in the east.
233
 With at least 50,000 cases of flu 
in Massachusetts alone by September 27, communities throughout the state began 
implementing more extreme measures. Boston, for one, chose to close all its dance halls, 
theaters, and "other unnecessary places of public assembly".
234
 In a definite sign of how 
seriously the federal government viewed the threat of influenza, and in recognition of 
the horrific conditions in military camps, Provost Marshall General Chowder even 
cancelled the draft of 142,000 American men.
235
 This was done despite the demand for 
manpower caused by the war effort. In Ohio, Camp Sherman near Chillicothe was 
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placed under quarantine on September 30.
236
 Quarantine did not arrest Spanish 
influenza. Shortly after arriving in Camp Sherman, the "grippe" began spreading to 
civilian locales throughout the state, forcing cities and towns alike to implement a 
variety of flu regulations. Miami University closed on Oct. 4, as did all churches, 
schools, lodges and theaters in Cambridge.
237
 A day later,  Cincinnati followed suit and 
ordered the closing of all the city's churches, schools, theaters, and "other places of 
congregation."
238
 During this same time, the Spanish Influenza was quietly making its 
way into Cleveland, infecting more and more of the city's men, women, and children. 
Still, as there was not a serious, recognized influenza presence in the city, the health 
commissioner decided to rely primarily on education and voluntary public preventive 
measures.  
  
The Weapons of Public Health 
First and foremost by a long interval among the weapons of attack,  come 
education.
239
 
 
 
     Whatever caused Dr. Rockwood to delay more stringent flu measures, these reasons 
soon became less important as Spanish Influenza began producing the kind of serious 
situation that required far more extensive and determined actions. Friday, October 4, 
1918, brought a series of disconcerting news to the city. First, the flu situation was 
quickly going from bad to worse on the East Coast, developing into a genuine epidemic 
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disaster. The tremendous impact of the epidemic caused U.S. Surgeon General Rupert 
Blue of the Public Health Department to send out a message throughout the U.S, "urging 
the closing of all churches, schools, theaters and public institutions in every community 
where the disease has developed."
240
 Second, the Ohio State Department of Health 
reported from Columbus that the illness had arrived and was spreading furiously 
throughout the state with 4,000 reported cases at Camp Sherman alone. Of these, over a 
hundred had already died. On this same day, Cleveland also saw its first official cases of 
Spanish Influenza.
241
 Of the twelve reported cases, one person died. Seventy-two year 
old Murdoch Ross thus became the first person in Cleveland known to succumb to the 
epidemic.
242
  
     Health Commissioner Rockwood's response to all of this highlights a couple of key 
issues. Presented with evidence of an increasingly rampant and rapidly encroaching 
epidemic, Rockwood exuded a degree of confidence that would later prove remarkably 
unfounded. "Blue's order [will] not be carried out in Cleveland at present", Rockwood 
stated, "because of the few cases reported and the improbability of the disease 
spreading."
243
 As discussed, his response was less a genuine case of hope than it was an 
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indicator of the city's reluctance to implement bans on schools, churches, businesses and 
public gatherings. Furthermore, Rockwood's handling of the Surgeon General's message 
does not mean that Cleveland public health leaders neglected to respond to the situation 
or increase their precautionary measures against the epidemic. In fact, city officials, 
hospitals, private organizations and institutions, and private individuals, responded to 
the increasingly threatening situation in a variety of ways.  
     Deeming isolation of patients one of the best means of fighting flu, Dr. Rockwood 
ordered that parts of City Hospital be prepared and equipped to care for influenza 
patients if the situation in the city deteriorated to epidemic proportions. Although this 
move was important, the most crucial part of the fight was education. Welfare Director 
Beman quickly joined in the education effort by ordering thousands of informative 
placards to be posted throughout the city, telling people to avoid crowds and get "plenty 
of fresh air."
244
 Dr. Rockwood's education campaign went much further than that. On the 
very next day, Rockwood presented Cleveland with the city's own alternative to Blue's 
closing orders. Rather than implementing flu bans and closings, Rockwood called on all 
Clevelanders to "Help to Keep 'Flu' Out of Cleveland". The call was posted in large 
letters on the front page of the Cleveland Press.
245
 The article that followed is a 
tremendous example of what Dr. Rockwood and the city's health department viewed as 
the ideal way of responding to Spanish Flu. Essentially, it is a great example of the kind 
of education effort that not only informs, but also seeks to win the hearts, minds, and 
cooperation of the public. Reflecting the city's ideals, the health commissioner resisted 
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flu bans and appealed instead to people's voluntary participation. Like his predecessor 
Dr. Friedrich, Dr. Rockwood was not above placing a large degree of responsibility in 
citizens' hands, expressing the belief that the disease could only be defeated if people 
cooperated and fought together against the scourge. "The situation is not now alarming," 
he stated, "but it will become alarming unless proper preventive measures are taken by 
every man, woman and child in Cleveland."
246
  
     Drawing on examples from other cities, Rockwood highlighted the importance of not 
allowing the disease to reach epidemic proportions in Cleveland, as this would force the 
city to start closing down schools, theaters, and even churches. This was bad enough in 
itself, but the gravest danger - apart from the obvious danger to human life - was the 
epidemic's ability to hamper the war effort by shutting down factories and suspending 
public gatherings, including Liberty Loan events. "We don't want that to happen here", 
Rockwood declared. The health commissioner thus appealed to civic responsibility and 
patriotism to ensure people's loyal obedience. In short, Dr. Rockwood told Clevelanders 
that love, loyalty and duty to both city and country demanded everyone's cooperation in 
responding to the Spanish Flu. Cooperation was not forced, per se, but it was certainly 
strongly encouraged. Dr. Rockwood did not limit his call for cooperation to feelings of 
duty and responsibility. Also appealing to the innate human desire to avoid dangerous 
diseases, the health commissioner emphasized the need for Clevelanders to cooperate 
with the health board in order to minimize the threat to human life. Thus highlighting 
and explaining the importance of defeating Spanish Influenza, the doctor once again 
presented his idea of the ideal response to the epidemic, stating that "[e]very person 
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must become an unofficial health officer charged with the responsibility of seeing to it 
that the disease will not gain ground in Cleveland." He then gave them a list of proper 
actions and precautions to follow.
 247
 If successful, this effort of educating the public 
would produce a well-informed and highly motivated, cooperative city. This was clearly 
more important than forcing flu restrictions on people. The health commissioner hoped 
that if his education campaign succeeded, the harsher methods would not have to be 
implemented. The situation was clearly getting serious enough to prompt a strong 
exhortation from the city's health commissioner. Even so, it was not yet considered 
serious enough to implement restrictive regulations or challenge the long established 
Cleveland ideal of voluntarism and willful cooperation.  
     The entire October 5 front page article was clearly part of the health commissioner's 
education campaign, created to maximize Cleveland's preparedness and resistance 
power. As stated, Dr. Rockwood saw education as one of the most crucial elements of 
the city's response to public health issues and crises. His education campaign should 
therefore not be interpreted as a lame, second-rate alternative to strict regulations and 
forced prohibitions of public gatherings. Instead, we need to view the role, power, and 
nature of education and voluntarism as Dr. Rockwood and his contemporary health 
professional viewed it. Education, as understood by Cleveland health officials in the 
1918-19 period, was much more than simply "the training of the intelligence [and] the 
distribution of the facts[.]" Crucially, education was also "the development of the 
feelings, the emotions, [and] the instinctive reactions which guide us chiefly in the 
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emergencies and great decisions in life."
248
 In other words, education included winning 
the hearts and minds of the populace, and through this also win their voluntary, willful, 
engaged and effective cooperation. The health commissioner not only wanted to present 
Cleveland's residents with a list of weapons to use against Spanish Flu. He also wanted 
everybody to become actively involved in the fight. An educated populace was therefore 
seen as a populace that not only knew what to do, but, recognizing the wisdom and need 
for action, also did what had to be done. Therefore, his education campaign included 
both a profound call for public participation and a thorough explanation of what people 
should do to fight Spanish Influenza.  
     Dr. Rockwood posted his long list of practical advice in a clear and straight-forward 
way, giving people specific instructions about what to do in order to avoid getting the 
flu, and what to do if suffering from the disease.
249
 The list is exceptionally helpful 
when it comes to understanding subsequent measures and responses taken by city 
officials, private organizations, and a private individuals. This is because the list 
provides a great view into the prevailing official ideas on etiology, medical beliefs and 
practices at the time. And, considering that people tend to have reasons for acting or 
responding in certain ways, ideas or beliefs about the nature of influenza and how to best 
fight it help us understand why people did the things they did during the epidemic. For 
instance, there would have been no reason for closing churches and schools unless 
people believed that flu spread through human interaction. Or, people would not have 
worn face masks to ward off the disease unless they believed that the masks could 
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actually help. Whether hindsight would prove their beliefs to be true or not is beside the 
point. What matters is that people acted one way or another because of their etiological 
beliefs. This was obviously the case with Dr. Rockwood as well, which makes the front 
page article important for yet another reason. Specifically, the article shows that Dr. 
Rockwood viewed modern medicine and science as the best way to combat the scourge. 
Although this is not surprising, it is very important. Throughout the epidemic, the doctor 
was remarkably consistent in providing reasons for his different actions, making sure to 
provide expert medical opinion as the intellectual authority behind his decisions. This is 
seen particularly well whenever he chose to use coercion or force to implement and 
enforce flu regulations. Essentially, by referring to modern medicine and educating the 
public about expert opinions and scientific views, Dr. Rockwood found a way to 
legitimize and implement unpopular regulations by declaring them a necessary part of a 
collective fight against influenza. It was in many ways like convincing people of the 
virtues of smallpox vaccination. And, as with the matter of smallpox vaccination, some 
people questioned the wisdom of the health commissioner's recommendations, while 
others resisted or even rejected the doctor's scientific argument altogether.
250
 One writer 
to the Plain Dealer wondered for instance why,"[seeing how t]he influenza germ is so 
small that it cannot be seen with a microscope... people have been trying to shut it out by 
the coarse meshes of a 'flu mask.'"
251
 Cleveland's Christian Scientists' opinions about 
Rockwood's later closing orders were of a much fiercer character. How can the churches 
be closed, they asked, when the church is needed more than ever? Viewing Rockwood's 
                                                 
250
 For tremendous discussions on the controversies over smallpox inoculation and vaccination in U.S. 
history, see Fenn, Pox Americana, 38-42, 83-4, 112 and Willrich, Pox.  
251
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 18, 1918. 
84 
 
scientific approach as something akin to blasphemy they lamented that "it is proposed 
that these churches shall be shut, and that the admission shall be made that it is 
dangerous for men and women to congregate to worship God, for fear the Lord's arm is 
so shortened that He cannot contend with microbes." Mixing theological arguments with 
the world war context, they went on to ask: "[i]s it to be supposed that the prayers for the 
success of Truth in the war will be more successful than the prayers in the churches for 
freedom from influenza?"
252
 In a special petition to Dr. Rockwood for the sake of being 
allowed to keep their churches open, the Christian Scientists argued that "[s]urely the 
God to whom Christians pray will protect them and deliver them from any danger while 
they are praying to Him[.]" Dr. Rockwood, preferring the tenets of modern medicine to 
the tenets of religion, and holding that there could be no exception to the order, did not 
comply with their wishes.
 253
 
      On October 5th, well prior to the debacle with the Christian Scientists, Dr. 
Rockwood did not yet see the need to introduce flu bans and regulations. Instead, he 
hoped that people would diligently follow his list of advice and that this would be 
sufficient to halt the Spanish Flu. The main pieces of advice that he offered for avoiding 
catching the illness included staying away from crowds, staying warm, keeping the 
hands and mouth clean, covering the mouth and nose with a handkerchief when sneezing 
or coughing, not visiting the sick, keeping feet warm and dry, and to not worry. The 
advice given to the ill was to go to bed and stay there until at least three days after any 
type of fever had disappeared. While in bed, the patient should preferably be in a warm 
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yet well-ventilated room. In addition, everybody who fell ill should contact a physician, 
avoid kissing, and avoid sharing bowls, plates, and cutlery with others. Finally, the sick 
were reminded that the "[a]fter effects of influenza are worse than the disease" and that 
the real danger came from pneumonia. This was the reason given for telling people to 
stay in bed even after they felt better.
254
  
     Several issues become instantly clear when considering the health commissioner's list 
of advice. Most notable is the great challenge or even utter impossibility for many 
people to adhere to the different points on the list, for cultural, social, political, and 
economic reasons. Not visiting the sick, for instance, was quite contrary to some of the 
cultural traditions that were present in the city's remarkably varied ethnic population.
255
 
For instance, evidence suggests that some groups interpreted quarantine placards on 
houses to be invitations to visit the sick rather than to stay away, much to the health 
officials' chagrin. Some even "insist[ed] on seeing those sick".
256
 Economic necessity 
and need must also have affected a number of people's obedience to the list. To stay in 
bed, even when struck by fever, could present severe economic hardships on workers 
who would certainly not receive any money from their employers while on sick-leave. 
The fact that Dr. Rockwood asked employers to send home anyone who showed signs of 
illness certainly suggests that a number of workers were reluctant to forego work and the 
wages that came with it even if they were sick.
257
 Their reluctance is understandable. 
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The tremendous financial impact that sickness and inability to work could have on a 
Cleveland family in 1918 can easily be imagined. It is also made painfully clear when 
reading the numerous, detailed calls for aid posted by the city's charitable 
organizations.
258
  
     Avoiding crowds could also be next to impossible for a number of people, not least 
the poorer individuals and families who, as was common throughout the nation's cities at 
the time, often lived in rather crowded houses, rooms and apartments. And what about 
the thousands of people who were packed into the city's streetcars every day? Crowding 
was simply a fact of life for many Clevelanders at the time. How could they possibly 
hope to avoid it? Furthermore, even if people somehow managed to avoid crowds,  they 
still faced the daunting task of somehow finding a way to stay in a room that was not 
only warm but also well ventilated. As with most other matters, this must have been 
especially difficult for the poorer residents of the city. Even if poor insulation or open 
windows provided better ventilation, neither can be said to provide much heat during the 
winter months.
259
 Even so, the city's health department stated that the indoor temperature 
in homes and schools alike should not drop below an already chilly sixty degrees 
Fahrenheit during the epidemic.
260
 During the winter of 1918 and well into 1919 this 
meant artificial heating, most often by burning coal. Heating was obviously not free of 
charge, and it became even more expensive as coal prices increased along with the 
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ballooning demand for fuel caused by the nation's war effort.
261
 For others, the problem 
of heating had a more human character, specifically in cases of "profiteering apartment 
house owners." In more than a hundred instances, tenants reported landlords who 
neglected to keep apartment buildings heated.
262
 Claiming that they had been told by the 
county Fuel Administration to not light their furnaces until November 1, the landlords 
sought to save a good deal of money by withholding heat from their renters. Whether 
this scheme would have been successful in other circumstances is unknown. Under 
Spanish Influenza circumstances, it backfired tremendously. Denying the existence of 
any government orders prohibiting the heating of apartment buildings, Dr. Rockwood 
stated that "[t]he government wants public health protected[,]" and that "[the health 
department] will prosecute all unpatriotic landlords who are hiding behind the 
government at this critical time." The health commissioner also made sure to show that 
he was supported by both the National and County Fuel Administration in making these 
claims.
263
 Although the health commissioner came to the aid of a few people, it is clear 
that a large number of Clevelanders simply could not live up to all of Dr. Rockwood's 
recommended dos and don'ts.   
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Volunteer, Or Else. 
     Dr. Rockwood's reaction to profiteering landlords highlights the health 
commissioner's need to balance voluntary cooperation with coercion. The October 5 
front page article in the Cleveland Press gives another clear example of this. In addition 
to posting a list of advice and calling for the voluntary participation and obedience of 
every individual in the city, the health commissioner also made five very telling 
statements. The language used in each statement not only gives us an indicator of what 
the doctor saw as more imperative and essential, but also highlights the various limits 
and limitations of his authority and power. First, Rockwood "ordered" that people sick 
with the Spanish Flu should be quarantined. Second, he "requested" that manufacturers 
would send their sick workers home and not allow them back until they had received a 
proper diagnosis. Third, school officials were "urged” to report any cases where they 
suspected that a child had the flu. Fourth, the health commissioner "required" that 
doctors notified the city's Health Department of all cases of Spanish Influenza. Finally, 
he "got [streetcar] officials to agree" to keep windows open in their cars to improve 
ventilation.
264
 The article thus makes it clear that the health commissioner had the legal 
power to order quarantines when necessary, and to make certain requirements of the 
city's physicians. The fact that he chose to make use of this power from the very 
beginning of the epidemic tells us that he viewed these factors as imperative in order to 
combat the disease.
265
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     The other three points in which he requested, urged and convinced parts of society to 
carry out his wishes also highlight elements that Rockwood must have seen as very 
important. Intriguingly, they also show us that the health commissioner may not have 
had the legislative power to order or demand these actions, but relied instead on the 
tradition of cooperating with central parts of Cleveland's leadership and society in order 
to implement them. Much of these requests appear to follow along the same lines as the 
city's response to the smallpox epidemic almost two decades earlier, in which the city's 
mayor, schools, private organizations, and the Chamber of Commerce played 
instrumental roles in overcoming the scourge. Much like what was done in 1902, 
Rockwood responded to the threat of Spanish Influenza by asking for the help and 
cooperation of employers and school officials and relying on their powers and influence 
to further the health commissioner's wishes. As was also the case during previous 
epidemics, much of the cooperation that doctor Rockwood sought from officials, 
businesses and organizations was for the sake of encouraging and enforcing broader 
societal and individual cooperation. For example, employers were asked to send sick 
workers home, again clearly suggesting that ailing men would not necessarily volunteer 
to leave work.
266
 Pressure was thus applied from above to make sure that the needs and 
health of the public was placed ahead of individual persons or families. In short, through 
the voluntary cooperation of upper layers of society, Dr. Rockwood found the power and 
means to both encourage and coerce cooperation or compliance in others. 
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     The health commissioner found a huge part of this form of voluntary cooperation in 
various sections of the city government as well. For example, the often crowded 
streetcars that took many Clevelanders to and from work became an early concern. As 
seen, Dr. Rockwood sought and obtained the promise of cooperation from both ConCon 
officials and leaders of the Cleveland Railway Company.
267
 Apparently not trusting 
whole-heartedly in the voluntary cooperation of the streetcar companies, Dr. Rockwood 
also acquired the cooperation of the city's traction commissioner who blatantly ordered 
that all streetcars had to have at least two windows open during rush hour.
268
 The 
voluntary cooperation of the traction commissioner thus made the cooperation of the 
streetcar companies more or less compulsory. The cooperation - voluntary or not - of the 
streetcar companies and their employees, made widespread public cooperation also 
compulsory, as people were told that the windows had to stay open. The order was not 
popular among streetcar patrons who "shivered on their way down town", courtesy of 
cold weather. Many passengers tried to close the windows but were stopped by the car 
conductors, causing numerous heated arguments.
269
 By securing the help of the traction 
commissioner and the street car companies, the health commissioner managed to use the 
cooperation of another branch of the city government and of private companies to force 
uncooperative individuals to abide by flu regulations.  
     Similar tactics were used when dealing with a couple of other major concerns: dust 
and spitting. The exposure of soil had long been believed to be a cause of disease in both 
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Cleveland and elsewhere.
270
 The connection between soil and disease even survived the 
arrival and development of the germ theory of disease. The only thing that separated 
1918 views about the dangers of soil and multiple earlier views on the same matter was 
evolving medical theories and language. Soil went from being a contagion because of 
unfavorable humors, to being dangerous because of the presence of  fomites, to being a 
cause of disease because "[a]ll kinds of germs" were trapped in the soil, only waiting to 
be released into the air.
271
 As late as 1903, Dr. Friedrich stated that "[t]"he continual 
digging up of streets and the tearing up of pavements.... is not conducive to health. All 
kinds of germs which have been washed into the roadbed and buried there are brought 
again to the surface."
272
 Dr. Rockwood believed much the same in 1918, stating that "the 
dust swept from sidewalks floats through the air for hours and carries with it hundreds of 
influenza germs."
273
 During the epidemic the city therefore decided to periodically open 
fire hydrants to moisten city streets and sidewalks. This was believed to prevent 
infectious dust clouds from arising.
274
 Crucially, the health commissioner also secured 
the cooperation of the police chief who ordered his officers to arrest anyone who created 
dust clouds by sweeping. Anybody who wished to sweep their sidewalks had to make 
sure to wet the ground first.
275
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     Dust was dangerous, and stopping dust clouds was therefore important. Spitting was 
also a menace. Although spitting was originally connected to the spread of tuberculosis, 
Dr. Rockwood and other physicians also saw public spitting as an effective way of 
spreading flu germs.
276
 The health commissioner therefore declared "[w]ar to the hilt" 
against the practice. To fight this war against spitting, Rockwood not only relied on the 
voluntary response of the people. In a move quite in line with Cleveland's tradition of 
combining public health authority with police authority, he also obtained the help of the 
city's police to help put an end to the unsanitary, germ-spreading custom. Emphasizing 
the seriousness of the situation and supporting the validity of banning a very common 
practice, Police Chief Frank Smith stated that " [i]n the view of the present 
situation, every member of the police department must understand that it is just as 
important to arrest and prosecute people who spit on streets, sidewalks and street cars, as 
it is to apprehend burglars and thieves."
277
People who broke the spitting ban were to be 
immediately arrested and prosecuted without lenience and with no "golden rule" 
exemptions.
278
 Streetcar officials quickly seconded this move, ordering their motormen 
and conductors to "cause the arrest at once of all persons.... see[n] spitting on cars", and 
asking residents to report offenders.
279
 The police leaders, acting on behalf of 
Rockwood, also instructed streetcar conductors to turn over anyone seen spitting.
280
 
Although the new campaign against spitting quickly led to a few arrests, it soon became 
evident that enforcement of the regulation would never live up to the police chief's 
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extraordinary statement.
281
 Instead, it appears to have quickly fallen out of use 
altogether, as evidenced by the sudden disappearance of reported arrests in the 
newspapers and the 1920 Hospital and Health Survey which state that only seven people 
were convicted for breaking the anti-spitting ordinance in 1918.
282
 It is very likely that 
the war on spitting lost momentum as the influenza epidemic developed to the point 
where a tremendous amount of pressure was placed on both the police and the public in 
general. There are multiple examples of policemen working long hours to aid in 
transporting the sick, enforcing flu closings, placing quarantine placards on houses, 
making sure that sick people got in touch with doctors, and so on.
283
 Already overtaxed 
by the many demands caused by the epidemic, the police force became further limited in 
its ability to enforce spitting bans as several policemen fell ill with influenza and 
pneumonia. In fact, more policemen were incapacitated by the Spanish Flu than by 
anything else in the city's history, making it imperative for the police leaders to prioritize 
matters of greater importance.
284
 Despite the quickly diminishing importance placed on 
the spitting regulations, it still stands out as an example where the health commissioner 
sought cooperation from other parts of the city government to enforce public 
cooperation. The enormous expansion of police responsibilities during the epidemic also 
testify about the extent that Dr. Rockwood relied on the cooperation and help of other 
parts of the city government to deal with the Spanish Flu.     
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Teaching the People. Tracking the Foe.  
     The schools also played an important role in the city's response to the epidemic. 
Crucially, the schools took center stage in the health commissioner's plans "for a 
campaign of education, coupled with a system of tracing cases of influenza[.]"
285
 
Cooperating with the Board of Education, the chief medical inspector of the schools, and 
the city's Director of Hygiene, Cleveland's health department managed to provide every 
teacher in the city with a list of practices and precautions to teach to the school 
children.
286
 For example, in the belief that fresh air combats influenza, teachers 
instructed pupils in breathing exercises in front of open windows.
287
 Even greater plans 
were fashioned though, as Dr. Rockwood singled out the schools as a primary way "to 
bring knowledge of the disease and of means of prevention into every home in 
Cleveland."
288
 This was to be achieved by printing up informative pamphlets and hand 
them out to all the school children. The schools were particularly important in the 
dissemination of information because of the many various ethnic groups and languages 
in the city. Referring to the immigrant nature of Cleveland's populace Rockwood stated 
that "[i]f this plan is adopted these leaflets probably will be printed not only in English 
but as well in the chief foreign languages spoken in the city[.]"
289
City schools could thus 
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be used to educate the populace in two main ways. Firstly, they could educate the pupils 
who in turn could pass on the information to their families. Secondly, they could pass 
out leaflets that the school children could bring home with them. Both these approaches 
should be able to reach both English-speaking and foreign-language-speaking families 
alike. It is unclear whether the pamphlets that were handed out in the schools turned out 
to be in multiple languages or not. Even so, the pupils who were present - part of an 
immigrant family or not - would still be able to bring back knowledge to their families. 
Whether by delivering pamphlets to pupils' families, educating the school children, or 
both, Dr. Rockwood and his helpers managed to use the schools to educate a large part 
of the city's population until the schools were finally closed. Once the schools closed, 
they had to rely on other modes of communication and publication.  
     The schools were not only important because of their educational qualities. They 
were also used for the extremely important task of tracing the spread and prevalence of 
the epidemic in the city. Reporting and recording data about communicable illnesses 
was a tried and true public health tactic in Cleveland and elsewhere. As shown in 
numerous secondary works dealing with epidemic disease, as well as examples from 
annual reports and a myriad of newspaper articles describing the process, creating 
statistics and maps about diseases had risen along with other modern medical theories 
and practices.
290
 By 1912, Cleveland even had a separate Bureau of Vital Statistics 
under the Department of Public Health and Sanitation, along with a Bureau of 
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Communicable Disease.
291
 The perhaps greatest example of the practice is found in the 
annual mortality statistics made by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Bureau of the 
Census, where maps and statistics became the central means by which the nation's health 
was interpreted and determined.
292
 In Cleveland, Dr. Friedrich had used tracking and 
mapping tactics during both the 1902 smallpox epidemic and the 1903 outbreak of 
typhoid fever.
293
 The city had also been gathering information about death rates and all 
sorts of death causes for decades.
294
 During the Spanish Influenza epidemic, keeping 
track of the number of sick and dead became a main part of the overall strategy of 
federal, state, and local health authorities alike. Throughout the nation, people were told 
to contact a health professional if they were sick, and physicians were required to 
faithfully report cases of flu to the appropriate authorities.
295
 In Cleveland, Dr. 
Rockwood told doctors and hospitals to report all new cases and all deaths every day of 
the week except on Sundays.
296
 The state and federal governments in turn told the health 
commissioner to pass on his findings to them.
297
 Health officials  recognized several 
problems with the practice. For starters, many physicians found it difficult to accurately 
diagnose influenza amongst many other respiratory diseases, especially when given 
minimal time to reach a diagnosis. The problem was later reflected in both local and 
national mortality statistics. Most explicitly, writers of the 1919 federal report stated that 
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in the case of the Spanish flu epidemic, "doubtless[ly] many cases were returned as 
influenza when the deaths were caused by pneumonia, and vice versa.
298
 More crucially 
than misdiagnosis, there simply were not enough physicians available to visit or 
examine every person who showed signs of illness, and the doctors who were around 
were extremely overworked. At the height of the epidemic, Cleveland doctors worked 
practically around the clock and were still unable to keep up with the workload created 
by the Spanish Flu.
299
 The need for doctors eventually became so great that Dr. 
Rockwood saw no way out but to force a number of medical students from Western 
Reserve University to volunteer their services.
300
 Finally, it was a well known fact that 
many people, despite the health commissioner's insistence and admonitions, chose to not 
report their illness to either doctors or health officials.
301
 Throughout the epidemic, Dr. 
Rockwood therefore operated with two different lists; one for reported, official cases, 
and a markedly larger one for unofficial, estimated cases.
302
 On October 5, during the 
very early days of the epidemic in Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood listed the number of 
reported cases of influenza in Cleveland at under forty. At the same time, he estimated 
there to be another 450 unreported cases present in the city, making the ratio of 
estimated cases more than eleven times higher than the reported cases.
303
 The doctor 
changed his estimates a bit over the next two days, stating that by noon on Monday the 
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7th, there were a hundred official cases of influenza in the city and about 500 unofficial 
ones.
304
 A week later, the numbers had grown to about 2,000 official cases and an 
estimated 10,000 or more unreported sick.
305
 As the epidemic progressed and the 
number of sick exploded, Rockwood eventually stopped posting unofficial estimates. 
His last estimate posted in the Cleveland Press came on October 19, showing a total of 
8,366 sick in Cleveland, with 4,264 of these listed as official cases.
306
  
     It is unclear how the doctor made any of these unofficial estimates. What is certain is 
that mapping and tracking the epidemic was not an easy task. It did not help that the 
city's Bureau of Vital Statistics had not kept up with the improvements seen in many of 
the other sections of Cleveland's health department. In fact, in the Health and Hospital 
Survey of 1919-20, the bureau was pronounced sub-par, with appropriate and thorough 
vital statistics considered to be "to all intents and purposes non-existent."
307
 Faced with 
the challenge of mapping the proliferation of the epidemic, Dr. Rockwood therefore 
quickly turned to the schools. The idea was that just as the schools could be used to send 
information to homes and families, they could also be used to receive information from 
homes and families. First of all, absences served as a starting point of inquiry. It was 
quite obvious that not all absences were because of Spanish Flu though, making it 
necessary to investigate the homes of the absent children. Through the cooperation of 
the city's school medical director and acting school superintendent, Dr. Rockwood 
secured the authority to recruit the services of Cleveland's 3,500 teachers. The teachers 
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were all ordered to help the thirty city school nurses in visiting the homes of 12,500 
absent children and report the reason why the children were not in school. In cases of 
disease, the teachers were to find out who the attending physician was and report this 
back to their superiors who in turn would pass the information on to Dr. Rockwood.
308
 
Later in the epidemic, teachers were used to survey not just the homes of the absent 
pupils, but to canvas the entire city, "to see how many students are actually suffering 
from the [flu]."
309
Although far from providing official diagnoses, the teachers provided 
the health commissioner with important information about the  nature and spread of the 
epidemic throughout the city. The acting superintendent of the schools, Mr. Jones, 
emphasized the importance of the teachers' work, stating that checking up on the 
absentees was a great "aid in combating the disease."
310
 Before the end of the epidemic, 
Dr. Rockwood had come to rely heavily on the city's teachers both in tracking the 
epidemic and in providing desperately needed help working as nurses.
311
  
  
Clamping Down the Flu Lid.  
     The importance of keeping track of the spread of Spanish flu is easily overlooked. 
After all, simply knowing the number of sick and dead does not seem to provide any 
direct effect on fighting epidemic disease. However, for Dr. Rockwood, knowing the 
extent, nature and development of the scourge significantly influenced his actions in the 
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war against it. Crucially, the health commissioner used the number of sick in the city as 
the reason for both implementing and eventually lifting flu regulations. This gave the 
doctor a quantifiable, scientific argument, backed by expert advice, to legitimize flu 
regulations that affected people throughout the city in economic, social, cultural, 
political, and personal ways. It also gave him a powerful argument for moving from the 
ideal of voluntary participation to introduce forced cooperation through regulations.  
     On October 8, more than 300 Clevelanders were officially sick with the flu. Of these, 
at least fourteen had died. In order to make the best possible decision during a situation 
that was growing increasingly serious, Dr. Rockwood formed an advisory committee 
within the city's health department, and also met with the chief health officers from 
Lakewood, Cleveland Heights and East Cleveland. The health officers had two main 
tasks to take care of that day. Firstly they wanted to establish close coordination and 
cooperation among the area's health departments. Secondly, believing that close human 
interaction was instrumental in spreading the malady, they sought to limit public 
gatherings and crowding. Using the hundreds of new cases reported daily as an indicator 
of the seriousness of the situation and therefore a reason for their decision, the health 
officers soon agreed to issue a ban on indoor meetings. On the very next day - not giving 
up on the ideal of voluntary cooperation quite yet - Dr. Rockwood called for the 
"[s]crupulous observation by the public of voluntary restrictive measures, to save 
Cleveland from disastrous conditions such as [seen] in the eastern cities."
312
 Meeting 
with his advisory board, Rockwood explained that "various measures of a voluntary 
nature were decided on in the hope that general compliance with them would render 
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more drastic steps unnecessary."
313
 The effect of his admonitions were almost 
immediately seen as insufficient. The call for voluntary action had not been entirely 
rejected by the public, as evidenced by the cooperation of numerous groups and people, 
including employers sending sick employees home, nurses volunteering their services, 
Boy Scouts offering to help, city and suburb officials cooperating and coordinating their 
efforts, and so on. In fact, Dr. Rockwood appreciated these voluntary efforts very much.
 
314
  Unfortunately, the Spanish Influenza proved to be a foe that required even more 
powerful measures. 
     As evidenced by the growing number of sick, the Spanish flu eventually required the 
public to sacrifice some of their freedoms for the sake of public health, safety, and 
function. Public cooperation became paramount, making voluntarism less important than 
obedience. On October 10, a mere day after stressing the importance of public adherence 
to his lists of advice, Dr. Rockwood lamented that "[i]t had been hoped that effective 
work in coping with the disease might be done by voluntary action of those holding 
public gatherings in refusing admittance to persons with symptoms of influenza. 
Developments have convinced me, however, that more radical steps are needed."
315
 The 
doctor stated that the rapid spread of Spanish Flu in Cleveland had caused the disease to 
reach "the epidemic stage" in the city. The quick proliferation of the malady highlighted 
the very real threat that the "grippe" represented, and emphasized the importance of 
people obeying the health board's instructions in order to curtail the scourge. Just as 
importantly, by categorizing the illness as having reached the epidemic stage, Rockwood 
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placed Spanish Flu in a category of disease that allowed for more comprehensive and 
stringent public health measures, including banning public assemblies. This point needs 
to be given some serious consideration, as words are very powerful in matters of public 
health.  
     For centuries, certain words have had the power to legitimize or even force strong 
public health responses. For example, the reported presence of plague could lead to 
various public and private responses in Europe in the centuries following the Black 
Death outbreak. The responses were not without consequences. A quarantine may have 
been an appropriate response to a plague crisis, but it nonetheless brought with it 
tremendous economic, commercial and social repercussions.
316
 Words such as 'cholera', 
'yellow fever', and 'plague' have a long history of causing significant public health 
reactions in the U.S. as well. In San Francisco, the mere suspicion of plague was used to 
implement a tremendously intrusive and discriminatory measure as the entire Chinatown 
area of the city was placed under quarantine. The presence of plague was not even 
confirmed, but the word had enough power for racially motivated officials to implement 
extremely stringent and dubious regulations.
317
 The presence of yellow fever in several 
U.S. states in 1878 also led to quarantine measures, resulting in tremendous personal 
hardships, and great commercial and economic losses in many areas.
318
 These words 
were made powerful by the scourges they represented. The word "influenza" did not 
                                                 
316
 James S. Amelang, A Journal of the Plague Year: the Diary of the Barcelona Tanner Miquel Parets, 
1651 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991); Kristy Wilson Bowers, "Balancing Individual and 
Communal Needs: Plague and Public Health in Early Modern Seville," Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine vol. 81, no. 2 (2007): 335-358; Horrox, The Black Death,93-124, 208-223; Mary Lindemann, 
Medicine and Society, 43-7, 155-92  
317
 Kraut, Silent Travelers, 79-96; Shah, Contagious Divides, 120-157. 
318
 Nuwer, Plague Among the Magnolias, 48-74, 88, 113, 131-4. 
103 
 
have a similar track record or established power. "Epidemic", on the other hand, did. 
Crucially, Cleveland's health department had the legal power to enforce quarantines, 
isolations, closings and vaccinations during times of crisis and epidemic disease.
319
 
However, to be effective, the use of governmental power had to be legitimate both in 
legal terms and in the eyes of the populace. People had to understand the seriousness of 
the situation, or they would not easily comply with stringent regulations. During the 
Spanish Influenza period, "epidemic" was the magic word that established the situation 
as a crisis and therefore allowed for crisis measures and regulations.  
     Dr. Rockwood thus used the number of sick and dead to declare the situation an 
epidemic. By doing this, the health commissioner successfully labeled the disease an 
obvious and present threat to the safety and welfare of the city. He then used the threat 
of epidemic flu to legitimize official regulations and, if necessary, coercion. In this way, 
freedoms and voluntarism were only sacrificed for the sake of essential need and 
necessity. Having officially established the Spanish Flu as an epidemic crisis, Dr. 
Rockwood set about implementing stricter rules. This was not without problems though, 
as he immediately had to consider the various needs and interests of society.  For 
example, the doctor believed that many places of public assembly simply had to be shut 
down during the epidemic in order to limit person-to-person spread of the disease. At the 
same time, just as both cultural norms and wartime considerations made it impossible to 
implement broad quarantines, certain needs of society made it either difficult or 
impossible to shut down a number of places where people congregated.
320
 For instance, 
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the city government, the police, and the hospitals could not shut down even in the midst 
of an epidemic, as these parts of society were seen as essential for the safe and proper 
functioning of the city. If nothing else, these institutions were needed in order to 
organize the city's fight against the influenza epidemic. Telephone companies, 
newspapers, and the war industries were also high on the list of essential enterprises.
321
 
But, Rockwood assured the public, even less "essential" places would only be closed if it 
became "absolutely necessary."
322
 This meant two things. First of all, it became very 
important to determine what parts of society were "essential" and which ones were less 
so. Secondly, it became very important to identify the point where extreme actions 
became absolutely necessary.
323
 
     The point of absolute necessity was largely determined by considering the number of 
new cases every day.  A major threshold was quickly reached. With 300 new cases 
reported on Friday the 11th, Dr. Rockwood, with the support of both Mayor Davis' and 
the mayor's war advisory board, declared that dance halls, theaters, movies, churches, 
and "other public meeting places, excepting schools and Liberty Loan meetings" would 
be closed starting Monday, October 14. The closing bans were to be in effect for two 
weeks, or until conditions improved and the epidemic abated. 
324
 Rather than 
implementing the bans immediately, the delay until Monday the 14th allowed places of 
entertainment to fulfill their weekend schedule. This provided amusement for the public 
and, just as importantly, limited the inevitable financial hardship for the theaters a little 
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bit.
325
 One of the shows that was allowed to run as scheduled was a war play by famous 
French actress Sarah Bernhardt at the Keith Hippodrome.
326
 The same venue also held a 
large concert on Sunday evening in honor of wounded American and Italian soldiers, 
completing a weekend-long celebration of war-heroes.
327
 The celebration centered 
around a number of visiting Italian soldiers who had all been wounded in their fight 
against the dreaded "Huns". The festivities included parades that drew enormous crowds 
and a mass meeting in the Hippodrome that "packed the playhouse to the doors." More 
than 9,000 proud Italian Clevelanders also arrived to show their enthusiasm and 
support.
328
 These forms of mass gatherings were obviously not in line with the health 
department's recommendations concerning crowding. Even so, whether for economic, 
social, political, or any other reasons, Dr. Rockwood allowed it all to transpire.
329
  
     The health commissioner also allowed church congregations to meet and pray "for 
abatement of the epidemic" before closing their doors. Importantly, this gave the pastors 
and priests an opportunity to educate their congregations in proper influenza-prevention 
measures, and implore their flocks to follow the directions given by the city's health 
department.
330
 Church leaders quickly responded in a cooperative manner. Bishop John. 
P. Farrelly of the Cleveland diocese sent out a set of regulations to all the Catholic 
priests under his supervision, telling them to comply fully with the health 
commissioner's orders, including the closing of churches, schools and other buildings. 
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To make sure that both priests and parishioners got the message, the bishop even posted 
the order in local newspapers.
331
 A pamphlet that was supplied by national health 
officials was also read throughout the city's Catholic churches, and "the parishioners 
were urged to carry out its instructions."
332
 In addition, to help alleviate public and 
clerical opposition towards the ban on public funerals, the bishop told the priests that 
dead bodies would be blessed privately for as long as the flu regulations were in effect. 
The important funeral masses would be said once the bans were lifted.
333
 Most of the 
city's protestant leaders also chose to cooperate with the health commissioner. Following 
a  meeting with Dr. Rockwood, the president and the religious work committee of the 
Federated Churches - an organization that consisted of the vast majority of the city's 
various Protestant congregations - promised that their pastors would "warn 
congregations to adopt preventive measures."
334
 Indicating a widely held belief in 
voluntary public cooperation, the religious work committee expected extra large 
numbers of people to show up in their churches on Sunday morning, as the people would 
"wish to receive the information which has been furnished the pastors in order that they 
may co-operate to the fullest extent in stamping out the influenza in Cleveland."
335
 
Following this weekend of prayer and influenza prevention education, leaders of all the 
city's faiths stated their support of the public health cause by declaring a halt to public 
services until the flu regulations were lifted.
336
 This included the area's Protestant 
churches and clubs, Catholic churches and schools, and Jewish temples, lodges and 
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schools. Reluctantly or not, just about all religious congregations closed down their 
meetings during the four weeks of the flu ban.
337
 By using religious leaders to educate 
and encourage public cooperation, Dr. Rockwood reaped tremendous benefits by 
delaying the point of absolute necessity and postponing official flu bans until Monday, 
October 14. However, despite all the possible benefits of postponement, the hour of 
official flu closings drew inevitably closer.    
     In addition to the worsening situation in the city, on Friday, October 11, Doctor 
Rockwood found himself under pressure from the Ohio State Health Department, as it 
ordered all communities threatened by the epidemic to close not just churches and 
theaters but schools as well.
338
 As with the earlier federal recommendations, Rockwood 
chose to respond to the state officials' order in his own way. First of all, although he 
declared numerous closings, these would only go into effect on the following Monday. 
Showing an even greater degree of independent action, and holding on to the idea that 
places should only be closed when absolutely necessary, Rockwood declared that any 
given school would only close if attendance was eighty percent or less on Monday the 
fourteenth. Alternatively, a general closing of all of Cleveland's schools would be 
ordered if ten percent of all pupils in the city were absent.
339
 Once again, the health 
commissioner used quantifiable scientific methods to determine and legitimate his 
actions, even in the face of State health officials. Not everybody appreciated his 
approach. The editorial page of the Cleveland Press, for instance, criticized the health 
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commissioner for being too slow with closing the schools, stating that "[i]nfluenza is no 
trifling ailment[,]" and that "[a]ny advantage to be gained by keeping schools open will 
not justify sacrificing the life of a single child."
340
 The surrounding suburbs of East 
Cleveland, Lakewood, Bratenahl and Cleveland Heights apparently agreed with both the 
State Board of Health and the Press editor, and closed their schools starting Monday, 
October 14. Sticking to his original plan, Rockwood chose to keep the schools open on 
Monday the fourteenth, and met instead with Cleveland school officials to discuss the 
possibility of comprehensive closings. Noting that the total number of absent school 
children in the city was over ten percent, the health commissioner stuck to his stated 
approach. Together with the school medical supervisor and the school board Dr. 
Rockwood decided to close all public, private, and parochial schools, starting Tuesday 
morning, October 15.
341
 According to a member of the school board, the closings did not 
come a second too soon. "Spanish Influenza is a crowd disease", Mr. E. W. Williams 
said. "It would be little less than criminal to keep the schools open another day."
342
 
     Even though he was criticized for being slow in closing the schools, the health 
commissioner could not be accused of downplaying the seriousness of the situation. 
Defending his ban on public gatherings and once again highlighting the importance of 
public compliance, he told the newspapers that "[t]he epidemic is the most serious 
menace that has confronted Cleveland in years, and if people would just realize that, our 
efforts would be materially aided."
343
 To Rockwood, his delay in closing the schools had 
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less to do with the seriousness of the situation and more to do with his desire to use the 
schools for educational purposes. His approach also reflects the doctor's decision to deal 
with the epidemic from a scientific perspective and base his actions on quantifiable 
information. Furthermore, the health commissioner also had to consider the 
consequences and undesirable nature of enforcing any type of flu closures. Specifically, 
the closing of schools would have a dramatic impact on society in general as more than 
100,000 children would go from attending school to being at home.
344
 What would such 
a significant part of the city's population do when not in school? Some advice was given. 
For instance, the city's school medical director Dr. Childs told the pupils' mothers to 
keep their children outdoors as much as possible, and to "keep them away from parties 
and other gatherings."
345
 Dr. Rockwood held a similar opinion, stating that Cleveland 
would adopt the same policies as Cleveland Heights, Lakewood and other suburbs, and 
have the school children "stay in their own back yard[s]" if the schools were closed.
346
 
What the children should do while being outside was not discussed. In the end, although 
closing the schools for an extrended period of time was certainly possible it was not 
something to be done lightly. Basing his decisions on numbers and statistics, Dr. 
Rockwood established a scientific reason for his actions and also created a measurable 
point of absolute necessity. When this particular point was reached, closing the schools 
could be seen as a smaller sacrifice than keeping them open. Once the line was crossed, 
the necessary sacrifice was implemented. The health commissioner must have had these 
things in mind when he stated that  "[c]losing the schools would be a drastic step," but, 
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recognizing the danger of Spanish Flu, "it would be a calamity to allow them to remain 
open if a considerable number of the pupils are affected."
347
 On Tuesday October 15, he 
finally ordered all schools to close. The ban would remain for four long weeks. 
     As already seen, the flu bans did not end with the schools. Instead, Dr. Rockwood 
expanded the flu time restrictions according to the spread of the disease and the number 
of new cases in the city. In addition to the dance halls, theaters and churches that were 
closed on Monday the fourteenth, Rockwood ordered several other places to close 
starting on Tuesday the fifteenth. The new list included pool halls, cabarets, bowling 
alleys, libraries, movie houses, Sunday schools, night schools, meetings at lodges, 
meetings of organizations in general, and the art museum.
348
 These places may 
technically have been included in the Monday fourteenth ban but were now stated 
explicitly. One of the reasons for this was that the banning of "unessential meetings" was 
confusingly vague. For instance, eager to do whatever was asked of them in order to 
fight the epidemic, groups of women contacted the health commissioner and asked if 
their clubs and parlor meetings were in the non-essential category. Answering them that 
the main objective of the ban was to avoid crowding, Rockwood told the women that 
they could still meet if there were only a few of them and if none of them were ill. 
However, if the epidemic worsened he would have to curtail even those types of 
meetings. Reflecting their desire to cooperate with the health commissioner, several 
women's organizations and clubs voluntarily cancelled their meetings for the duration of 
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the crisis.
349
 Many other women's clubs also responded favorably to the more specific 
October 15 bans by willfully obeying Dr. Rockwood's wishes.
350
 The explicit orders 
were probably not meant to simply clarify matters for the willful and cooperative 
though. It is very likely that specific meeting places were named so that nobody could 
claim that they had miscomprehended the perimeters of the ban. Even so, some of the 
vagueness remained through October 14 as Dr. Rockwood also banned "all indoor 
public gatherings."
351
 Intriguingly, these indoor gathering places did not include 
factories, saloons, restaurants, department stores, downtown offices, grocery stores and 
hardware stores.
352
 Clearly, some meeting places were more essential than others. Some 
of the less important meeting places included public weddings and funerals, which 
Rockwood also banned on October 15. Restaurants and saloons were threatened with 
closing if the situation deteriorated further.
353
 In short, all places and activities that were 
considered in one way or another to be less essential were liable to officially sanctioned 
closure.
354
 The more essential ones were more likely to simply receive requests and 
words of advice. For instance, although he allowed them to remain open, Dr. Rockwood 
still asked owners of stores, shops and factories to prevent loitering and group formation 
among patrons and employees.
355
 Amazingly, the health commissioner stated that even 
some of the more essential endeavors could technically be closed, but that this would 
only happen if the epidemic developed into truly cataclysmic proportions.
356
 This did 
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not happen in Cleveland, and it is rather unlikely that certain parts of the city would 
have been forced to close even if things had deteriorated further. After all, factories, 
shops and stores were essential for the city's economy and, just as importantly, also for 
the nation's war effort. The latter point becomes especially clear when considering that 
Cleveland was the fifth most important industrial city and the forth most important 
financial city in the U.S. at the time.
357
 More than anything, the October 14 and October 
15 bans show that economic considerations and the war effort were considered more 
important than religious, social and cultural matters. Some things were simply more 
essential than others. 
 
Voluntarism, Cooperation, and Coercion 
     As with the war on spitting and dust clouds, adherence to the new flu regulations was 
to be enforced, if necessary, by the police.
358
 Even so, Dr. Rockwood held on to the 
ideal of voluntary cooperation, and also recognized the importance of public compliance 
and willful participation in combating the Spanish Influenza. In fact, the health 
commissioner kept promoting and stressing the importance of cooperation throughout 
the crisis. Importantly, Dr. Rockwood saw the flu regulations more as necessary 
sacrifices than as coercive government actions created to force public cooperation. The 
closings were certainly ordered by the city government, but Dr. Rockwood hoped that 
people would recognize the danger posed by Spanish Flu and voluntarily follow the flu 
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regulations. After all, the regulations were created for the sake of saving lives and 
limiting the damage to the economy and the war effort. The temporary loss of certain 
freedoms and liberties was an unfortunate sacrifice made necessary by the dangerous 
nature of the epidemic. Essentially, the flu orders were there for the sake of the people, 
the city, and the nation. Therefore, people may not have liked the restrictions, but if they 
understood the necessity of the measures they would still be likely to cooperate. In this 
way, many Clevelanders voluntarily cooperated with the health commissioner, even if 
they did not necessarily like the type of cure he was prescribing.  
     This form of unenthusiastic yet obedient cooperation was certainly present in 
Cleveland, especially as the epidemic wore on and the flu restrictions tightened even 
further. On October 23, Dr. Rockwood expanded the flu bans in two significant ways. 
First, he banned most outdoor meetings, to go along with the former ban on indoor 
meetings. The new ban affected local politicians who were suddenly almost completely 
prohibited from using any  indoor or outdoor meetings in their election campaigns that 
year.
359
 Their obvious but annoying solution was to fill people's mailboxes with election 
"propaganda", and cover the city with posters.
360
 A writer in the Plain Dealer described 
the result in the following colorful manner:  
     One brilliant candidate, barred by influenza regulations from gassing the voters into  
     delivering the required number of X marks at the polls, hit on the plan of spending  
     his money on printed matter. "I'll plaster this town with my picture," he said. 'I'll have   
     my face on every telephone pole and in every barroom. I'll not let the dear public  
     forget I need the votes." So he did. The only flaw in his plan, however, was that every  
     other candidate thought of the same thing. And they did. And so these are happy days  
     for the printer and the billposter and most unhappy days for all but the blind  
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     voters."
361
  
 
Even more importantly than inconveniencing politicians and voters, Dr. Rockwood also 
implemented a new system of closing hours for downtown businesses, restaurants, cafés, 
stores, arcades and saloons. The new closing hours made the different establishments 
close down over the span of an hour and a half instead of more or less simultaneously. 
This was done in order to minimize crowding in the streetcars as people would be made 
to leave their different work places in intervals rather than in one big rush. The order 
also forced restaurants and saloons to close between 8 pm and 5 am, with one telling 
exception: the restaurants that served night workers were allowed to stay open if they 
obtained special permits from the health commissioner. This exception was put in place 
so that work in essential industries would not be so heavily affected.
 362
 The importance 
of excluding a number of restaurants became immediately clear, as the city suddenly 
faced the problem of thousands of hungry night workers. During the first night of the 
ban no restaurants had yet received special permission for night-service from Dr. 
Rockwood. This resulted in closed doors and "[g]reat throngs [that] hunted Wednesday 
night and early Thursday for places to satisfy their hunger."
363
 Responding to the 
situation, two downtown restaurants established outdoor bread lines where they served 
coffee and sandwiches to the half-starved crowds. Many other workers sought out all-
night drugstores "to stave off hunger pangs."
364
 The food lines and crowding of drug 
stores certainly did not support the health commissioner's plan to limit crowding. The 
decision to allow some restaurants to stay open was therefore based on the need to feed 
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workers, for the sake of productivity and public order, and to reduce crowding. The 
exceptions quickly became confusing and unmanageable though, as some restaurant 
were allowed to stay open while others were not. On October 25,  Dr. Rockwood 
revoked all the special night permits and declared that all saloons and restaurants had to 
be closed between 8 pm and 5 am. It was unnecessary for them to be open during the 
night, he said. As an alternative solution to the food issue, the health commissioner 
simply  urged night workers to bring lunches with them instead of relying on 
restaurants.
365
        
     The tightening of the flu bans were far from universally popular. Some, reflecting 
greater trends in society, were even contentious and divisive. The saloon closings is a 
prime example of this. The various members of the city's Anti-Saloon League were not 
surprisingly in favor of closing down bars and saloons. In fact, they kept on a relentless 
campaign throughout the epidemic, urging both Mayor Davis and Dr. Rockwood to shut 
down the drinking holes completely. Framing their arguments in epidemic terms, they 
praised the health department for closing down "nonessential places of gathering", and 
stated that, "in evidence of [their] good faith," they had complied with the health 
commissioner's wishes. "[However]", they strongly declared, "saloons are not an 
essential business or industry[.]" Therefore, these places should not only have restricted 
hours but be shut down.
366
 The saloons were actually extra dangerous, they argued, as 
all other places of recreation and amusement had been closed, leading to huge groups of 
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men and women gathering in saloons instead. Was this not in clear contradiction of the 
health commissioner's intention to avoid crowding?
367
  
     The "Drys" were certainly intent on closing down their perennial foes. However, the 
bars also had their supporters. For instance, the vast crowds that both pastors and city 
officials witnessed in the saloons show that far from every Clevelander favored bar 
closings.
368
 The city's various labor unions were among the strongest supporters of open 
saloons, or at least the strongest opponents of Prohibition. The labor oriented newspaper 
The Cleveland Citizen, periodically disparaged the value of Prohibition, calling the 
ideology a "blight" and a "menace to industry", and referring to Prohibitionists as "self-
righteous sycophants[.]"
369
  
     Saloons and alcohol consumption were clearly sensitive issues in the city, as they 
were throughout the state and the nation. The Spanish Influenza epidemic simply 
brought some additional ammunition to the combatants. A Methodist pastor in the 
Cincinnati area, for instance, refused to close his church for Spanish Flu reasons unless 
the saloons were also closed. In the end, he and sixteen of his followers went to prison 
for their protest. The reverend still got to preach to the members of his church though, as 
some five hundred of them showed up outside his prison cell and listened as he preached 
through the cell window.
370
 In Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood apparently did not share "the 
Drys'" conviction that saloons were entirely nonessential businesses. Perhaps the doctor 
recognized the role that these establishments played in workers' morale and therefore in 
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productivity and - almost ironically - civic order. Or maybe he considered the economic 
role that saloons played in a city that was desperately in need of revenue.
371
 Whatever 
the reason, the health commissioner allowed the watering holes to keep operating. He 
was not entirely deaf to the opposing view though. After all, the crowding in saloons 
was a real issue that had to be addressed. In the end, Dr. Rockwood decided to follow a 
course somewhere between the Drys who wanted the saloons closed and the saloon 
owners and patrons who wanted them to stay open. On October 25, he simply stated that 
the saloons would be allowed to stay open, but that they had to close their doors by 6 
pm.
372
 Neither side saw this as a satisfactory situation, as evidenced by the persistent 
calls on one side to shut down the saloons, and a number of blatant disregards of the 
closing orders on the other.
373
 Some members of the latter group were especially 
unwilling to abide by the health commissioner's rules. In fact, although most store 
owners and saloons abided by his orders Rockwood still had to rely on the help of the 
police to enforce universal closings in the downtown area.
374
  
     The outright resisters were a minority. Most Clevelanders willingly and obediently 
followed the flu bans. Many of them even cooperated with Dr. Rockwood in making 
sure that the regulations were kept. For instance, hundreds of businessmen and 
restaurateurs actively protested to the health commissioner whenever they saw saloon 
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owners or barber shop owners disobey the closing orders.
375
 Others lamented the 
insufferable boredom that the flu closings created, but still decided to abide by the rules. 
A wonderfully honest article in the Cleveland News bemoaned the many closings that 
made it impossible to buy smokes after 5 pm and drinks after 6. After 8 pm there was no 
eating out, no shows, no movies, no parties, no fun. All that was left was "just a big 
vacuum, a great monstrous wad of nothing." Capturing the sentiment of many 
cooperative but bored Clevelanders, the writer stated that  
     Saturday night in Cleveland will be the gloomiest since  the first log cabin was built    
     on the banks of the old Cuyahoga. But for the occasional footfall of a belated  
     pedestrian and the rumble of a street car now and then, the little old town will be as  
     noisy as the middle of the Sahara desert. It will be so quiet that a man talking to  
     himself will be in peril of having a riot call turned in. The Saturday nighter, armed  
     with his week's pay, will have nowhere to spend it...... Gosh darn the flu!
376
     
 
This boredom and longing for amusement and fun is further evidenced by the fact that 
Clevelanders of every age simply could not wait to "blow [the] flu lid entirely off".
377
 
The Cleveland News reported that the city "was preparing itself.... for one grand 
celebration" as the "long stay-at-home-for-there's-nothing-to-do period is expected to 
bring a reaction of wildest indulgence."
378
 The Cleveland Press wistfully stated that the 
lifting of the flu ban would mean a lifting of gloominess and boredom. More practically, 
the newspaper celebrated the fact that laundry would no longer pile up on Saturday 
evenings, and that men no longer would have to shave themselves on Sunday 
mornings.
379
 People's impatience is also reflected in the multiple times Dr. Rockwood 
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had to tell the public that conditions were still not good enough to lift the bans.
380
 He 
would not have had to re-state this had it not been for various people asking, pressuring, 
and pestering him about it. In the end, Rockwood used a marked decrease in the number 
of new reported cases of flu as his reason for lifting the bans.
381
 Once the bans were 
lifted, people partied, danced, and formed parades with great enthusiasm and glee. The 
fact that the flu bans ended up being lifted on the same day as the end of the Great War 
certainly did not curtail the celebrations. Celebrating the combined news of peace and 
lifting of flu bans with a "[t]hree cheers and a tiger!", the Plain Dealer promised that 
"with the lifting of the influenza ban and the wonderful peace news to celebrate all at 
once, the dance tonight promises to be unusually joyous."
382
 And joyous they were. In 
fact, the peace celebrations in particular were so joyous and exuberant that accidents 
began to happen. Pretty soon, hospitals that were already overworked due to the 
epidemic had to fix broken legs and perform emergency surgeries on broken skulls.
383
   
     Despite the eagerness for entertainment and a return to normal life, most 
Clevelanders remained remarkably compliant with the flu bans. They may not have been 
happy about it and their cooperation may have been based more on necessity than desire, 
but most still followed along with the health commissioner's orders.
384
 Furthermore, a 
lack of enthusiasm, or complaints about the bans, should not be mistaken for a lack of 
voluntary cooperation. After all, the flu regulations were not anybody's ideal reality, and 
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no one in his right mind ever longs for epidemic disease, crisis situations, or the need to 
implement certain societal restrictions. However, when these situations do happen, 
willful cooperation is not the same as enjoying or loving the regulations. Instead, it is 
much more like stepping up to the plate and doing what needs to be done. Or, it can be 
like agreeing to take an unpleasant medicine and deal with various negative side effects 
for the sake of defeating a greater threat. It may be to sacrifice comfort for the sake of 
survival. Or it may be to expose parts of a body to pain for the sake of the saving the 
body as a whole. In other words, willful cooperation can be to choose an unpleasant 
course of action out of necessity, or if this action increases the chance of a positive 
overall outcome. In this way, there are two main types of voluntary, or willful, 
cooperation when talking about epidemics and public health regulations. First of all, 
willful cooperation can be to recognize the danger of the situation and to sacrifice 
individual desires or concerns for the sake of public health and safety. Sacrifices are 
never enjoyable or fun. But they are by definition voluntary. It is the willful act of 
placing somebody else or something else before oneself. Not everybody were willing to 
do this during the Spanish Flu epidemic in Cleveland, but a great number of people 
evidently were.
385
 Others were probably just as inspired to cooperate by the other main 
impetus for voluntary cooperation: the desire to preserve their own lives. Presented in 
these sorts of terms, obeying the flu bans could be seen as good for the self, the public, 
the city, and the nation. As previously discussed, when Dr. Rockwood prepared for and 
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responded to the crisis, he cleverly appealed to both these forms of motivation.
386
 The 
degree of public cooperation may be a reflection that his approach was largely 
successful. We could argue that parts of the public cooperation was forced rather than 
voluntary, seeing how the city abandoned their entirely voluntary approach and 
implemented flu regulations in order to deal with the crisis. From this perspective, 
people were pressured and forced to toe the line. Although this may have been true for a 
number of Clevelanders, it is equally possible to view the flu regulations as another set 
of instructions that people could choose to obey or not. Individuals and groups may have 
responded in various degrees of cooperation or resistance, but unless they blatantly 
disobeyed the flu orders, or were forced by legal actions or the police to cooperate, they 
still chose to follow along with the new rules. In other words, for one reasons or another, 
they chose to cooperate.  
     Voluntary cooperation limited the need to use blatant coercive methods to secure 
general compliance. From this perspective, Dr. Rockwood's flu regulations were not all 
that different from his lists of advice. In both cases, he sought an educated populace that 
would willfully follow his instructions. Still, the major difference was that unlike the 
lists of advice, the flu regulations could place a legal penalty on people who failed to 
cooperate. Voluntarism was suddenly less voluntary. If education failed to produce the 
desired response, threats and outright force were there to compel cooperation. The 
coercive threat of police force and criminal prosecution was therefore an attempt to 
balance a genuine call for voluntary cooperation with whatever was needed to secure 
obedience during a time crisis. This was a clear recognition of the obvious fact that in 
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any given society, and in any given situation, one hundred percent voluntary cooperation 
is simply not possible. The balancing act became very clear on October 18 when 
Rockwood managed to place voluntarism and coercive power almost in the same 
sentence. He first recognized that the cooperation of "every man, woman and child in 
Cleveland" was fundamentally important to control the epidemic. In the next sentence, 
he threatened that any undertaker who held a public funeral would be subject to an arrest 
warrant.
387
 He also used "softer" forms of coercive, or persuasive, powers in order to 
encourage public compliance and cooperation. Calling once again on people's sense of 
duty and patriotism, Rockwood appealed to "everyone to exercise every precaution to 
prevent further spread of the disease so that industries engaged in war work shall not be 
crippled.
388
 Drawing on traditional Cleveland ideals and recognizing the power of the 
patriotic argument during the World War, the doctor continued to focus on patriotism 
and public responsibility as reasons for cooperation throughout the epidemic. His 
approach resulted in statements such as the following: "The OFFICIAL health officer is 
doing what he can. But the real burden of the situation falls upon the UNOFFICIAL 
health officers - which means each and every one of us. Each of us must constitute 
himself an UNOFFICIAL health officer charged with the responsibility of protecting our 
own health and the health of those about us."
389
All told, Dr. Rockwood used education, 
persuasion, strategic cooperation with powerful factors in the city, and coercion in order 
to acquire as much cooperation and compliance in the war against Spanish Flu as 
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possible. In regards to the flu regulations, Cleveland's cooperation during the 1918 
epidemic was certainly both voluntary and coercive. 
 
The City That Cooperates 
 Cleveland once again has answered 'present' in time of need[.]
390
 
     Voluntarism encompasses much more than simply obeying rules. In fact, the most 
important part of Cleveland's cooperation during the epidemic came in the form of 
people and organizations volunteering their services in the fight against the flu. For 
example, numerous groups and organizations such as various parts of the city- and 
county governments, private organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, the Welfare 
Federation, the Associated Charities, and the Red Cross, private employers, hospitals, 
community leaders such as priests and pastors, and individuals, quickly joined in the 
fight against Spanish Influenza.
391
 Their cooperation appears to have been largely 
voluntary, and they used their resources, power and influence to both encourage 
voluntary cooperation and to force compliance in cases where people proved 
unresponsive. Many also helped provide essential aid and services such as nursing, 
funding,  coordination, and crisis relief services. Most crucially, they cooperated. The 
Chamber of Commerce, for instance, was very much involved in coordinating relief 
efforts in the city, and also worked closely with the Red Cross and the different branches 
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of the city government.
392
 The Welfare Association and the Associated Charities joined 
with numerous other charitable organizations in taking care of flu-orphans and helping 
the sick.
393
 The mayor and his war advisory board, along with the Red Cross,  provided 
much needed funding for hospital beds and also organized soup kitchens in schools 
throughout the city.
394
 The city also helped the health commissioner by opening all the 
fire hydrants in the city several times a day in order to flush away what was believed to 
be bacteria-infested dust.
395
 A number of employers provided specific aid forcing sick 
workers to go home and by offering flu-ban-unemployed actors and actresses temporary 
manufacturing jobs.
396
 Even the American Protective League helped in the fight against 
Spanish Influenza by lending several of its automobiles to a number of nurses who made 
house visits.
397
 Others helped by working to boost and preserve the public's morale. 
Catholic priests helped provide spiritual guidance by posting special prayers such as 
"The Prayer to St. Roch in Time of Pestilence" and writing historical articles showing 
that quarantines, isolation and other public health measures were part of a proud 
Catholic tradition.
398
 They also arranged outdoor masses until the epidemic became so 
prominent that even outdoor meetings were banned.
399
 Protestant denominations also 
found creative ways to deal with the situation. The idea that the individual church 
members and their families should worship in their own homes during the epidemic was 
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a central part of the solution. To preserve the sense of unity amongst the believers, the 
members were often instructed by their pastors to hold service in their individual houses 
but at the same time and with the same order of worship.
400
 Many pastors and churches 
used newspapers to spread the information about what hymns to sing and what passages 
from the Bible to read. These instructions also tended to include specific prayers that 
addressed the flu situation.
401
 Some pastors even mailed sermons to their followers, 
while others posted bulletins providing instructions, prayers and information.
402
 
Although their actions varied wildly, all these groups and organizations shared the 
common traits of cooperation and voluntarism. Together with numerous other 
organizations and uncountable individuals, these volunteers provided the most powerful, 
profound and comprehensive response that Cleveland could muster against the flu 
epidemic. 
     In his book on the Spanish Flu pandemic in the U.S. Alfred Crosby singles out 
publicity and organization as the two largest challenges that a city government faced 
during the influenza crisis.
403
 Cleveland's ability to organize and coordinate its response 
is clearly seen in the city's extremely broad and comprehensive system of cooperation. 
The close cooperation between Dr. Rockwood, the various departments of the city 
government, the Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, the city's hospitals, they city's 
religious groups, and the many charitable organizations and volunteers shows that 
Cleveland came together to fight the scourge. Even so, Dr. Rockwood did not consider 
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the level of coordination to be optimal. In fact, after the worst crisis had passed, but still 
in the midst of the epidemic, the doctor likened an epidemic to a "state of siege" and 
suggested that the city should create stronger public health legislation, specifically 
giving the health commissioner absolute control over the city's hospitals during an 
epidemic crisis.
404
 Despite this call for increased centralized power over public health 
coordination, the health commissioner still considered the degree of organization and 
cooperation in the city as praiseworthy.
405
 Other medical leaders joined him in this 
praise. Mt. Sinai hospital, for instance, stated that it was the hospital's duty to publicly 
recognize "those who during these trying times have so nobly helped us to carry on the 
work assigned to us." Among the great and noble helpers were the Red Cross, the city's 
health department, Dr. Rockwood, people from the Ursuline Academy, various Jewish 
organizations, and scores of private volunteers.
406
  
     Organization and coordination does not work well without communication though, 
and although Dr. Rockwood and leaders of the different groups could clearly get 
together or converse over the phone, it was just as important to get information and 
instructions to their subordinates, to volunteer workers, and to the masses. Several of the 
city's newspapers provided invaluable help in  this by faithfully printing the health 
commissioner's and various organizations' instructions and orders. The Cleveland Press 
led the way among newspapers, using a significant amount of both front page and in-
paper space for coverage of the epidemic. This included specific instructions from health 
officials, information about the epidemic's progress, multiple calls for public 
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involvement and cooperation, flu statistics, and a tremendous poster that told the public 
exactly what the city had done so far to fight the scourge, along with thoughts about 
what more could be done.
407
 Other papers like the Plain Dealer, the Cleveland News, the 
Catholic Universe, and the Jewish Independent also provided the public with vital 
information about the epidemic.
408
 The newspapers were also used to call on volunteer 
nurses, and get information to teachers.
409
 For instance, due to the difficult 
circumstances caused by the epidemic, the acting school superintendent declared 
newspaper communications from his office to be official orders, and instructed all 
teachers who read the orders to pass them on to their coworkers.
410
 The newspapers did 
not only convey orders and instructions though. Contrary to what has appears to be a 
common conception about American newspapers during the first world war, several of 
the city's newspapers printed rather honest, accurate, and remarkably un-censored 
articles about the epidemic in Cleveland. As previously shown, the Press even publicly 
criticized the health commissioner in his handling of the schools. The papers were also 
very blunt about the tremendous impact of the disease, faithfully recording numbers of 
dead and recounting horrendous stories of people suffering and dying.
411
 Although this 
can conceivably be interpreted as hurtful to morale, it can more easily be seen as a way 
to educate the public about the seriousness of the situation and the importance of 
cooperating in fighting the scourge. The important point remains that so many 
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newspapers cooperated and participated in the fight against Spanish Flu. For Dr. 
Rockwood and his allies, the press remained a great helper not least in informing and 
educating the public.  
      The health commissioner did not rely exclusively on the cooperation of community 
leaders and the press to deal with the crisis, nor did he rely just on the kinds of hard or 
soft coercive or convincing powers that these helpers supplied him with. In fact, Dr. 
Rockwood relied just as much on the voluntary cooperation of individuals. And 
although the doctor worked hard to persuade and convince people to help him, many 
Clevelanders never even had to be convinced. In fact, a tremendous amount of 
Cleveland residents enthusiastically joined in the fight against the flu. For instance, the 
vast majority obediently followed the flu regulations, which in itself can be seen as 
participating in the fight. Even so, many Clevelanders fought far more actively than that. 
Throughout the epidemic, the first and most notable volunteers were women, especially 
those who volunteered to work as nurses and/or for the Red Cross. On October 5, as the 
first official cases of Spanish Flu appeared in Cleveland, three of the city's women 
answered a desperate call from the influenza-riddled Camp Sherman and left the city to 
fight influenza at the military base.
412
 They were quickly followed by many other 
nurses, including ten from Cleveland's Lakeside hospital, along with a number of 
mothers.
413
 The military authorities saw the mothers who arrived at the camp "[to] look 
after their boys" as especially helpful, as they "in most instances [ended up] nursing half 
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a dozen of their comrades, too."
414
 Thousands more went on to look after sick family 
members, make house calls, serve as nurses, work as hospital assistants, prepare food for 
the needy, staff food stations, take care of orphans, and produce an absolutely incredible 
amount of flu masks.
415
 Hundreds of Catholic Sisters also volunteered their services to 
Dr. Rockwood through Bishop Farrelly. The sisters went on to serve the city in the most 
admirable and faithful ways; nursing, making house calls, cooking and cleaning for the 
sick, and generally "proving a wonderful help."
416
 Several women's organizations also 
cooperated by deciding  to "keep the spirit rather than the letter of health Commissioner 
Rockwood's decree against crowds[.]" As a result, numerous women's groups and 
associations, including suffrage groups, women's civic rights' clubs, and parts of 
Cleveland's Federation of Women's Clubs decided to suspend their meetings 
voluntarily.
417
 Thousands of school teachers helped out by working as nurses and with 
charitable aid through the epidemic.
418
 The importance of all these women workers and 
volunteers cannot be exaggerated. For example, the work of the school teachers and 
Catholic Sisters was so important that Dr. Rockwood singled out the loss of their 
services as the only great drawback in re-opening the schools.
419
 The health 
commissioner also gave special recognition to the Red Cross and the "Catholic 
sisterhoods", describing the actions of the latter during the epidemic as "beyond 
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praise."
420
 Cleveland's women were certainly among the health commissioner's best 
helpers. The work they did for a city in need is worthy of both recognition and 
remembrance. 
     The tendency of the city's women to cooperate can also be seen in a less profound but 
still telling way. Specifically, Cleveland's women were much more likely than the men 
to follow the advice of wearing flu masks. A number of men also wore the masks. They 
wore them in courtrooms, for instance, or if they worked as elevator operators, dentists, 
barbers, doctors, or other jobs where close proximity to other people was involved.
421
 
But even in these high-risk situations, and even after being ordered by Dr. Rockwood to 
wear them, a notable number of men chose to not don the mask.
422
 Furthermore, when 
the general manager of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company requested that all 
employees wear flu masks, it soon became evident that men required a lot more 
convincing and coercion than women. "The girls like them," a female employee charged 
with implementing the rule declared, "but I have more difficulty in convincing the men 
they ought to wear them."
423
 Perhaps the men were more reluctant to wear the mask 
because the press repeatedly made fun of the device or described it in rather feminine 
terms. One newspaper, writing about the situation in Washington D.C., not only did all 
of this but even made the face masks sound un-American. The writer stated that the 
masks made "the town [look] as if American women had suddenly been taken away and 
inmates of a Turkish harem put in their places." The face masks thus reminded the writer 
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of a culture that was not only seen as inferior to American culture, but of a country that 
the U.S. was at war with.
424
 Other articles were far kinder in their descriptions. Even so, 
they still tended to make light of the masks and presented them as a feminine type of 
garment. An otherwise supportive article about a young Cleveland woman who 
embraced the advice to wear the mask still managed to draw some unfavorable 
comparisons to the practice. Stating that "[i]f one ounce of prevention is worth a pound 
of cure, a one-quarter ounce handkerchief ought to be worth four ounces of cure[,]" 
Rosilda Splittorf wore the mask with pride. Even so, the article opens by stating that 
"[n]o, it is not a picture of a Turkish lady", clearing connecting the practice of wearing 
masks not only to an enemy country in the war, but even more shockingly to un-
American behavior.
425
  
 
                                                 
424
 Cleveland Press, Oct. 17, 1918. 
425
 Cleveland News, Oct. 16, 1918. 
132 
 
     Flu masks were not only made fun of for being feminine in style. In a number of 
cases, the masks were portrayed as symbols of weakness in the form of fear, suggesting 
that people who wore the masks were unduly scared of influenza. The fear of looking 
frightened, foolish or weak in the face of flu was particularly evident in newspaper 
comic strips, some of which poked fun at people who were overly afraid of people 
sneezing or coughing.
426
  
 
Whether because the masks were seen as a sign of weakness or as a feminine type of 
garment, some men who wore the masks were simply made fun of. A comic strip printed 
in the Cleveland Press shows a man laughing at another man who is wearing a flu mask. 
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As comics typically draw on reality in one way or another, this comic strip suggests that 
such teasing was not entirely uncommon.
427
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     Not wanting to look foolish, fearful or feminine were not the only reasons why some 
people chose to avoid the flu masks. Some honestly questioned the usefulness of the 
masks, wondering how the "coarse meshes of a flu mask" could protect against an 
influenza germ that "is so small that it cannot be seen with a microscope."
428
 Others 
refused to wear it for religious reasons. A pastor in Alliance, Ohio,  for instance, refused 
to wear the mask during church services, as it would "make a reverent spirit 
impossible."
429
 On the flipside of all this, some men allegedly chose to wear the masks 
for all the wrong reasons. For example, three Chinese men in San Francisco were 
reported to have worn the masks as disguises during a robbery.
430
 It is possible that the 
story was either a fabrication or influenced by anti-Chinese sentiments. Even so, it 
shows some of the associations that people had with the masks. This is also the case 
with the almost certainly fabricated story claiming that about 1,300 "negro draftees" 
were scared witless by the sight of a few white soldiers wearing flu masks, thinking that 
the soldiers welcoming them were members of the Ku Klux Klan.
431
 Again, especially 
considering the ridiculing tone of the article, the story is very possibly made up. Even 
so, it still shows that people associated flu masks with other things, like crime and the 
KKK. The flu masks were clearly not without controversy. Even so, they were officially 
recommended by health boards throughout the country, and many people chose to wear 
them.
432
 Dr. Rockwood strongly recommended them in Cleveland as well, as is 
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evidenced in numerous newspaper articles and posters.
433
 But although he eventually 
ordered the masks to be used in certain areas where close contact was inevitable, such as 
in elevators and court rooms, he never ordered them to be universally worn.
434
 This was 
probably a wise decision, as it seems unlikely that the order would have been universally 
obeyed.   
     Although they may not have been too enthusiastic about the flu masks, a number of 
Cleveland men still volunteered and cooperated in the fight against flu. Numerous male 
doctors worked tremendously hard during the epidemic, as did police officers, fire 
fighters and sanitary policemen.
435
 Others volunteered in much more personal ways. 
County Prosecutor Samuel Doerfier, for instance, showed private initiative by 
organizing a "'fight the flu' club." The goal of the club was for car owners to help relieve 
streetcar congestion by driving workers to and from work.
436
 It is unclear how effective 
the club was, but it is certainly proof of men volunteering in the fight against influenza. 
At least one of the volunteers paid the ultimate price for his efforts. Father Martin 
O.Malley, pastor of St. Columbkill's Catholic Church suffered a "physical collapse 
brought on by [his] untiring work in the recent influenza epidemic." He died on New 
Year's Eve, 1918.
437
 On the whole however, it is much harder to find direct, specific 
evidence of men volunteering to fight the Spanish Flu. Most of the men who are 
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mentioned in newspaper articles, annual reports, historical works and various minutes 
were leaders of companies, organizations, churches, or heading up the various branches 
of the city and county governments. A number of others were workers who were simply 
carrying out orders, such as the mentioned firemen and policemen. The great need for 
men to fill various jobs and positions both in the city and abroad may be one of the 
reasons why men are mentioned less frequently than women in voluntary flu-fighting 
work. In the midst of the flu crisis, the help-wanted sections of the city's newspapers 
were packed with more or less desperate calls for manpower. On October 25, for 
instance, thousands of "[f]ighting men, nurses, mechanics, accountants and individuals 
qualified in practically every line of endeavor" were needed for the war effort.
438
 A few 
days later, the assistant federal employment director for Ohio, Wilbur F. Maxwell, asked 
Cleveland's Community War Labor Board to immediately provide 8,681 men for various 
war industries. These men were to be taken from various "nonessential" Cleveland 
factories and other work places, including construction workers, car manufacturers that 
were not involved in war work, and makers of anything from bricks and tiles to brushes, 
paper boxes, wagons, cutlery, furniture, paint and spring beds. 
439
 In short, the available 
workforce in Cleveland was so small that men had to be drawn from less important work 
places to fulfill essential war needs. The need for workers is also shown by the 
proliferation of women in the work force. Although the greatest call for women was for 
nursing or Red Cross work, thousands of women also worked in various other jobs, 
including manufacturing.
440
 For instance, Mr. Maxwell asked the war board to supply 
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Cleveland with 1,500 women to fill in for some of the eight thousands men who were to 
be relocated.
441
 On November 12, the same man highlighted the importance of women 
in the workplace by saying that "[w]omen in industrial war work will be in even greater 
demand in peace work." On the same day, Mr. Maxwell also re-emphasized the 
tremendous need for workers by stating that "[a] conservative estimate of the labor 
needs in Cleveland today would be 50,000 men and women."
442
 With such tremendous 
pressure on men to fill needed work spaces, it may not be surprising that fewer of them 
were able to partake in voluntary flu-fighting activities. One great exception was the Red 
Cross, as Cleveland men and women alike raced to enroll with the organization.
443
 The 
role of the Red Cross in Cleveland during the world war and during the Spanish Flu 
epidemic is discussed in depth in chapter IV. 
      There may have been other reasons why women appear more often as volunteers in 
the sources than men do. For instance, much of the volunteer work that was needed 
appear to have been divided by gender roles and gender lines. Women may have been 
able to enter the work force in new ways during the war, but it seems very unlikely that 
men would be asked to volunteer their time to knit or make flu masks. In fact, they were 
not explicitly asked to do so. Instead, more often than not the calls for volunteers 
appealed specifically to women. For example, a call for volunteers to make flu masks 
stated that "[t]eachers and high school girls are particularly urged to give their Saturday 
to this work."
444
 Women were also implicitly, and often times even explicitly addressed 
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whenever the city or the nation called for nurses, midwives, and hospital attendants to 
enroll in various surveys or volunteer their services.
445
 Although boys and girls alike 
were invited by the city's settlement houses and the Y.M.C.A. to learn about tuberculosis 
prevention and social hygiene, girls and women were specifically targeted by the Red 
Cross for learning health care and nursing skills. In the Cleveland Health and Hospital 
Survey of 1920, the Red Cross is praised for being an "agency which is bringing the 
message of health to large numbers of women and girls[.]" The organization not only 
received women at their training centers, but also sent their nurses to "factories, schools, 
settlements, department stores and churches" to teach girls and women about health care 
and nursing.
446
 Nursing and first aid was also largely considered women's work in the 
schools. Throughout Cuyahoga County, around 97,000 high school girls were involved 
with different forms of domestic training. Parts of this training included nursing and 
home care skills. Furthermore, when Cleveland's Junior Red Cross considered offering 
first aid and home nursing classes to high school seniors, they only considered girls to be 
eligible.
447
 This is not surprising at all, for American society at the time viewed girls and 
women as responsible for the home and therefore also for the health of the home. 
Women were therefore more often asked to volunteer as nurses and for other flu-related 
tasks. Men were needed for other things. High school boys, for example, did not have to 
make flu masks. They were asked instead to help dig trenches for a huge, patriotic event 
called the War Expo. The trenches were part of a plan to mimic conditions at the 
Western Front. For anyone who has had to dig a trench it is not surprising that very few 
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boys responded to the call.
448
 A number of male medical students from the Western 
Reserve University were asked by Dr. Rockwood to volunteer to work as doctors.
449
 
Although the health commissioner had to resort to threats to get the students to 
volunteer, he eventually ended up praising their efforts in the fight against flu.
450
 
However, as a rule, most of the men's work in the epidemic took place within formal 
institutions and positions.         
     Cleveland's women and men clearly served different purposes and performed 
different tasks during the Spanish Influenza epidemic. The key point remains that 
although their tasks and actions varied, they were all part of a greater system that 
responded to a crisis during extraordinary conditions. In the end, they were all needed. 
The various tasks and efforts came together as the people of Cleveland contributed their 
unique roles and efforts in a common fight against the flu. Surely some contributed more 
directly than others, but that does not negate the fact that Cleveland's men and women 
cooperated in their war on influenza. In fact, considering the numerous organizations, 
churches, employers, city government departments and officials, newspapers, schools 
and so on that also participated in the fight, it becomes clear that practically the entire 
city of Cleveland fought together against the scourge. It was not a one-gender response, 
nor was it solely an official response, or a private one. It was a collective response, 
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organized by a few but fought by many. Faced with a public health crisis, Cleveland 
largely lived up to its ideal of being a city that cooperates.
451
   
     A five-day period provides a great example of the tremendous interplay and 
cooperation between the city's many various groups and organizations. During the height 
of the epidemic, Cleveland experienced some issues that were reminiscent of east coast 
cities and military camps. Specifically, with anywhere from seventy to more than a 
hundred and sixty people dying of flu and pneumonia every day, some cemeteries began 
having problems digging graves fast enough.
452
 The deaths that were attributed to the 
epidemic came in addition to deaths from other causes, as the other causes obviously did 
not take a Spanish Flu vacation. As a result the daily number of funerals increased 
markedly. For instance, in the five city-owned cemeteries, funerals went from an 
average of fifteen a day to an average of forty. With regular grave diggers overwhelmed, 
cemetery foremen, watchmen, and even superintendents picked up shovels to help out. 
Increasing their work hours from eight hours a day to eleven, and also digging on 
Sundays, the city cemeteries managed to keep up with the great influx of dead bodies, 
and prevented the corpses from being temporarily placed in vaults.
453
  
     Other cemeteries faced worse. The most desperate situation was found in Calvary 
Cemetery,  a Catholic cemetery that had never before experienced more than thirty 
funerals in a day. Then Spanish Flu hit and suddenly the cemetery had to provide a 
resting place for thirty-six bodies one day, forty-seven another, then fifty-one, sixty-
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seven, and finally eighty-five.
454
 Before the numbers had even reached fifty, the man in 
charge of Calvary - Father Martin O'Malley - described the situation as "the most serious 
in the history of this cemetery."
455
 By the time they reached eighty, it was almost 
catastrophic. The cemetery regularly employed twenty-six grave diggers but these were 
quickly overwhelmed. The city's utilities director Farrell quickly assigned twenty-five 
workers from the waterworks department to help dig graves. The move produced a 
profound statement of gratitude from the chancellor of the Cleveland diocese and also 
enabled the cemetery to deal with the situation for a little while.
456
 However, as more 
people died, the fifty workers proved woefully insufficient. Before long, Father 
O'Malley found it necessary to use a steam-shovel to dig graves.
457
 The city also 
responded by ordering another 100 waterworks employees to help dig graves in the 
various cemeteries in the city.
458
 To speed things up further, Calvary Cemetery even 
began digging mass graves, "large enough to receive a number of caskets placed side by 
side."
459
 On Monday October 28, Father O'Malley ordered a second mass grave to be 
dug, large enough to hold eighty-five bodies. The steam shovel also helped out, digging 
a long trench grave at the speed of two hundred feet per day.
460
 On Tuesday the 29th, 
Utilities Director Farrell recognized that the help of 125 waterworks employees was not 
enough to keep up with the number of dead bodies waiting for burial. He therefore 
called for volunteer grave diggers to help ease the situation. A number of people had 
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already volunteered. In some cemeteries, friends and family members of the diseased 
had even dug the graves for their dearly departed. This was the case for Mr. Abram Niri 
Turk whose body arrived at Highland Park Cemetery so late in the day that the workers 
there were unable to dig the grave. In the end, four of Abram's friends grabbed some 
shovels and provided the dead man with a final gesture of respect and friendship.
461
 The 
city also helped deal with the grave emergency by having workhouse prisoners dig 
graves and by recruiting the services of people who were usually in charge of 
landscaping and gardening. Thankfully, the crest of the epidemic passed swiftly, and 
Cleveland never got to experience the truly horrendous scenes described in Philadelphia 
and Fort Devens, et cetera. The city was also spared from the indignity of running out of 
caskets. Fortuitously the home of The Cleveland Burial Case Company, the city was 
actually producing an excess of caskets and was daily shipping anywhere from 3,000 to 
4,000 caskets to the east coast cities.
462
 Even so, the sudden, tremendous pressure on the 
city's cemeteries was a significant challenge. The city solved it by cooperating and 
working hard.             
     During this same time, the city's fight against influenza was also helped by numerous 
other groups, businesses, organizations and individuals. On October 24, the Cleveland 
Press helped in the dissemination of information by posting a huge, front-page poster 
detailing the city's fight against the epidemic and what were the symptoms and treatment 
of the disease. The city's undertakers were doing their share by working long and 
exhaustive hours. Mr. John. I Nunn reported that he had worked for twenty-two hours 
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one day, whereas Mr. Paul P. Wright said that he had hardly slept for three days straight. 
The city helped by having the streets flushed regularly, while police officers were busy 
coordinating transportation of the very ill to the city's many hospitals. Linen for 
emergency hospital beds was acquired from boats serving the Cleveland-Buffalo route, 
and private companies volunteered their automobiles to Catholic sisters who had 
volunteered to work as visiting nurses.
463
 It was also during this period of time that 
Samuel Doerfier organized his "fight the flu" club and that downtown restaurants 
created bread lines for hungry workers.
464
 The American Protective League followed the 
example of private businesses and loaned several of their cars to visiting nurses. Not 
surprisingly, the Red Cross was also highly engaged, providing nurses, serving at food 
centers, helping stricken families financially, and making flu masks.
465
 The list goes on. 
In fact, a quick read through three of the city's leading newspapers shows that at least 
thirty-two different city departments, organizations, hospitals, groups, and businesses 
provided their unique contribution during these five days alone. The actual number is 
even higher than that, as several of the thirty-two contributors I identified include broad 
categories such as "catholic institutions", "settlement houses" and 
"manufacturers/industry".
466
 In addition, these are only the cooperators that are 
mentioned in the newspapers. When Dr. Rockwood eventually expressed gratitude to 
everyone who had helped out during the crisis, he emphasized the roles played by the 
Red Cross, the Police Department, the city's hospitals, the Welfare Federation, a number 
of doctors, the newspapers, several Western Reserve University medical students, and 
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the Catholic sisters.
467
 A representative of Mount Sinai Hospital also offered his thanks 
to everyone who had contributed greatly, naming the Red Cross, Dr. Rockwood and the 
Health Department, Catholic volunteers, a number of Jewish organizations, and 
individuals who volunteered to help at the hospital.
468
 Amazingly, even these long lists 
of volunteers and cooperators fail to describe the true width of cooperation and 
voluntarism that characterized Cleveland's war on Spanish Influenza. Expanding the 
newspaper search to include the whole months of September, October and November, 
1918, the list of contributors, volunteers and cooperators becomes truly vast, easily 
eclipsing one hundred and twenty different groups and categories of people.
469
 However, 
although this list clearly shows that a tremendous number of Cleveland's residents and 
organizations participated in the flu fight, it still provides a woefully incomplete picture 
of the overall level of cooperation in the city. In fact, the list is best seen as a starting 
point that establishes a general overview and encourages further inquiry.    
     One of the main problems with the list of cooperators based on newspaper articles is 
the many organizations, groups and individuals that are curiously absent in the sources 
or that received much less attention than they were due. For example, the newspaper 
sources are surprisingly silent the about Cleveland Foundation. Established in 1914, the 
Cleveland Foundation's stated purpose was "to provide a means to distributing funds for 
assisting charitable institutions, for promoting educational and scientific research and to 
provide for the sick, elderly, or helpless." This included to "aid in the mental, physical, 
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and cultural improvement of Cleveland's citizens."
470
 In the years leading up to the 
Spanish Flu crisis, the foundation had been actively involved in Cleveland, especially 
performing surveys of schools and work places. However, during the epidemic, this 
groundbreaking organization simply vanished from the public eye. The foundation's own 
records do not provide much help in illuminating the issue, as the available sources start 
in 1919 and make no mention of the epidemic.
471
 It is possible that the Cleveland 
Foundation did not play an official role during the epidemic, but for an organization 
with such a stated purpose, it seems more likely that it was involved in one way or 
another. Still, as there is no clear evidence to support the idea, the foundation's 
involvement remains largely speculative.  
     What is certain is that the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce was more deeply 
involved in the fight against flu than both newspaper and archival sources explicitly 
report. The newspapers hardly mentioned the organization in connection with the 
epidemic. Just as surprisingly, the Chamber's own minutes and annual reports make very 
few references to the epidemic, if any at all. On the face of it, the sources thus seem to 
suggest that the Chamber of Commerce was little involved in the fight. However, in 
reality few things could be further from the truth. After all, the Chamber of Commerce 
was intrinsically and powerfully involved in the coordination and workings of most 
aspects of the city at this time. Through its myriad committees, the Chamber worked 
closely together with practically every major group or interest in Cleveland. The span 
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and variety of the committees is incredible, ranging from the River and Harbor 
Committee, the Foreign Trade Committee, and the Special Committee on Passenger and 
Freight Terminal, to committees that were involved in coordinating and organizing the 
city's war efforts during the Great War. Through its Military Committee, for example, 
the Chamber of Commerce worked closely with Mayor Davis' War Advisory Committee 
and also worked with the War Chest Campaign and the War Savings Stamp Committee. 
The organization was also deeply involved in arranging parades, entertaining allies, 
helping with war time recruitment, and aiding the Liberty Loan campaigns.
472
 Crucially, 
the organization had traditionally also been very involved in public health matters, 
including, as we have seen, during epidemic crises.
473
 Being so widely involved in city 
activities, and having a tradition of involvement in matters of public health, it seems 
logical and likely that the Chamber of Commerce was also involved in Cleveland's fight 
against Spanish Influenza. Again, the newspaper evidence is not very direct or 
conclusive, but the circumstantial evidence mounts very quickly. In April of 1919, the 
Chamber of Commerce's Board of Directors released an annual report for the fiscal year 
ending on April 1, 1919. Informing its members on the organization's many 
achievements that year, the report is strangely free of any mention of the Spanish Flu 
epidemic. However, not finding a mention of the epidemic is a matter of failing to find a 
specific key word in a sea of supporting evidence. In fact, the report is brimming with 
tales of close cooperation with the Red Cross and with "the relief work carried out 
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through many agencies". "[A]ll of these movements and others", retiring president 
Myron T. Herrick wrote, " have found their strongest and most effective support in the 
Chambers of Commerce."
474
 Although the report was largely framed in a wartime focus, 
it seems clear that the organization was also involved in anti-influenza work, even if it 
was not often explicitly stated. In fact, the failure to mention the epidemic has more to 
do with the extreme importance of the war effort than with anything else. In their own 
words, the Board of Directors stated that during "one of the most interesting years in [the 
Chamber's] history... [i]t was necessary at all times to emphasize the war activities."
475
 
This emphasis on the war made the Spanish Flu epidemic disappear from mention in the 
report. It also makes it even more likely that the Chamber of Commerce was deeply 
involved in fighting the scourge. After all, the epidemic quickly proved its ability to 
negatively impact the war effort by affecting soldiers, sailors, workers, industry, 
transportation, and even by halting the draft and slowing down Liberty Loan 
activities.
476
 One of Dr. Rockwood's stated goals for fighting the epidemic was for the 
purpose of limiting and even preventing any negative effects on the war effort.
 477
 In 
fact, newspapers even reported that the health commissioner was "directing the medical 
forces in an attempt to prevent crippling of Cleveland war plants."
478
 It is extremely 
unlikely that the Chamber of Commerce would not partake vigorously in this fight to 
limit the negative impact of the epidemic. Therefore, when the Chamber's Board of 
Directors stated that "[i]t goes without saying that no written report can do justice to the 
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numerous detailed services performed by the Chamber, the aggregate result of which is 
considerable[,]" they were certainly also alluding to anti-flu efforts.
479
    
        Another big problem with the newspapers is the fact that they obviously fail to 
mention the reactions among thousands of private individuals. In particular, at least as 
far as the English language newspapers go, they fail to portray the sentiments and 
actions of the city's various immigrant groups. Certain information can be gleamed by 
combining the newspaper sources with other documents. For instance, the makers of 
Cleveland's Hospital and Health Survey of 1920 stated that many immigrants were 
afraid of hospitals and of ambulances.
480
 From this we can induce that many immigrants 
were probably not likely to tell the health officials that they were sick with flu. On the 
other hand, the patriotic spirit that many of the city's immigrants and immigrant groups 
exuded at the time suggests that they may have also been likely to abide by the health 
commissioner's regulations, especially as the war on flu became more and more tied to 
the Great War.
481
 
     In the end, we do not know the true extent of cooperation or dissent in Cleveland. 
However, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the city indeed lived up to its ideal 
of being a city that cooperates. The cooperation came in many forms, as many different 
people, organizations, and groups participated in various and often times unique ways. 
With Dr. Rockwood leading the way, a tremendous part of Cleveland's city government, 
private organizations, charities, businesses, employers, churches, synagogues, hospitals, 
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schools, women and men all fought the scourge together. This chapter has explored 
some of the complexities that existed in such a vast and varied public health response, 
including the role of education, the ideals of voluntarism and civic duty, the need to 
balance public and societal needs and interests, and the health commissioner's use of 
modern scientific methods to make and legitimize unpopular decisions. It shows that 
although some Clevelanders clearly opposed the flu regulations, most people agreed to 
"swallow the pill" and carry on with life. Furthermore, Cleveland's response to the 
epidemic was much more than the health commissioner's regulations. It also included a 
tremendous amount of work, coordination and cooperation, such as raising funds, 
organizing the hospitals and medical staffs, transporting the sick, mapping the 
developments of the epidemic, nursing and treating the sick, digging graves, making flu 
masks, establishing and manning food centers, disseminating information, taking care of 
infants, and much more. The amount of cooperation and voluntarism that was evident in 
these activities is truly monumental, highlighting the large degree of success that the city 
experienced in terms of fighting the flu together.  
     This chapter has also attempted to tie the multiple ways that Cleveland responded to 
the epidemic with the city's past and with its ideals. To speak of a city's ideals is clearly 
a way to generalize a very varied and complex populace. Even so, certain ideals are 
often generally held in a society, and also often affect decisions, actions and reactions. 
In Cleveland's case, the ideals of an educated populace, voluntarism, civic duty, and 
cooperation, were above all present among the people who took charge of the situation 
and led the city through the Spanish Influenza crisis. This includes various leaders and 
helpers such as Dr. Rockwood and the Health Department,  the Board of Education, the 
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Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, various charitable organizations, religious 
leaders, hospitals, doctors,  nurses, Catholic nuns, and an unknown number of 
volunteers. The city's long traditions of cooperation in matters of public health, 
especially on the level of city government, private organizations, and community leaders 
also played an important role in the fight. Ideals and traditions, along with the 
identification of the more or less essential needs of society, and tailoring flu responses 
and regulations accordingly, greatly influenced and even largely dictated the city's 
response. There was another exceptionally important factor that influenced the city's 
response though, and that was the Great War. It has only been alluded to up to this point, 
but the almost incomprehensible importance and impact of the war on American society 
can hardly be overstated. This was clearly the case in Cleveland as well, as life began to 
revolve more and more around the war and the war effort. In such a context, it is only 
natural that the Great War also affected the city's war on Spanish Flu. The next chapter 
will explore this tremendously important factor in depth.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FIGHTING THE GERMANS. FIGHTING THE GERMS. 
482
 
 It is as important to safeguard ourselves against preventable diseases and keep   
ourselves in condition for service for our families and the nation as to do many 
other things we are learning so nobly to do. We will fight more ably against the 
Hun "over there" if we at the same time wage war upon filth over here.
483
 
 
 
     An epidemic has the power to turn the most ordinary of times into a most 
extraordinary event. 1918 was anything but ordinary. The world war made it so. Firmly 
embroiled in the Great War since April, 1917, the United States had suspended many of 
its hallowed ideals for the sake of the war effort. Free speech and the right to disagree or 
dissent had been replaced by almost incomprehensibly powerful and fundamentalist 
forms of Americanism and patriotism.
484
 The war effort also resulted in an astounding 
degree of social, economic, industrial, and ideological mobilization throughout the 
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nation. The times were so extraordinary that even a remarkable and devastating event 
like the Spanish Influenza epidemic faded in comparison. Essentially, the Great War 
defined and dictated American life in 1918. Other factors had to be judged and 
determined accordingly, including responses to the Spanish Flu crisis. Spanish Flu did 
not define its time. It arrived into a historical context that not only influenced its spread, 
but powerfully affected the many ways that people fought back. In Cleveland, the war 
on Germans affected and materially aided the war on germs. The many unique war-time 
needs affected the city's responses markedly, at times making it impossible to implement 
recommended public health measures. However, the city's health officials also found 
ways to use the Great War to their benefit. By declaring the Flu War a part of the Great 
War, the city managed to recruit much of the war time fervor, cooperation, loyalty, 
mobilization, organization, sacrifice, funding, and voluntarism in the public health 
battle. More than any other group, the Red Cross proved a natural and extremely 
powerful unifier of the two wars. Intrinsically linked to the U.S. war effort against 
Germany, and fundamentally involved in the gospel of American patriotism, the 
humanitarian organization became one of Cleveland's greatest helpers in the war on 
germs.            
 
Mobilizing the American People 
  What had been tolerated became intolerable now.  
  What had been wrongheadedness was now sedition. 
  What had been folly was now treason.
485
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  May God have mercy on [war opponents],  
  for they need expect none from an outraged people 
  and an avenging government.
486
 
  
     Ever since the outbreak of fighting in Europe in 1914, the U.S. populace had been 
very divided in regards to American involvement in the war. The division over the war 
issue followed at the heels of more than half a century of intensive social and political 
conflicts in the nation. Anti-immigration sentiments began during the antebellum era, as 
Irish and Chinese immigrants experienced increasing degrees of dislike and even hatred 
from the American old stock. Temporarily overshadowed by the enormous sectional 
conflict that was the Civil War, anti-immigrant feelings continued up to 1918 and 
beyond, culminating in the anti-immigration bills passed by the U.S. Congress in 1921 
and 1924.
487
 The country also experienced a tremendous amount of labor conflicts, 
including what amounts to endemic labor strikes and violent strike-breaking in various 
coal and steel regions. The social division was made worse by the emergence of vast 
corporations and the concentration of money and power in a number of "trusts".
488
 The 
world war issue thus found a United States that was anything but united in opinion, 
sentiment or conviction. Not surprisingly, when discussing the war, the nation once 
again found itself very much divided. 
     The conflict and debate over U.S. involvement in the war is highlighted by a number 
of telling events. One of the most famous examples took place in 1915 as German U-
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boats torpedoed and sank the British ocean liner Lusitania. The ship was carrying almost 
2,000 passengers and crew at the time. Of these, 1,195 were lost to the sea. Importantly, 
more than one hundred of the dead were U.S. citizens. The loss of Americans lives to 
German torpedoes caused an uproar in the nation, as people, newspapers, the U.S. 
Congress, and the President debated the topic thoroughly.
489
 In Cleveland, the Lusitania 
tragedy dominated the newspapers for weeks, with mentions and discussions of the issue 
appearing daily from May 8 well into June.
490
 Many of the articles and opinions 
expressed popular outrage, and several urged the public to "keep cool" and allow the 
President and the government to handle the situation.
491
 The local outrage may not have 
been as fierce as some feared or believed. A local coal company conducted polls to 
gauge public opinion on the matter, concluding that only one out of 265 workers in the 
city's coal, ore, and vessel businesses favored using force against Germany as a response 
to the Lusitania sinking. However, as Mark Twain famously stated, there are three kinds 
of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. In short, it is utterly uncertain whether the poll 
was an accurate presentation of Cleveland's sentiment or not. The numerous calls in 
newspapers asking people to simmer down and leave the issue to President Wilson and 
the U.S. Congress suggest that  more people may have been visibly upset than the poll 
claimed. Regardless of this, the company sent their result to Wilson.
492
 If he ever saw 
the poll, the numbers must doubtlessly have encouraged the president, who feared that 
the sinking would upset the "calm manner in which Americans are viewing the 
European struggle[.]" Hoping to keep the nation out of the war, Wilson feared that the 
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loss of lives with the Lusitania would cause "a decided restlessness over the country... 
complicating the efforts of the administration to keep the United States out of the 
European mix up."
 493
 With the president still seeking to keep the nation out of the war, 
the Lusitania debacle eventually passed without any drastic measures being taken. Even 
so, the incident was not forgotten. 
     Even more than the sinking of the Lusitania, the 1916 presidential election strongly 
reflected the importance of the European war in the United States. Although labor issues 
and Americanization were highly discussed matters, nothing received quite as much 
attention as the war question. By the end of the campaign, the war had risen to such 
importance in the public awareness and psyche that many observers attributed Wilson's 
narrow victory to his campaign slogan "He Kept Us Out of War."
494
 Different opinions 
on the matter existed throughout society. For example, many of the country's progressive 
reformers and practically all its socialists were against the war, whereas many on the 
conservative side of politics favored U.S. involvement.
495
 The immigrant nature of the 
American people inevitably provided a variety of opinions and feelings as well, as 
groups hailed from various areas and countries that were now locked in devastating 
war.
496
 Despite the deep-seated divisions and the great resistance to war, the president 
eventually caved in to the historical context.
497
 On April 2, 1917, pressured by the 
deteriorating conditions in Europe, by numerous German provocations, and by pressures 
at home, President Wilson asked the U.S. Congress to "formally accept the status of 
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belligerent which has thus been thrust upon [us]."
498
 Congress responded, war was 
declared, and the United States quickly changed into a very different being.  
     Believing that the war effort required the involvement of every aspect of the country, 
the president recognized the need for a strong central government and the cooperation of 
the people. Wishing to avoid the use of blatant coercive power, Wilson and his 
administration "turned instead to voluntaristic[sic] means, to persuasion, propaganda, 
and the purposeful fueling of patriotic fires."
499
 The president thus led the nation in a 
comprehensive campaign against Germany by seeking to win the hearts and minds of 
the public. Much of this campaign revolved around extolling the virtue of patriotism, 
and emphasizing the civic and patriotic duties that came with being an American. The 
idea of civic obligations was already a familiar part of American culture. The wartime 
propaganda took this ideal, distorted it, and used it for its own purposes. In wartime 
America, a good American was a whole-hearted patriot. As such, he or she was loyal, 
obedient, cooperative, and voluntarily supportive of the war effort. Intrinsically, a good 
American also accepted sacrifice. Patriotism, voluntarism, cooperation and sacrifice thus 
became manifestations of loyalty.
500
 U.S. leaders and their wartime propaganda 
apparatus demanded that American men, women, and children should live according to 
these ideals. Disloyalty, on the other hand, was to be punished. Crucially, the U.S. 
government and the propaganda machine also re-defined disloyalty in war terms. 
Whereas disagreements and various opinions had been accepted previously, these things 
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were now considered un-patriotic and punishable. With the nation's leaders elevating the 
Great War to the position of supreme and essential importance, any resistance or failure 
to cooperate became a threat or even an attack against the nation itself. Cooperation, 
collaboration, one-mindedness, efficiency and sacrifice became synonymous with the 
war effort. Everything else was unpatriotic, un-American, and therefore punishable, 
whether by the government or by an incensed public.
501
 Tennessee Senator Kenneth 
McKellar brilliantly summarized the sentiment in April, 1917, stating that  "[f]rom now 
on there can be but two classes of people in the country - Americans and traitors."
502
 
     The message of patriotism, loyalty, cooperation and sacrifice was hammered into the 
American public by force, intimidation, propaganda, and persuasion. The federal 
government was clearly the main force behind these efforts, but many other actors 
contributed as well. The semi-official, private organization The American Protective 
League, for instance, went to great extremes to enforce public compliance with the new 
ideals. Armed with a sort of quasi-legal authority, the League organized raids against 
draft dodgers, spied on people to look for anti-American or anti-war sentiments, and 
even made arrests.
503
 In Cleveland, the League organized a "slacker hunt" to create a 
"dragnet" for catching more than 2,500 draft dodgers. Armed with the slackers' names, a 
thousand A.P.L. members, together with people from the police, the immigration 
services, the U.S. Marshalls, the Secret Service, and "a host of unorganized patriotic 
citizens", scoured the city for unpatriotic elements.
504
 Intensifying their "investigation of 
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persons in Cleveland and adjacent territories suspected of disloyalty", the Cleveland 
branch of the League quickly grew to be about 1,200 members strong. Many of them 
were businessmen or members of the Cleveland Rotary Club.
505
 By 1918, the A.P.L. had 
established a truly significant presence in the city and was carrying out actions that can 
send uncomfortable shivers down anybody's spine. In an article ominously entitled 
"Eyes That Never Close Guard Cleveland", complete with creepy drawings, a Plain 
Dealer journalist described the League's activities and declared the League members to 
be loyal, patriotic heroes. In one of the most chilling paragraphs, the writer stated that 
"[t]he 'eye and ear squad' of the A.P.L. is always on the job - in the street car, in 
restaurants, in the streets, school, church, homes, every public assembling place. In no 
time your misdemeanor or folly will go tinkling over the wire to some ear in 309 Federal 
Building, and though you may never know it, you will be under surveillance." In this 
highly charged, coercively patriotic, Big-brother-like context, the article even 
encouraged readers to spy on each other, saying that "[t]he safety of the country is 
everybody's business".
506
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     Patriotism was not only used as an excuse to catch draft dodgers. At the hands of 
U.S. leaders and thousands of volunteer educators and enforcers, the very concept of 
patriotism and cooperation became infused with incredible coercive force and public 
fervor. The tactics proved remarkably successful. Combining efforts to force loyalty 
with "the deliberate mobilization of emotions and ideas", President Wilson managed to 
form public opinion to the point where "[t]he people of the United States [became] stark 
160 
 
raving patriotic[.]"
507
 As a result, the American society and public became incredibly 
dedicated to the war effort. The U.S.  also became a place where un-patriotic behavior 
was culturally and socially unacceptable, and where ordinary people made sure that their 
neighbors and co-workers lived up to the patriotic duties and sacrifices that were 
expected of them. Anybody who wished to avoid trouble had to toe the line. An event as 
essential as the Great War left no room for disobedience or dissent. In a supreme case of 
irony, engaged in a global "war for human liberty", the world's greatest democratic 
nation readily rescinded a number of its own freedoms and liberties. Americanization, 
already a great ideal and concern among old stock Americans and reformers, went from 
being mainly implemented over time to being instantly demanded. In an exceptionally 
heterogeneous nation, the "longing for a unanimous spirit" and unity led to the 
establishment of "correct" opinions and behavior, specifically forcing Americans and 
residents of all backgrounds to obey the tenets of wartime patriotism.
508
  
     This new, extreme form of Americanism clearly revealed itself in the rejection of all 
things German. In its propaganda campaign to ensure the voluntary cooperation of the 
American people, the Wilson administration also created what one of the president's 
advisors, Walter Lippman, called "a newspaper campaign of manufactured hatred" 
against Germany.
509
 This created a dichotomy of good versus evil where the U.S. was 
presented as the beacon of civilization, liberty and democracy, whereas Germany and 
everything German were denigrated and demonized to the point of caricature. 
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Reminiscent of the later American obsession with rejecting all things communist, 
American leaders of the Great War era convinced the American public to fiercely reject 
every single aspect of their declared enemy. The German Kaiser Wilhelm was described 
as "the arch-demon of this world...who shed[s] the blood of millions" and who sits on a 
"blood drenched throne".
510
 Clearly favoring the big stick to soft speaking, Theodore 
Roosevelt eagerly joined in the chorus, stating that "[t]he only way to make a Hun 
friendly is to knock him out."
511
 The former president also added fuel to the fire by 
declaring that all who held anti-war sentiments or "declare[ed] inopportune the effort to 
arouse the spirit of Americanism" should be referred to as "shadow huns", and viewed as 
enemies of the United States.
512
 German soldiers did not escape the propaganda 
machine. Instead, they were accused of plunder, rape, enslavement, and murder  in the 
occupied areas.
513
 Sometimes, the Huns were even accused of killing off people for 
some concocted reason, or as a matter of routine, as if this was the most natural thing for 
the German psyche to do.
514
 One of the most gut-wrenching stories was allegedly 
reported by a soldier who had partaken in the liberation of a village in France. Upon 
entering a hut, the soldier had found the following gruesome scene.  
     Against one wall was the dead body of a woman, her hands crossed above her head   
     and nailed to the wall by a spike. There were no other wounds on her body - she must  
     have been left there to die from torture. Opposite her, against the other wall, was a  
     little three-year old child, with its head impaled on a sharp hook and its limp little  
     body hanging down. The two had doubtless been crucified at the same time and left  
     alone to watch  each other's death agonies.
515
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It is not certain whether this story was a true account of a horrendous, vicious deed, or if 
it was simply another part of war time fabrications. Either way, the story shows the 
kinds of language and propaganda that was used to create an image of the evil Huns that 
had to be stopped.   
     The Kaiser and his kin were thus described as butchers and oppressors of men, who 
"reek with the blood of the innocent."
516
 Not surprisingly, the distaste of Germans 
seamlessly extended to all things German. In this way, anything that had even the most 
cursory connection with Germany was rejected as evil and contrary to United States 
ideals. The propaganda quickly led to an incredible spike in anti-German sentiments in 
the U.S, causing a series of notions and actions ranging from the peculiar to the 
outrageous. In an action reminiscent of the more recent nonsense of re-naming French 
fries "Freedom Fries", sauerkraut was temporarily dubbed "liberty cabbage".
517
 A 
number of beer gardens and breweries were forced to close down because of the 
association of beer with Germans, and several schools decided to drop German lessons 
from their curriculums.
518
 Amazingly, many Americans even began rejecting German 
toys, books, and music.
519
 Far more destructively, the anti-German sentiment virtually 
destroyed German-American cultural life in the U.S. during the war by shutting down 
numerous German organizations and institutions. The previously very rich German-
American culture never truly recovered. 
520
 More eerily, people began blaming the 
Germans for spreading epidemic disease. On September 13, 1918, newspapers reported 
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that a shipment of food stuffs had arrived from Madrid, Spain, and was "known to have 
been infected with diphtheria germs by German agents there."
521
 Soon thereafter, 
newspapers once again blamed the Huns for spreading disease, this time declaring that 
the release of Spanish Flu in the U.S. was of German origin and "quite in keeping with 
German tactics and kultur."
522
 Creative minds developed numerous theories on how the 
Huns had carried out their diabolical biological attack. Some stated that flu germs had 
been placed inside aspirin, seeing how aspirin was manufactured by the German 
pharmaceutical company Bayer. Others held that German agents had snuck ashore in 
some east coast harbor - whether from a ship or a U-boat - and had released the scourge 
upon an unsuspecting populace.
523
 The common denominator was a deep suspicion and 
hatred for all things German, and a glorification of all things American.  
     Patriotism and anti-Germanism found its way to America's pulpits as well. Cleveland 
reverend Minot O. Simons led a crowd in shouting "Who prescribed the medicine for the 
world war? Germany. Who's going to take it? The Hun. When are Germans good? When 
they're down and dead."
524
 Reverend Charles Stelzle highlighted the difference between 
the two nations by creatively likening the U.S. to the compassionate organization the 
Red Cross while likening Germany to the symbol of its army and to a German military 
distinction medal; the Iron Cross. Between the two, Stelzle stated,  
     there's all the distance between heaven and hell! The Red Cross stands for mercy –  
     the Iron Cross stands for 'shrecklichkeit', for terrorism. The Red Cross destroys  
     disease – the Iron Cross spreads corruption. The Red Cross gives life and hope - the  
     Iron Cross brings worse than death. The Red Cross rehabilitates crippled men,  
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     making them over - the Iron Cross tortures crushed bodies, driving them mad. The  
     Red Cross comforts women and children - the Iron Cross curses mothers and babies,  
     and outrages all womankind. The Red Cross serves all - the Iron Cross tyranizes[sic]  
     over all. The Red Cross is the symbol of sacrifice - the Iron Cross is the sign of  
     supreme selfishness. All the forces of light are behind the crimson-red cross, dyed by  
     the blood of martyrs - all  the powers of darkness are arrayed under the cruel iron  
     cross, made hideous by a history because of which its wearers will one day stand  
     disgraced and dishonored."
525
 
  
     The Germans were evil. The Americans were good. Even the clergy said so. 
Patriotism, loyalty, cooperation, and sacrifice was therefore also good, whereas 
disloyalty was wrong and evil. Clearly, the propaganda campaign was a success. And, 
by creating such a tremendous degree of patriotic emotion and fervor, Wilson and his 
compatriots also succeeded in ensuring loyalty and cooperation without relying 
primarily on blatant governmental force. This does not mean that force and coercion was 
not rampant. The emotions ran so strong through much of the U.S. that freedoms were 
sacrificed at the altar of patriotism, and people were forced to cooperate and sacrifice for 
their nation lest they be prosecuted or persecuted for their failure to be good Americans. 
The consequences of failure could be harsh. In Holland, Ohio, three men accused of 
being "outwardly pro-German and refusing to purchase Liberty bonds" were taken from 
their beds at night, dragged outside, stripped of their clothes, and then had hot, greasy 
pitch poured over their bodies. Suffering horrible burns from the pitch, the men had 
insult added to their  injuries as they were first tarred and feathered and then, terribly 
injured and ridiculed, brought to Liberty Court in nearby Toledo where they were made 
to kiss a large American flag. The three men ended the night in police custody, where 
they were held for government agents.
526
 Speaking one's mind could be positively 
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dangerous. In Youngstown, Ohio, a German sailor was imprisoned and held for 
questioning, charged with speaking disparagingly about President Wilson and the U.S. 
armed forces.
527
 Many places, people were even lynched for failing to express the proper 
degree of patriotism.
528
 If a person managed to avoid the mobs or the police, they still 
had to contend with the A.P.L. and their menacing presence and practices. Anyone who 
uttered a seditious or treasonable word, who supported Germany, or who acted in a 
seditious of treasonable way were liable to be investigated by the League. As one 
newspaper article stated: "The A.P.L.'ll git you, ef you don't watch out."
529
 
 
Cleveland at War 
Under the impulse of the unifying motive growing out of the war, Cleveland, in 
common with many cities, built up very strong organization which, through 
united effort, gathered money for the various purposes connected with the war..... 
these experiences revealed to the community itself a fuller measure of 
satisfaction and achievement in cooperative effort than the city had ever known 
before.
530
 
 
 
     The war years were truly an extraordinary time in U.S. history. But how did this 
affect Cleveland? And how did it affect the city's response to the Spanish Flu epidemic? 
First of all, Cleveland was certainly not exempted from the intense patriotism that ruled 
the day. As was the case in most of the country, this almost mad patriotism was 
manifested both in cases of genuine, eager and voluntary patriotism, and in coercion 
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against the disloyal or subversive. Patriotism thus came to engulf both voluntary 
cooperation and coercive cooperation. Both these sides of wartime patriotism in 
Cleveland can be seen in the city's fourth Liberty Loan campaign.  
     The three week long fourth Liberty Loan campaign began in Cleveland on Saturday, 
September 28, 1918. At noon, preluded by five minutes of church bells ringing and 
factory whistles howling, Cleveland mayor Harry L. Davis declared the start of the 
largest fundraising campaign in the city's history. Already dubbed "the quota campaign", 
participation in the liberty loan event was anything but voluntary. Or, although voluntary 
in theory, it was very coercive in practice. The national leaders of the campaign had 
decided that the national quota was an astounding six billion dollars. Of this, Cleveland 
was expected to raise $113,000,000. The city, in turn, passed on quota expectations to its 
citizens. Anyone making five dollars a day was told that he had a quota of contributing a 
day's pay every week for twenty-six weeks. People making more were expected to 
contribute more. Individual factories and businesses were also assigned quotas. The 
Liberty Loan organizers, which included city officials and members of the Cleveland 
Chamber of Commerce, exhorted everybody to do their part. "To win the war" they 
stated, "the spirit shown by the army must fire the whole nation. Each must be like a 
soldier. Each must have the will to accomplish the impossible." Although appealing to 
the monetary returns that people could expect from their liberty bonds, the organizers 
held that the loan had a much stronger appeal than simple economic gains. Instead, they 
wrote, "[the Loan's] strongest appeal is to loyalty. Buying Liberty Bonds is a duty every 
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loyal American owes to the United States[.]"
531
 Leaning heavily on the virtues of 
patriotism and sacrifice, the Loan organizers went on to declare the opening day of the 
campaign as that generation's Fourth of July, only "[i]t is a new and greater 
Independence Day," they proclaimed, "for it means independence not only for the 
United States, but for every people, every nation that values the rights of life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness." Their calls for cooperation were followed by long lists of 
businesses and companies that were already cooperating and contributing.
 532
 Other 
Clevelanders, including individual workers, were also supportive and even enthusiastic 
about the campaign and quickly contributed above and beyond their assigned quotas.
533
  
     The very next day, the city held a grand Liberty Loan parade, complete with John 
Philip Sousa and his 305 piece Great Lakes Band. It was a monumental affair. 
Commenting on the vast number of participants, Liberty Loan directors who witnessed 
the spectacle stated that "[o]ne half of the city seems to be parading and the other half to 
be watching." Ohio's governor James M. Cox joined in the choir of praise by declaring 
Cleveland's parade to be the most spectacular parade he had ever witnessed. Thoroughly 
impressed he said that "[i]f the organization and spirit I have seen manifested today do 
not mean that Cleveland is determined to subscribe its quota in record time, then count 
me a mistaken and surprised man[.]" It is very understandable that the governor and 
other spectators were impressed as some 40,000 Clevelanders walked in the parade. 
Among these were almost forty bands who certainly helped keep noise levels and spirits 
up. The most noticeable part of the parade, however, was that more than half the 
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participants were women. Their presence was hailed as proof of the city's patriotic 
women who worked with the Red Cross, in factories, and everywhere else where their 
presence was needed.
534
Another notable aspect of the display were the crowds of men, 
women and children who witnessed the parade. Many places, the masses of people grew 
so thick that it became entirely impossible for people to pass by.
535
 A vast affair, the 
parade was heralded as proof of the depth of Cleveland's loyalty and willingness to make 
sacrifices for the war effort. The Plain Dealer raved that this "demonstration of loyalty, 
of determination to 'keep faith with the boys overseas', has no precedent even in a city 
boastful of its traditions." The parade was therefore Cleveland's pledge to do "everything 
in the power of human beings to crush autocracy and light the lamp of liberty in every 
land." Curiously, the newspaper, along with government officials, private citizens, men, 
women and children, appeared to believe that the size and splendor of the parade was an 
indicator of the city's pledge and loyalty. However, it quickly became evident that many 
Clevelanders were far quicker to show patriotism by attending parades than by opening 
their wallets.  
     With patriotic expectations running high after the successful Loan parade, the 
campaign organizers were shocked and dismayed to find Cleveland "lagging far behind" 
a number of other cities in bonds purchases. One week into the campaign, the Cleveland 
Press reported that the city had raised less than half of what Boston and Baltimore had 
managed to do in three days. One third into the campaign, Cleveland had not even filled 
thirty percent of their quota. This was a big problem and great shame for a city that 
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prided itself for its spirit of civic duty. It was in fact unacceptable. Highlighting the 
tremendous sacrifice and duty showed by American troops in the trenches, the Press 
lamented that the same spirit was not shown in Cleveland. "Americans here held back", 
the front page article cried. "Their spirit was slack. Their lines sagged. They seemed to 
hope that the war will win itself, somehow, without much sacrifice." Such lack of duty 
and sacrifice was not only deplorable, but proof that the public had their priorities 
completely wrong. In a sign of the depth of sacrifice that the war effort wished for, the 
article declared that "[w]e must meet our quota, if we have to sell shirts off our backs to 
do it. A shirt is not absolutely necessary. But it is absolute necessary that the bond quota 
be reached and topped."
536
 The Great War essentially created a hierarchy of needs that 
was quite unlike Maslow's later pyramid, declaring that the war effort was America's 
most important challenge, duty, and responsibility. "It won't be easy", the Cleveland 
Press said, "[b]ut it must be done. Patriotism isn't shouting. Loyalty isn't measured by 
cheers. But it can be measured. It can be measured by sacrifice."
537
 A huge parade was 
evidently not a true sign of patriotism and loyalty. Sacrifice was. And if people could 
not be moved by either shame or love of country to make sacrifices voluntarily, then 
they simply had to be forced.  
     Mr. C. D. Bradley was the vice president of Cleveland's Executive Committee for the 
Liberty Loan campaign. On October 5, as it was evident that Cleveland was lagging 
behind on its quotas, Mr. Bradley decided to add threats to the mix. A vital part of the 
Loan Committee's tactics to reach all Clevelanders was to send special ward salesmen 
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throughout the city. These salesmen even went from door to door to look for proof that 
people had contributed to the cause. To ensure that every man in the city contributed in 
the campaign, Bradley told every bond subscriber to report their bond activities to the 
ward salesmen, disclosing both the amount of investment that each family had done so 
far, and through whom the subscription had been made. By doing this, Bradley said, "we 
will have a check on every man in the city."
538
 A couple of days later, the threats became 
even more explicit. Responding to reports from ward salesmen that some Clevelanders 
had made "flagrant attempts to shirk the national duty", Loan officials strongly declared 
that "[n]o man earning from $7,000 to $10,000 a year can buy a $100 or $200 bond and 
think he can get away with that[.]" To boost the contributions further, the Loan officials 
even ordered the ward salesmen to make subsequent visits to people's homes to find out 
whether further contributions could be made.
 539
 Ideally, people should sacrifice twice 
the amount that they felt comfortable investing.
540
 It is not known whether any 
Clevelanders experienced the terrors of tar and feathering or lynching that took place in 
numerous other locales during the Liberty Loan campaigns.
541
 What is certain is that 
there was a tremendous amount of pressure on everybody to contribute. The city's 335 
Chinese residents, for instance, must have felt both a sense of pride and a sense of relief 
as they declared that "Cleveland's Chinese Have Gone Over the Top in the Fourth 
Liberty Loan!" Even better, every single Chinese Clevelander had contributed to the 
campaign, and almost every single one had doubled up on their subscription after the 
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"double up" call.
542
 At least the city's Chinese could not be accused of being Loan 
slackers.  
 
     The fourth Liberty Loan campaign was clearly characterized by coerced forms of 
cooperation and patriotism. Even so, it is important to remember that there was also a 
tremendous amount of genuine patriotism, with thousands of Clevelanders lining up to 
do their part in defeating the Huns. For instance, the newspapers printed numerous lists 
of big contributors as companies lined up to prove their patriotic zeal. Some of these 
lists read much like a who's who of Cleveland commerce and industry, including 
McKinney Steel Company, Sherwin Williams, the Cleveland Electric illuminating 
Company, White Company, M.A. Hanna & Company, Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company, 
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Standard Oil Company of Ohio, and numerous other businesses and banks.
543
 One of the 
city's great industrialists and philanthropists, Samuel Mather, responded very 
specifically to the Loan campaign's call to "double up" on loan subscriptions and 
increased his purchase from $500,000 to a million.
544
 Many others followed suit, even if 
their totals were smaller.
545
 A great number of the city's men made their contributions 
through their places of employment, as evidenced by newspaper listings. For example, 
on Wednesday October 9, "Van Dorn Iron Works Co. employees" and "Lakewood 
Engineering Co. employees" were listed among the greatest subscribers of loans for that 
day.
546
 Much of the men's prescriptions went rather unnoticed in the media though, 
making it very difficult to determine the degree of voluntarism or coercion that was 
involved in each pledge or purchase.  
     This was not the case with Cleveland's women. Volunteering in great numbers to 
help with the campaign, the women even formed their own Liberty Loan committee and 
organized a number of Loan events. For example, led by the president of the Ohio 
Woman Suffrage Association, Mrs. Harriet Taylor Upton; wife of former Cleveland 
mayor and in 1918 the U.S. Secretary of War, Mrs. Elizabeth L. Baker; Mrs, Elizabeth 
Miller of the Cleveland Women's Liberty Loan Committee; and Miss Lavinia Engle of 
the National Women's Liberty Loan Committee, Cleveland's women organized both a 
four day speaking and selling tour and a gigantic fund raiser in the city's B. F. Keith's 
Hippodrome. The event at the Hippodrome even had famous French actress Sarah 
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Berhardt contribute in the program.
547
 For once though, the French star was outshined. 
Enjoying a "sympathetic atmosphere" created by a naval band, a number of speakers, 
and communal singing, Mrs. Harriet T. Upton took the stage to call for bond pledges. 
After an initial subscription for fifty dollars, a man in the audience made a call for 
$1,000. This was immediately followed by a woman shouting out twice that amount. "I 
never knew the time when a woman couldn't match the best any man could do," the 
suffragist leader declared. Another woman immediately called out the tremendous 
pledge of twelve thousand dollars, obviously pleasing the vast crowd. Soon thereafter, a 
man promised a $5,000 investment, to which Mrs. Upton answered, "That's from a 
tenor's voice - where's the soprano to match it?" Not surprisingly, the five thousand 
dollar pledge was matched by women not once, but twice shortly thereafter. By the time 
all was said and done, the Hippodrome event raised over half a million dollars for the 
Liberty Loan, making the Plain Dealer conclude that "Women Enthuse [the Loan] 
Rally."
548
 This opinion was seconded by  Mr. Bradley. At the end of the campaign, as it 
became evident that Cleveland had in fact gone above and beyond its quota, the vice 
president of Cleveland's Loan Committee stated that although much thanks should be 
given to bond subscribers and the many patriots who also volunteered their time and 
energy, most of the credit for a successful campaign belonged to the city's many 
women's organizations.
549
       
      1918 Cleveland was a city largely defined by the Great War. The city and its 
residents had learned to make sacrifices, to cooperate -willingly or not- , and to 
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wholeheartedly embrace Americanism, loyalty and patriotism. The war effort was of the 
utmost importance and life in the city was dramatically affected by this. It was therefore 
natural and even inevitable that all aspects and functions of society were influenced by 
the war in one way or another. Public health measures were no exception, even during 
the Spanish Flu crisis.  
   
War Against Germans. War Against Germs. 
 The army and navy are fighting and conquering Germans. 
 We must fight and conquer germs without taking anything  
 away from the army and navy."
550
 
 
  
 Avoid crowds, coughs and cowards, but fear neither germs nor Germans!
551
  
 
     The war affected Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu in a number of ways. First, 
the war significantly reduced the number of doctors and nurses who were available to 
deal with the scourge, as many were either overseas or serving elsewhere in the 
nation.
552
 As mentioned in chapter II, this included the city's original health 
commissioner Dr. Bishop and a number of his close co-workers. The war also helped the 
disease spread. For example, just around the time the Spanish Flu arrived in the U.S., 
about thirteen million young men - more than ten percent of the entire population - 
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gathered in halls and buildings throughout the country to sign up for the draft.
553
 The 
ones who got called up had to travel from their homes, congregate in crowded barracks 
in overflowing military bases, and then ship off to Europe. An astounding 1.5 million of 
them went overseas between June, 1918 and the end of the war alone.
554
 With a disease 
that for some reason preferred the young and strong to the old and infirm, this massive 
mixing of young men was extraordinarily unfortunate, causing intense suffering in 
military installations throughout the country.
555
 Furthermore, cramming thousands of 
young men together, and moving them from base to base, helped the epidemic spread 
like wildfire.
556
 This was the way the disease originally spread to many areas, including 
Ohio where the first case was reported in Camp Sherman, near Chillicothe. In 
Cleveland, the war aided the spread of the Spanish Flu because influenza is a crowd 
disease and the war effort inspired and required many public gatherings. The immense 
Liberty Loan parade on September 29 is a prime example, as are the daily Liberty Loan 
gatherings in Public Square, the Loan rally at the Hippodrome, the parade to celebrate 
Italian war heroes, another parade to honor women who had lost sons in the war, and so 
on.
557
 Although both these factors certainly played a role in Cleveland's Spanish Flu 
experience, there were three main ways that the Great War most notably and profoundly 
affected Cleveland response to Spanish Flu. First of all, the war created an atmosphere 
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and a historical context that allowed Dr. Rockwood and the other city leaders to tie the 
war on flu to the war on Huns. Secondly, the nation and its leaders were incredibly 
dedicated to the war effort. In terms of a hierarchy of importance, the war remained the 
most essential part of U.S. life even in the midst of an epidemic. Dr. Rockwood and the 
city's public health response existed within this context and had to both act and make 
decisions accordingly. Thirdly, the war effort required a tremendous amount of 
organization, mobilization, cooperation and voluntarism. All these elements connected 
brilliantly and extensively with the public health sphere through the Red Cross. The City 
of Cleveland and its health commissioner doubtlessly enjoyed the benefit of this during 
the fight against flu.    
     As seen in chapter III, when fighting the flu, Dr. Rockwood and the city's health 
department preferred the voluntary help and cooperation of the public. This cooperation 
ideally extended into every aspect of the city, including private companies and 
organizations, churches, various government departments, newspapers, schools, homes, 
and work places. Traditionally, public health regulations had been very difficult to 
enforce on a city-wide basis, and typically required the help of organizations such as the 
Chamber of Commerce and the School Board to be successful. Generally speaking, 
many people were simply not willing to abide by regulations that required personal 
sacrifice, especially if the regulations appeared unnecessary, too stringent, or dangerous. 
The amount of persuasion, education, and coercion that was sometimes required to 
implement public health measures could be very large. However, in the Great War 
context, much of the language, attitude and mentalité required to execute an effective 
public health campaign was already in place. In short, the public was utterly primed for 
177 
 
calls to volunteer, cooperate and make sacrifices. From the very beginning, Dr. 
Rockwood wrapped his response in typical war time imagery, rhetoric and exhortations, 
and also tied the fight against flu to the war effort. On October 5, the health 
commissioner pointed out that the epidemic had hampered Liberty Loan campaigns and 
war work in other cities. This, he stated, should not be allowed to happen in 
Cleveland.
558
 To fight the flu was to support the war effort. To fight germs was to fight 
Germans. Voluntary cooperation with the health commissioner was therefore a matter of 
loyalty and patriotism, much like investing in Liberty bonds. 
     The connection between the Great War, the war on flu, voluntarism and patriotism 
saturated Dr. Rockwood's Spanish Flu education campaign. The city's newspapers gave 
him invaluable assistance in this. Nurses who volunteered to treat flu victims were 
portrayed as war heroes.
559
 In similarly bellicose terms, "war to the hilt" was declared on 
flu-spreading practices such as spitting, and the city was quick to launch an "open 
campaign to free [the] city of flu."
560
 Once again stressing the importance of the flu fight 
in the context of the Great War, the health commissioner told the public that it was "their 
patriotic duty" to follow his instructions.
561
 The war-like language also continued as 
Rockwood called for a ban on meetings as part of the "flu war", and recruited 3,500 
teachers to help "combat influenza."
562
 On November 3, the doctor took the war 
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metaphors even further by likening the epidemic situation to a siege.
563
 To further 
cement the connection between the war on Germans and the war on germs, and to 
legitimize the health commissioner's authority, the Cleveland Press declared that Dr. 
Rockwood "is directing the medical forces in an attempt to prevent crippling of 
Cleveland war plants."
564
  
     With such noble motives attached to his leadership and actions, the health 
commissioner was able to implement wartime language to encourage, persuade and even 
coerce cooperation. As early as October 10, the health commissioner had lamented the 
shortage of doctors and nurses, stating that the lack of personnel was seriously 
hampering the "fight against the 'flu'".
565
As the epidemic worsened in the city, the need 
for nurses and doctors became increasingly desperate. In a call for volunteer nurses, 
Rockwood once again appealed to wartime ideals and language by stating that 
volunteers would be "performing a patriotic service in a time of unusual stress."
566
 As 
days went by and the number of volunteers proved insufficient, the language became 
more explicit. By October 28, large notices in the local newspapers told women with any 
type of nursing training that it was not only their "privilege" to cooperate, but also their 
"patriotic duty"
567
 By November 2, the same group of women were even told to not be 
among those "Who Have Shirked Their Duty to Their Country and Their 
Community."
568
 Volunteers were patriots. The ones who shied away from service were 
not. In similar fashion, the doctor accused landlords who refused to provide proper 
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heating for their tenants of being unpatriotic.
569
 Even more harshly, Rockwood declared 
nurses who chose to stay with wealthy families rather than help treat the masses to be 
"as much 'slackers' as men who attempt to evade service in the army."
570
 Although 
exasperated with these "hundreds of 'luxury' nurses in the city", the doctor was clear in 
stating that "[t]he nursing profession as a whole... has shown that it is patriotic."
571
 In 
Cleveland's fight against influenza, cooperation was a sign of patriotism; selfishness and 
disobedience were signs of disloyalty. 
      By making the flu fight a part of the war effort, Dr. Rockwood was able to call on 
the power of patriotism, duty, and loyalty to aid in the war on Spanish Influenza. This 
allowed him to use patriotic language and arguments in his calls for volunteers and 
cooperation. It also lent additional legitimacy to his actions so long as they could be 
presented as part of the war effort.
572
 Making the epidemic a war issue also allowed the 
health commissioner to seek funds for flu hospitals from the Mayor Davis' War 
Advisory Board.
573
 Finally, it provided Dr. Rockwood with a way to establish and 
defend a hierarchy of importance and need. Public health regulations that force members 
of the public to sacrifice freedoms, money, social desires, and so on can be hard to 
implement during any epidemic crisis, as people may choose to resist or disobey the 
orders. In 1918 Cleveland, war conditions made it much harder for people to disobey. 
For instance, if there was ever a doubt that the city's churches and church leaders would 
rally around the health commissioner, the Great War provided the necessary "spirit" to 
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ensure their cooperation. In the same way, if for some reason the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce had proved uninterested in the Spanish Flu during ordinary times, the war 
context made its involvement virtually certain. Considering the tremendous amount of 
patriotism, both voluntary and coerced, that existed in the U.S. and Cleveland during the 
Great War, it is very likely that similar claims can be made for greater parts of the 
general populace. At the very least, making the war on germs part of the war on 
Germans brought the epidemic into a realm where it was much more difficult for people 
to disregard the flu fight.    
     The connection between the war on flu and the Great War was not only by design, 
but also by default. In 1918, the war against influenza was not only a part of the greater 
war, but was essentially subordinate to the war effort. This was due to the simple fact 
that in 1918, everything was subordinate to the war effort. The war on germs was 
important, but not nearly as important as the war on Germans. After all, the Spanish Flu 
epidemic could never have inspired such a profound and society-wide mobilization, 
propaganda machine, and amount of patriotism, cooperation, voluntarism, persuasion, 
coercion and sacrifice as the Great War did. Granted, epidemic diseases often have the 
power to unite certain groups and force others to comply.
574
 Even so, diseases simply do 
not have the same power, influence, and impact on a society as the Great War did, with 
practically all of U.S. society fighting the war for democracy and liberty together. The 
Cuyahoga County War Savings Committee, for  one, was very explicit about the 
hierarchy of importance. As the various flu bans forced people to stay home and 
consequently save money, the war savings committee urged them to invest in the Great 
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War as this investment would help keep people safe "from things far worse than the 
flu."
575
 The war on flu was important, but Dr. Rockwood made it even much more 
important by connecting it to the Great War effort. By focusing on the connection 
between the two fights, the health commissioner managed to use the most important war 
effort to help the less important public health effort. 
      This tactic posed one unintended drawback. Although officials were able to lean on 
the authority of the war effort in the fight against flu, once the war with Germany was 
over, most of the people's interest in the war on germs appears to have evaporated. In 
fact, with the end of the Great War, many somehow decided that the Flu War was also 
over. The day after Armistice Day, on November 12, 1918, the Cleveland News declared 
the "Flu Peril Over".
576
 Theaters were filled to the brim and almost all the moving 
picture theaters were packed as well.
577
 The very same week, notices for dances and for 
the great War Exposition also began to appear in the newspapers.
578
 Just as importantly, 
mentions of the Spanish Flu practically disappeared, going from taking up significant 
space, especially in the Plain Dealer and the Cleveland Press, to getting only an 
occasional mention. Focus shifted to festivities and celebration. A big dance was 
scheduled at Zimmerman's Dancing Arcadia for November 17 to celebrate that both the 
war and the flu were over.
579
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     The War Expo, originally designed as a way to raise and retain public morale during 
the war, was re-packaged as a tremendous victory celebration. "No one in this city, or 
within suburban car ride, can afford to miss seeing this great patriotic show in the nine 
days it is here", the Cleveland Press said, declaring that "Buffalo Bill's Wild West was a 
sideshow by contrast."
580
 The Jewish Review and Observer emphasized the involvement 
of numerous Jewish organizations in the Expo and declared that it was "The Greatest 
Event of the Greatest Week in All History."
581
 With torch-lit parades, mock battles, 
exhibits of war relics and weaponry, miles of trenches and barbed wire, a community 
chorus of 50,000 Clevelanders, and a chance to see how the war was won, it is not 
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surprising that people young and old flocked to the event.
582
 Clevelanders crowded 
together to watch eight hundred "dough boys" charge across a mock no-man's land on 
the city's lakefront. The untold thousands of spectators revelled in the authentic feel of 
the scene as their heroes pretended to attack an equal number of men dressed in the 
grey-blue color of the enemy, while smoke and the sounds of rifles and guns filled the 
air. Big cannon, warplanes, and even three tanks even showed up, dropping dummy-
bombs and spewing flame and smoke. A night-time display saw parts of downtown 
blacked out, only to be illuminated by searchlights, flares, and flumes of fire erupting 
from numerous artillery pieces and airplanes.
583
 By the end of the week, hundreds of 
thousands of people had visited the event, celebrating that the war was over.
584
 One the 
final day alone, around 200,000 people showed up, packing the downtown area with a 
huge, flowing human mass.
585
 Throughout the nine-day-long Expo, the crowds grew so 
great and congested that soldiers and police had to work all day long to prevent serious 
accidents. Often people had to stand in line for an hour or more simply to get in or out of 
buildings or bleachers.
586
 In the end Expo officials estimated that more than seventy 
percent of the city's residents had visited the event.
587
 The Great War was over, and 
people celebrated by crowding together in unprecedented ways. And this was happening 
despite the fact that people were still dying from Spanish Flu and pneumonia at the rate 
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of anywhere from twenty to sixty a day.
588
 And although Dr. Rockwood posted very 
subtle warnings about crowds following the Armistice Day celebration, all calls against 
public assembly quickly disappeared.
589
  The Great War was over, so Clevelanders 
simply decided that the flu crisis was over as well. From this point on, it was handled 
much like any other flu situation, receiving very little public attention and very few 
official public health measures.      
     There is a very good reason why the people of Cleveland may have jumped to the 
conclusion that the flu crisis was over. Under significant pressure, on November 6 Dr. 
Rockwood declared that if flu conditions improved steadily and markedly, he would lift 
the bans on November 13. However, if conditions did not improve significantly, the 
bans would stay. In the health commissioner's opinion, the flu danger was still very 
much there.
590
 Then suddenly, on the next day, reports arrived from the United Press 
that Germany had capitulated. This prompted the Cleveland Press to print an extra night 
edition, practically shouting "WAR'S OVER".
591
 The Press and the Plain Dealer went 
on to describe scenes of wild celebration. Harry Vail, the secretary of Mayor Davis' War 
Board, asked all Clevelanders "to stop work at 4 p.m., meet on City Hall grounds and 
give three great cheers" for the president, for the United States, and for General 
Pershing. People went nuts. Forming impromptu parades, Clevelanders from all parts of 
the city crowded together in celebration; singing, yelling, cheering, shaking hands, 
weeping, hugging, and kissing. Factories, boats, and locomotives shrieked their whistles 
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and people joined in the cacophony by banging pans together and using any noise maker 
available to add to the choir. Places that sold flags, "horns and noise makers" quickly 
sold out. It was a tremendous party: an exuberant patriotic celebration. Strangers became 
friends. The city stopped. Shops, stores, factories and businesses emptied of workers as 
"tens of thousands of men and women were moved to a state of delirious joy" and joined 
the throng in the streets. Thousands of the people were foreign born, but in this grand 
celebration, they all became American. At 6 o'clock "a man with a voice that compared 
favorably to a fog-horn" appeared in the streets, loudly announcing that the war was in 
fact not over. The crowds chose to overlook him. The excitement of ending the war, and 
having a valid reason to blatantly disobey the flu bans against public assembly, was 
simply too much to give up.
 592
 The Great War was not over, but the false armistice 
proved the bane of the flu regulations, and by extension the flu crisis. 
     On Friday, November 8th, the day after his orders had been entirely disregarded by 
people and government officials alike, Dr. Rockwood suddenly declared that because of 
"[s]udden improvement yesterday in the influenza situation", he had tentatively decided 
to lift the flu bans at 6 p.m. on Monday, November 11th. Using an extremely creative 
form of interpreting statistics, the health commissioner stated that the 273 new cases on 
November 7th was only about a quarter of daily cases at the height of the epidemic.
593
 
What Dr. Rockwood failed to state was that the 273 new cases on November 7th was not 
a significant drop compared to the preceding week, and actually lined up very well with 
conditions that the doctor had recently referred to as insufficient for lifting the bans. He 
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also failed to remind the public of an earlier statement in which the doctor had said that 
he would not consider lifting the bans until the number of new cases in a 24 hour period 
dropped to around 120.
594
 The numbers did line up with the conditions around October 
12th when the flu bans were first presented to the public. Even so, the drop between 
November 4th and November 7th was certainly not a sudden and vast improvement, at 
least not according to the health commissioner's own statistics.
595
 It is much more likely 
that shifting conditions in the Great War effort convinced Rockwood that conditions in 
the Flu War, although far from great, were good enough for him to lift the bans. He may 
even have realized that as the world war drew to an end, there was no way he would be 
able to successfully uphold the closing orders much longer. This becomes even clearer 
when considering the other ways that the war effort influenced and in many ways 
dictated the city's flu response. By tying the germ war to the German war, Dr. 
Rockwood had opened the door for ending the bans. By declaring the situation 
statistically promising, and thus giving a quantifiable, scientific reason to lift the closing 
orders, he opened the door even further. The popular response was that given an inch, 
they went for the mile. Ready to "blow [the] flu lid entirely off", Clevelanders looked 
forward to Monday, November 11th with great excitement and enthusiasm. Even if the 
Great War effort had continued on beyond that day, it would have proven extremely 
difficult to hold back the tide of people who longed to put an end to four weeks of the 
excruciatingly boring "stay-at-home-for-there's-nothing-to-do" flu bans.     
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     The Great War effort did not continue past November 11th. Instead, the effort was 
replaced with even greater celebrations than what had taken place during the false 
armistice day. The War was over and Clevelanders could not be bothered to wait until 6 
p.m. to lift the flu bans. Instead, they blew the lid off with vigor. Once again, the city 
stopped working as stores and factories and any other place of employment suspended 
work. People formed numerous parades and, joining in with factory sirens, church bells, 
and fire station bells, made an indescribable amount of noise. By 9 a.m., Public Square 
was already overrun with people who arrived from points throughout the city. Whole 
neighborhoods emptied out and moved downtown in steady streams. Mayor Davis 
proclaimed the day a holiday and ordered the courts closed. In the words of the 
Cleveland Press, "[t]he city was given entirely over to celebration."
596
 One man, 
drawing loud cheers from the crowds, expressed his celebration by carrying an effigy of 
ex-Kaiser Wilhelm stuck atop a bayonet.
597
 Another used his car to make gas explosions 
with his muffler. Lost in excitement, he ended up blowing the muffler straight off his 
car. This did not seem to faze him the least. "What's a muffler on an occasion like this?" 
he said.
598
 And he was right. What was a muffler on the day the war was won? What 
was the Spanish Influenza on the day the war was won? It turned out that in the context 
of Armistice Day, neither muffler nor flu mattered much at all.  
     The health commissioner was very much answerable to the Great War, both during 
the war effort, and during the victory celebration. The false victory celebration, the real 
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Armistice Day, and the War Expo all show this. During the earlier parts of the epidemic 
though, nothing showed this factor better than the fourth Liberty Loan campaign. For 
example, when Dr. Rockwood called for a ban on all meetings, he expressly excepted 
Loan rallies. Instead, he simply asked the Loan organizers to limit the size of their 
meetings.
599
 He also postponed the ban on all indoor meetings, which would include 
Loan meetings, until Monday, October 14th. This allowed the campaign to properly 
welcome, parade and celebrate visiting Italian war heroes, and to carry out the vast fund-
raising mass meeting at Keith's Hippodrome.
600
 Dr. Rockwood also postponed the ban 
on evening and late-night outdoor meetings until after the Loan campaign was over. This 
allowed the campaign to arrange a number of large parades, hold daily outdoors 
meetings, and even organize an evening of "noisy celebration in downtown streets and 
Public Square."
601
 Once the Loan was over, Rockwood declared that there would be no 
more outdoor gatherings without special permission. He emphasized the importance of 
the order by stating that "[t]he epidemic will get beyond control unless people stop 
gathering in crowds" and that violators would be arrested. Even more importantly, the 
health commissioner shows the subordination of the flu war to the Great War by 
blatantly stating that "[t]his action is advisable now that the Liberty Loan Campaign is 
ended."
602
 The Flu was important enough to warrant closings and arrests, but not 
important enough to infringe on the war effort. People may have been answerable to Dr. 
Rockwood in matters of public health. But the health commissioner was answerable to 
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the war effort. In the hyper-patriotically charged, Great War focused city of Cleveland, 
the war on germs surely mattered for the sake of saving lives. However, from a broad, 
social perspective, the greatest purpose of the flu fight was to prevent Spanish Flu from 
interfering with the war effort.  
     In one case Dr. Rockwood managed to impose his opinion upon the war effort. 
Amazingly, on November 1st, the health commissioner told the city's and county's War 
Expo organizers to postpone the exposition from the week of November 9 to the week of 
November 16. The doctor reasoned that the great influx of visitors that the Expo would 
bring could prove detrimental for the flu situation. Although he may have had the 
authority to keep visitors from coming to Cleveland, Rockwood still had to answer to 
the mayor, the mayor's War Advisory Board, the Chamber of Commerce, and more. If 
these groups had decided that the Expo was essential for the war effort, it is very 
unlikely that the health commissioner would have managed to delay the event. In the 
end, Dr. Rockwood got his will. The sources do not state how or why he was successful 
in postponing the Expo. Still, the example shows that in some cases, flu restrictions were 
even applied to war effort matters.
603
 The postponement of the Expo was not alone in 
this. For example, the Great War was placed under Flu War limitations when the draft 
was halted in Cuyahoga County for a month and a half for the sake of preventing further 
spread of the disease. This order did  not come from Dr. Rockwood, but arrived instead 
from Ohio's selective service.
604
 Importantly, the draft was halted for the sake of limiting 
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the damage to the war effort. It is possible that the War Expo was postponed for similar 
reasons.  
     In the end, the war on Germans and the war on germs were intricately linked. One 
dominated over the other, as the germ war was fought largely for the sake of helping the 
German war. Dr. Rockwood managed to use the Great War context as a way to fight the 
Flu War. He did this by embracing the patriotic power and propaganda of the Great War 
in order to raise and strengthen city-wide support for the public health fight. This was 
not the only way the Great War helped Cleveland combat the Spanish Influenza 
epidemic. Crucially, the world war refashioned American and Cleveland society into a 
highly mobilized and organized machine that functioned on patriotism, loyalty, 
cooperation, and sacrifice. Many people, groups and organizations made up this 
tremendous war-time machine. However, in regards to the Spanish Flu crisis, none 
proved more important than the Red Cross. 
 
The Red Cross Goes to War on Spanish Flu 
In war time - next to our American army and navy - there is no other institution 
so important, so necessary, so useful. In peace time it helped the workers when 
disaster came, notably in the mining regions, where it quickly furnished nurses, 
doctors, food, clothing and shelter, and th[e]n saw to it that the widows and 
orphans were properly and permanently care for. It is... a patriotic duty to be of 
assistance to this most altruistic organi[z]ation[.]
605
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      In his book on how war and warfare has influenced the development of the Red 
Cross, John F. Hutchinson states that during World War I, "[t]he logical conclusion of 
the militarization of charity was that working for the national Red Cross society became 
both an outlet for, and a measure of, a citizen's patriotic enthusiasm."
606
 This was 
certainly the case in Cleveland. As early as February, 1917, the Plain Dealer reported 
that "Patriotism Booms Applications for Membership in Local [Red Cross] Chapter."
607
 
By October of the same year, more than 100,000 volunteers had enrolled in the local 
chapter. That same fall, Mr. J.A. Hawken and others formed the local Junior Red Cross 
program. The program was designed to mobilize the city's school children for the war 
effort. By the time the war ended, 125,000 pupils were enrolled in the organization.
608
 
An article in the National Association of Retail Druggists' journal highlights the 
connection between patriotism and Red Cross involvement even further. When 
proclaiming that Cleveland was "The First City in American Spirit", the author based the 
claim on two things: the city's oversubscription in Liberty Loan campaigns, and the 
number of donations and enlistments in the Red Cross.
609
 This included men, women, 
and children. By the end of 1918, reports from the local chapter suggested that more 
than 460,000 Clevelanders were enrolled in the Red Cross.  The chairman of the roll call 
committee, Mr. George B. Harris attributed much of the success to "the patriotism of 
Cleveland's industrial workers." That was certainly part of the explanation. Several firms 
and companies in the area, such as Cleveland National Bank, Halle Bros., Westinghouse 
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Electric, and many more, boasted of the fact that one hundred percent of their workers 
were members of the Red Cross.
610
 The patriotic nature of the Red Cross was not limited 
to Cleveland though. By January 2nd, 1918, an incredible one fifth of the American 
populace was already enrolled in the organization. This huge achievement was 
commented on by Henry P. Davidson, chairman of the national war council, who stated 
that "[t]he Red Cross is not merely a humanitarian organization separate and distinct 
from others - it is the mobilized heart and spirit of the whole American people."
611
 This 
point was driven home in horrifying fashion in Richmond, California, where a mob of 
fifty white robed men abducted German immigrant Guido Poenisch and charged him 
with disloyalty for failing to purchase Liberty Loan bonds. The abductors became judge, 
jury, and executioner, and punished Mr. Poenisch with tar and feathering. They only let 
him go after he promised to purchase a hundred dollars worth of bonds and join the Red 
Cross.
612
  
     Far from all patriotism or Red Cross involvement was coerced. Just like the war 
effort in general, the Red Cross proved a great place where different groups and different 
people could volunteer their time, resources, and services for a common cause. For 
instance, the Red Cross cooperated closely with Cleveland's Church Women's War 
Committee, which consisted of women from three hundred of the city's  protestant, 
catholic and Jewish congregations, and was organized in an effort to "unify and 
systemize" these congregations' war programs.
613
 The Red Cross also cooperated with 
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various local hospitals, the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Military, the 
Associated Charities, the city schools, the city and state health departments, and many 
more, expanding into virtually every group and section of the city.
614
  
     The Red Cross provided a great link between the Great War and the war on Spanish 
Influenza. Prior to the arrival of the "grippe", Red Cross nurses were often referred to as 
"war nurses", and typically served in war related positions. In fact, at the end of the war, 
around 20,000 Red Cross war nurses were serving somewhere away from home.
615
 In 
short, the Red Cross was first and foremost playing the patriotic role of providing 
humanitarian and medical aid to the U.S. military and its allies. Once Spanish Flu 
arrived though, it quickly became evident that no other organization was better 
organized and equipped to help in the situation. After all, the Red Cross was already 
cooperating closely with large parts of U.S. and Cleveland society because of the war 
effort. Furthermore, they were well organized, well funded, and the public had become 
familiar with the Red Cross through school programs and the years-long struggle against 
tuberculosis. In public health terms, the Red Cross was a godsend. Dedicated to 
providing aid in disasters and fighting diseases, and fueled by a monumental wave of 
patriotism and voluntarism, the organizations became an invaluable ally in the fight 
against Spanish Influenza. 
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     When Dr. Rockwood and various health workers summed up the most important 
helpers in the Spanish Flu crisis, they invariably listed the Red Cross.
616
 There were 
many reasons for this. First of all, the Red Cross was ready and willing to fight. For 
example, from the very beginning of the flu epidemic in Cleveland "[e]very available 
city and state health official and nurse of the lake division of the Red Cross combined 
forces to battle the Spanish Influenza epidemic in the city."
617
 This readiness for anti-flu 
service was exemplified by nurses who volunteered to fight flu in Camp Sherman, and 
also by nurses who fought flu in Cleveland.
618
 Crucially, nurses were among the most 
desperately needed helpers both in the Great War and in the Flu War, and the Red Cross 
played an essential role in training, locating, and organizing them.
619
 Although the 
nursing part of their involvement was extremely important, the Red Cross contributed to 
the flu fight in many other fundamental ways as well. The organization disseminated 
education publications, cooperated with government specialists to find solutions to the 
flu crisis, helped coordinate Cleveland's flu response with state and national efforts, 
donated funds for hospital beds, purchased ambulances and gave these to the police for 
transporting the sick, paid wages for volunteers, made flu masks, cooperated with 
various charitable organizations, organized and manned food centers, helped with the 
flu-orphan crisis, supported charity patients financially, and helped contact, organize and 
coordinate the city's nurses. The Red Cross also provided help and volunteers to the 
city's health department, the Visiting Nurse Association, babies' dispensary 
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organizations, hospitals, doctors, and many more.
620
 The organization even appointed 
health commissioner Rockwood chairman of the Red Cross Influenza Committee for 
Cuyahoga County, "empower[ing] him to provide hospital facilities wherever they are 
needed in the county", and gave him $20,000 to use in the fight.
621
 In the process, they 
also gave Dr. Rockwood a greater ability to organize and coordinate the city's response. 
In short, the Red Cross was one of Cleveland's most important soldiers in the war 
against Spanish Flu. Thanks to war time mobilization and patriotism, the organization 
was able to not only provide invaluable aid and services, but also helped bridge the gap 
between the Great War and a public health war. 
 
Conclusion 
     The Great War deeply affected Cleveland's response to the Spanish Flu epidemic. 
1918 U.S. society was largely defined by the war effort, and practically every aspect of 
life was seen and judged in this context. During a time of incredible social and economic 
mobilization, the U.S. government also embarked upon an equally extraordinary 
mobilization of people's minds and emotions. Seeking to establish an American 
population that was unified in purpose, belief, and dedication, President Wilson released 
an official propaganda campaign that succeeded in raising patriotic sentiments to 
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incredible heights. Patriotism ran so wild, wide, and deep that it became a mark of 
proper American conviction and behavior. In this context, cooperation, voluntarism, 
sacrifice, obedience, loyalty, Americanism, and patriotism were not only desired 
behavior but demanded behavior. Where the government failed to attain or enforce these 
ideals, pseudo-official groups like the A.P.L., and entirely unofficial mobs stepped in to 
teach their neighbors proper behavior. Certainly, in innumerable cases people were 
simply convinced, persuaded, or harassed into embracing the dominating war time 
mentalité and behavior. The people of Cleveland lived in a time that was dominated by 
the war effort and by war time priorities and sentiments. The Spanish Flu epidemic was 
simply another aspect that fell into the far more important world war context. This 
allowed the health commissioner and other leaders in the Flu War to tap into the 
wartime spirit, cooperation, organization, and mobilization, and use these factors to form 
the city's public health response. However, as the war on germs was always less 
important than the war on Germany, Dr. Rockwood had to tailor his measures and 
regulations accordingly. It was, for instance, quite impossible to shut down war related 
industries, or prevent Liberty Loan parades and events. Finally, the Red Cross serves as 
a wonderful example of how the war against Germans and the war against germs were 
intricately entwined. Straddling both wars, the organization was greatly bolstered by the 
Great War, and was able to use its great advancements in organization and mobilization 
to help in the fight against flu. In the end, the Spanish Flu epidemic in Cleveland must 
be seen as an event that took place during the first world war. Although wildly important 
in its own accord, the epidemic fades in comparison to its much more important, all-
encompassing historical context. If anything, the Spanish Influenza epidemic in 
197 
 
Cleveland, and the city's response to it, shows us the extent to which the Great War 
dominated life in the city and the nation in 1918.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE END OF THE WAR 
  How beautiful upon the mountains 
  Are the feet of the messenger of good tidings 
  That announceth peace, the harbinger of good tiding. 
  That announceth salvation; 
  That saith unto Zion: 
  "They God reigneth!" 
      Isaiah 52: 7
622
 
 
     The Great War ended on November 11, 1918. The Flu War ended in Cleveland on 
the same day. The Spanish Flu was still there, and the public health effort continued, but 
it was no longer a war. Instead, the flu fight began to follow a much less aggressive path. 
In fact, after Armistice Day, the health commissioner's actions became more reminiscent 
of traditional Cleveland responses to epidemic disease. The crisis was over, and crisis 
tactics were left behind. Quarantine signs were still placed on houses, but enforcement 
was more or less left up to the quarantined themselves. Few complied with the rules, 
even after being reminded of the meaning of the quarantine cards. In fact, observers later 
stated that official attempts at quarantines in the city were futile. Reports from 
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"[r]esponsible physicians and nurses" showed that "keeping of quarantine in Cleveland 
is so unusual that a family who does keep it is cause of much comment and no little 
surprise."
623
 Dr. Rockwood does not seem to have been concerned enough to attempt 
stricter enforcement. Nor did he attempt to prevent crowding around Thanksgiving, as 
"record crowds" filled the city's churches and restaurants, and hotels were packed "to 
capacity" to celebrate Thanksgiving dinner.
624
 Following the rules he established during 
the crisis part of the epidemic, the health commissioner did close a number of the city's 
schools for a very short while in December. The closings were based on surveys that 
showed that more than ten percent of the pupils were absent from these schools.
625
 The 
closing of a dozen schools for a short period of time was not a particularly drastic 
measure though, and Dr. Rockwood appears to have taken the whole situation in stride. 
Although the number of new influenza cases had increased a bit again, the health 
commissioner remained positive and relied largely on the disease "burn[ing] itself 
out."
626
 There were no more general flu bans, no more large closings. In the grand 
scheme of things, some schools taking a day or two off was not unlike typical bouts of 
epidemic diseases, and certainly not a crisis-like measure.  
     The Spanish Influenza epidemic remained in Cleveland until March, 1919. However, 
Dr. Rockwood declared the crisis stage to be over at the same time as the Great War 
ended. By November fifteenth, the doctor officially expressed his gratitude to the 
numerous groups and organizations "whose co-operation in combating the disease made 
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possible its practical elimination before its ravages were as great as in some other parts 
of the country."
627
 The crisis was over. Regular public health work, as seen during less 
dangerous, routine-like epidemics, could commence. Between November eleventh and 
March, 1919, most of the Spanish Influenza work in the city thus consisted of taking 
care of those who were hospitalized, providing for and finding homes for hundreds of 
flu orphans, continuing the mapping and charting of the disease, pontificating about why 
this bout of "grippe" had been so deadly, reflecting on the epidemic, and looking for 
signs of pneumonia or tuberculosis in people who had suffered from Spanish Flu.
628
  
     Cleveland's response to the epidemic varied markedly from a number of other places 
in Ohio. In Warren, for instance, the flu bans lasted for eight long weeks, and were only 
lifted after "one of the most heated arguments" and "hardest fought battles in the history 
of the city."
629
 In Chardon, the bans stayed in place even longer. Reaching the thirteen 
week mark around Christmas, Chardonites lamented that "Santa's visit to Chardon this 
year will be curtailed... all on account of the celebrated flu." For the first time in the 
city's history, churches were closed on Christmas, and pastors were forced to share their 
Yule-tide messages through the newspapers.
630
 Marion, Ohio, saw flu bans lifted and 
then forced back in place by state health officials.
631
 Residents were not pleased. Faced 
with new closing restrictions, a number of merchants and business owners openly defied 
the board of health's orders. In order to enforce the ban, Marion officials were forced to 
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send a number of policemen to record the names of the violators. The disobedient 
residents were subsequently taken to court for their defiance.
632
 Members of St. Ann's 
Catholic Church in Cleveland Heights were not excited about flu bans either. When the 
city re-implemented closings in December, the church took Mayor Cain and Cleveland 
Heights' chief health officer to court in an attempt to lift the ban. Judge Vickery was 
apparently sympathetic enough to their plight to allow the church special permission to 
be open for Christmas services. Even so, it was the judge's opinion that "health 
regulations and police powers are paramount in emergencies such as exist during the 
influenza epidemic." The ban was to stay in place for as long as the health officials and 
mayor deemed necessary.
 633
   
     Lorain, Ohio, and Erie, Pennsylvania provide two of the best examples of places that 
varied markedly from Cleveland in their Spanish Flu responses. First of all, referring to 
orders from the state board of health, officials in Erie decided to use the flu epidemic as 
an excuse to make the city dry. That is, by closing down all saloons, bottling houses and 
liquor stores, the only place to get alcohol in Erie after October 9th was by doctor's 
prescriptions.
634
 Furthermore, although the city lifted its flu bans around the same time 
as Cleveland, Erie soon found itself in the unenviable position of being ordered by state 
officials to re-implement the restrictions. This was too much for the city's saloon 
keepers, who went to the county courts and obtained an injunction against the closing 
orders. The Plain Dealer reported that "[t]he Spanish Influenza quarantine will not be 
placed  upon Erie again unless the state finds some manner of overriding the county 
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courts." State officials were not amused and wired Erie's mayor and health board, 
ordering them once again to enforce the bans.
635
 The city balked. A week later, the bans 
were still not in place. In the end, it took a meeting between county and city officials, 
local manufacturers and businessmen, the local chapter of the Council of National 
Defense, and numerous other citizens to find a solution, which was to leave the matter in 
the hands of the local health officials.
636
 The local health officials and the mayor decided 
to side with the city's commercial and economic factors. Rejecting a "united demand" 
from local churches to make the city dry again, the mayor declared that he and the health 
officials found no reason to implement general quarantines, and, even more damning, 
stated that they could not find any evidence to support that general closings even helped 
prevent the spread of flu. In the midst of conflict and controversy, Erie, Pennsylvania 
kept the flu lid off.  
     Lorain, Ohio differed widely from Cleveland in two particular ways. In Cleveland, 
the Spanish Flu fight was led by their own health commissioner. In Lorain, the fight was 
led by an outsider; Dr. Henry E. Koch of the United States Health Department. Arriving 
on October 22nd, Dr. Koch, although working closely with the local health department, 
still had the final say in Lorain's flu time actions.
637
 Although many of the measures 
were similar to Cleveland's, such as closing stores, prohibiting public assemblies, 
working with the Red Cross, and establishing emergency hospitals, one of the measures 
was very different. One of the medical field's great quests throughout the epidemic was 
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to find a working vaccine or serum to help combat the scourge.
638
 Cleveland's acting 
chief bacteriologist, Dr. G. E. Harmon was one of many who actively sought an 
effective serum for curing the "grippe". However, in Cleveland, Dr. Rockwood clearly 
stated that no flu serums would be used "until their worth have been proven."
639
 Dr. 
Koch was not as cautious. On October 26th, some six thousand steel workers at the 
National Tube Company in Lorain were inoculated with an influenza antitoxin.
640
 On 
October 28, encouraged by the low flu rates among the vaccinated steel workers, the 
doctor opened a free public inoculation center that offered the same serum that was 
being used at Camp Sherman to prevent pneumonia.
641
 On November 1, Koch and 
Lorain health officials began the process of vaccinating every single Lorain resident at 
the rate of 3,000 per day.
642
 Inoculations remained a primary tactic in Lorain even after 
the flu bans were lifted on November 18.
643
 Although some private institutions in 
Cleveland, such as St. Luke's hospital, decided to vaccinate their workers, inoculations 
and vaccinations never became a primary weapon against flu in Cleveland.
644
           
     The various examples of other responses to the flu epidemic highlights the fact that 
Cleveland's response to the scourge was greatly influenced by a number of factors. The 
long tradition of public health work in the city, and the increased organization and 
professionalization of the health department, enabled Dr. Rockwood to launch a broad 
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and organized attack against the disease. American cultural values and progressive 
ideals played a big role in placing education, voluntarism and cooperation in the 
forefront of the response. Cleveland's great traditions of private charitable organizations, 
cooperation and coordination among hospitals and  public health nurses, the active 
involvement of various government departments and the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce in public health matters, and the experience of broad societal  cooperation 
during previous bouts of communicable disease, meant that the city was not new to 
epidemic crises. In fact, when Spanish Influenza struck the city, Cleveland already had a 
series of well established responses to react with, not least a tradition of broad and 
profound cooperation. Education was seen as paramount in the fight, as it was in any 
and every public health matter. Voluntarism and cooperation were likewise seen as 
cornerstones in the city's response, whether these were obtained through education, 
persuasion, or force. However, coercion and force were seen as last resorts, only to be 
used when the situation made cooperation an absolute necessity. The city also had a 
tradition of distrusting vaccines. This most likely explains why Dr. Rockwood chose a 
very different approach to inoculations than Dr. Koch did.  
     In responding to the epidemic, Dr. Rockwood also had to consider the various 
interests, needs and desires of the city. Business owners clearly did not want to lose 
money by closing their stores. People would certainly like to be able to go to church. 
Campaigning politicians would obviously prefer to be able to hold mass meetings. In 
order to implement various regulations, Dr. Rockwood therefore had to identify what 
were essential parts of life and what were not. These conclusions had to be legitimate 
and acceptable to both the public and to other city leaders.  If they were not, Dr. 
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Rockwood could not count on their cooperation. The health commissioner also had to 
explain to people why they should adhere to his recommendations and orders. The 
doctor decided to rely heavily on educating the public in an attempt to convince them of 
the need to accept his "prescriptions", no matter how undesirable they might be. He also 
depended heavily on appealing to people's sense of civic duty and patriotism. Civic duty 
was a firmly established tradition in the city, and it was only magnified by the arrival of 
the Great War.  The Great War provided an extraordinary context for the fight 
against Spanish Flu. By organizing and mobilizing the nation, and the city of Cleveland, 
for war effort, the world war created a situation where Dr. Rockwood could lean extra 
heavily on the civic duty element in the flu fight. Framing the war on germs as part of 
the war on Germans, the health commissioner made the city's response to the epidemic 
part of the overall war effort. This allowed him to demand the same kind of patriotic 
zeal, or at least the same kind of loyalty and cooperation, that existed in other great 
social endeavors such as the Liberty Loan campaigns. It also allowed him to recruit the 
help of various groups in the city that were engaged in the war effort, such as the 
mayor's War Advisory Board, and the Chamber of Commerce. The Great War also 
provided great extra help to the flu effort by increasing the size, resources, and power of 
the Red Cross. Saturated with patriotic purpose and voluntarism, the organization 
provided invaluable help to Cleveland in the fight against Spanish Influenza.  
     The war effort placed some restrictions on Dr. Rockwood's flu fight as well. Clearly 
the most important element of life in 1918 America, the Great War effort could not be 
markedly restricted by the Flu War. Instead, the effort against "grippe" existed largely 
for the sake of preventing negative effects on the greater war effort. The health 
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commissioner could therefore not implement closings of various industries and 
businesses, even if he had been able to do so over economic considerations. In the same 
fashion, he could not very well prohibit war related parades and celebrations, even if 
these events caused tremendous crowding - the very thing Dr. Rockwood sought to 
avoid with his other flu closings.  
     It is unclear whether Cleveland's efforts against the Spanish Influenza epidemic made 
much difference in terms of preventing people from getting sick or dying from the 
disease. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to determine the value, virtue or 
effectiveness of the city's response. Instead, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the 
many reasons why cities and people believe certain things, or behave in certain ways, at 
certain times. Effective or not, Cleveland's response to the 1918-19 Spanish Flu 
epidemic was shaped by the city's past, by its American and progressive ideals, and by 
the unique historical context that made sure that Spanish Flu arrived on the shores of 
Lake Erie in the midst of one of the most astounding, unusual, and extraordinary 
moments of U.S. history.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 The following list shows various examples of cooperation in Cleveland during 
the 1918-19 Spanish Flu epidemic. It lists some of the persons, groups, associations, etc. 
that cooperated in the flu fight, and the newspaper editions where instances of 
cooperation were reported. It is important to note that the list is not comprehensive. For 
example, Dr. Rockwood is not listed, as he was obviously involved in the public health 
response. Furthermore, I have not listed every single time that the various people or 
groups were mentioned in the newspapers, as this would make the list far too large. 
Also, as mentioned earlier, the newspapers did not record every case of cooperation, nor 
every person, organization, or groups that offered their help and services to fight 
Spanish flu.  Therefore, rather than an all-encompassing list, the following is simply a 
quick overview and indication of the rich variety of Clevelanders who cooperated and 
partook in the public health response during the Spanish Influenza crisis. In addition, 
some categories can conceivably be seen as overlapping, such as "women" and 
"women's committee". I chose to include such variations in order to show that people 
volunteered their services in various ways. Some served within organizations and were 
recognized as such, whereas others simply volunteered as individuals.  
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Cooperation in Cleveland: 
 
 
Person/Association/Etc Cleveland Press 
Plain 
Dealer Cleveland News 
        
Acting Mayor W.S. 
FitzGerald   Oct 10.    
Advertisements Oct 12.      
Advisory Board Oct 15. Oct 9.    
Advisory Committee - 
the Health Board Oct 7, 8.     
The American Protective 
League Oct 25. Oct 25.   
The Associated Charities Oct 22, Nov 8.     
The Associated Draft     Oct 7, 12. 
Baby Dispensary and 
Hospital Oct 25.    Oct 30. 
Barbers Oct 18.   Oct 19. 
The Boy Scouts Oct 8.     
Case School Oct 12.      
Catholic Church, Bishop 
Farrelly Oct 16. Oct 16. Oct 19. 
Catholic Institutions Oct 24, Nov 6. 
Oct 25, 
27.   
Cemeteries Oct 24, 25, 29.     
The Chamber of 
Commerce Oct 12.    Oct 10, 14. 
City Bacteriologist Oct 17.     
City Hospital     Oct 5, 30. 
City Officials Oct 15.   Oct 5. 
City Marketmaster 
Samman Oct 29.     
City Nurses Oct 15. Oct 14.   
City Physicians Oct 15.     
City War Board Oct 10, 16.     
City Welfare Board Oct 21.     
Cleveland Academy of 
Medicine Oct 31, Nov 1.     
Cleveland City Council Oct 29, Nov 11.     
Cleveland's Field 
Nursing Bureau Oct 17.     
Cleveland Hospitals 
Superintendents Oct 15.     
Cleveland Railway Co.     Oct 6. 
The Cleveland Press Oct 5, 7, 23, 24.     
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Clubs - Union Club, 
Women's clubs, etc   
Oct 14, 
18, 27.   
Community Houses     Nov 7. 
ConCon/Streetcar 
Companies Oct 5, 16, 17, 26, 29.  
Oct 9, 10, 
16. Oct 26. 
Council Educational 
Alliance Oct 28.     
Councilman Sulzmann Oct 12.      
County Prosecutor 
Doerfler     Nov 1. 
County Representative 
of Red Cross Oct 17.     
The Cuyahoga County 
Fuel Admin. Oct 9, 11.     
The Cuyahoga County 
School Board     Oct 12. 
Day Nurseries Oct 21, 22, 28. 
Oct 21, 
27. Oct 28.  
Day Nursery Association Oct 21.     
Day Nurseries and 
Kindergarten Assoc. Oct 22. Oct 21.   
Dentists Oct 18.     
Director of Hygiene, 
Mrs. Rena C. Goss     Oct 8. 
Doctors Oct 18, 26, 31. Oct 6. Oct 31. 
"The Drys", The Dry 
Committee Oct 12.    Oct 15.  
Elevator Operators     Oct 16. 
Employers   Oct 6.   
"Every Citizen"  
Oct 5, 9, 18, 19, 26, Nov 4, 
8. 
Oct 9, 14, 
15, 20. Oct 25, Nov 7. 
"Every known agency" Oct 4.     
Federal Railroad Admin. 
McAdoo   Oct 9.    
Federated Churches Oct 12, 29. Nov 2. Oct 12. 
Fire Department/Fire 
Fighters Oct 28.     
Government Specialists Oct 10.     
High School Girls Oct 18.     
Hospitals Oct 19. 
Oct 14, 
16, 21, 30. 
Oct 5, 7, 18, 31, 
Nov 7. 
The Humane Society     Nov 7, 19. 
Illuminating Company Oct 23.     
Indiana State Health 
Officials     Oct 22. 
Individuals   Oct 11.   
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Jewish Welfare Board Oct 9.     
Kentucky State Health 
Officials     Oct 22. 
Law Director Fitzgerald Oct 14.   Oct 22. 
The Lend-A-Hand-
Mission (day nursery) Oct 22. Oct 21.   
Local Businesses/ 
Business Owners etc     Oct 25, 28. 
Local/State/National 
cooperation   Oct 21.   
Manufacturers/Industry Oct 14, 15, 24, Nov 6.   Oct 9. 
Mayor Davis Oct 11. 
Oct 14, 
16. Oct 22. 
The Mayor's War 
Advisory Board Oct 26. Oct 6, 16. Oct 16. 
Medical Forces Oct 19. Sept 27.   
Men Oct 23.     
Michigan State Board of 
Health Oct 26, 28.     
Mothers Oct 9, 10.   Oct 15. 
Municipal Judge(s) and 
Courts Oct 11, 16, 19, 23, 24.   Oct 7, 8, 15, 21. 
The National Fuel 
Administration Oct 11.     
Neighborhood 
Centers/Food Centers     Oct 28.  
Newspapers Oct 31, Nov 2. Oct 9, 16. Nov 1. 
Nurses Oct 9, 15, 17, 25, 26, 28. Sept 27.   
Office Workers     Oct 16. 
Ohio - local health 
officials/depts. Oct 10, 22, 31. Oct 11. Oct 5. 
Ohio State Health Board 
Oct 11, 12, 14, 30, 31, Nov 
23. 
Sept 27, 
Oct 4, 11, 
16. Oct 22, 30. 
Orphanages/Orphan 
Care Nov 21.     
Parents   Oct 11.   
The Patriotic League of 
Ohio Oct 31.     
Police, Sanitary 
Policemen 
Oct 15, 19, 25, 28, 29, 31, 
Nov 2. 
Oct 6, 11, 
14, 21. 
Oct 5, 15, 19, 22, 
25, 26, 28, 31, Nov. 
1. 
Poolrooms, bowling 
alleys, cabarets Oct 15.     
Popular/General 
Obedience   
Sept 25, 
Oct 27. Oct 25, Nov 9. 
221 
 
Private Initiatives Oct 25.     
Protestant 
Churches/Pastors/Clergy  Oct 12, 31, Nov 6. 
Oct 9, 14, 
25, 27. Oct 31. 
Publicity Committee Oct 31.     
Red Cross 
Oct 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 
25, 26, 28, 29, Nov. 2, 6, 9, 
23. 
Oct 4, 6, 
22, 27, 30. 
Oct 2, 5, 10, 11, 18, 
19, 21, 22, 28. 
Retail Merchants' Board Oct 26.     
School Children   Oct 15.   
School Medical 
Supervisor Dr. Childs Oct 8, 14, 15, 17.   
Oct 10, 14, 16, Nov 
7. 
School Doctors and 
Nurses   
Oct 15, 
16. Oct 16,  
School Officials/School 
Board 
Oct 10, 12, 14, 15, 26, Nov 
5, 15. 
Oct 6, 14, 
16, 21. 
Oct 14, Nov 7, Nov 
12. 
Schools - Public, 
Parochial and Private Oct 15.   Oct 5, 7, 15, 28. 
School Teachers 
Oct 7, 8, 16, 17, 18, 26, Nov 
9, 15. Oct 6, 16. 
Oct 5, 7, 15, 16, 21, 
Nov 7. 
Settlement Houses Oct 24, 28. Oct 27. Oct 28.  
State Food 
Administrators Oct 29.   Oct 30. 
Street Cars, Conductors, 
Motormen Oct 10. Oct 6. Oct 5, 7, 8, 16. 
Suburb Health Officials Oct 8, 14, 25. 
Oct 9, 10, 
14, 21. Oct 8, 12. 
Telephone Companies   Oct 31.   
Undertakers Oct 24.     
The United States Public 
Health Service Oct 10, 12, 16, 31, Nov 1, 2. 
Sept 22, 
27, Oct 
21, 31.  
Oct 4, 9, 12, 16, 31, 
Nov 1. 
U.S. Employment 
Service Oct 23.     
Visiting Nurses   Oct 6.   
Volunteers, Private 
Citizens, etc. Oct 24, Nov 1. Oct 9, 31. 
Oct 19, Oct 25, Nov 
7. 
War Department Oct 28, Nov 2.     
The War Exposition Nov 1.     
The Waterworks 
Department Oct 24, 26, 29.     
Welfare Association of 
Cleveland Oct 22.     
Welfare Director 
Berman Oct 4, 25.  Oct 10.  Oct 5.  
Western Reserve 
Medical Students   Nov 15.    
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The West Side Cottage     Oct 28.  
Women Oct 23.   Oct 11, 16.  
Women's Committee Oct 24, 31.      
Women's Hospital War 
Relief Assoc.   Oct 6.   
The Y.M.C.A.    Oct 9.  Oct 15.  
 
 
